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The consequences of introduction of multi-annual, multi-species and effort 
measures in fisheries management are evaluated. Methodology is developed and 
applied to three specific cases. The evaluation is based on biological, economic and 
institutional considerations. 
The methodology follows a matrix approach. Economic, biological and institu-
tional criteria are formulated. Subsequently, definitions are developed of multi-
species, multi-annual and effort measures. First, these definitions are evaluated in 
general terms in the light of the specified criteria. The case studies define the man-
agement problem in terms of the criteria and determine to what extent the new 
measures may contribute to its solution. 
Some measures offer a little more flexibility to the fleet without causing serious 
threat to the biological base of the fishery. Particularly, limited transfer of TACs 
from one year to the next one (multi-annual) or from one species to another 
(multi-species). Effort measures appear most promising in mixed fisheries. Major 
problems overcapacity and race for fish are not resolved by the introduction of 
new measures. These can only be resolved by privatizing the common property re-
source and setting up appropriate institutional arrangements. 
The results of this study are potentially useful in various respects. First, the de-
veloped methodology can be applied to the assessment of other fisheries manage-
ment measures. Second, the discussion of new measures contributes to further 
development of the CFP. Thirdly, the analysis of major EU fisheries (beam trawling 
in the North Sea, roundfish trawling in the North Sea and mixed bottom trawling 
in the Celtic Sea) provides insights into the problems and possibilities of their man-
agement. 
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SUMMARY FOR NON-SPECIALISTS 
Management of fish resources within the Exclusive Economic Zone of the 
European Union in the North Sea and in the Atlantic areas takes place within 
the legal framework of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). After the review of 
the CFP in 1991 a new basic regulation has come into force (EC Reg. 3760/92) 
and will be applicable until 2002. The objective of the CFP is formulated as: 
'to provide for rational and responsible exploitation of living aquatic 
resources and of aquaculture, while recognizing the interest of the fisher-
ies in its long term development and its economic and social conditions 
and the interest of the consumers taking into account the biological con-
straints with due respect to the marine ecosystem.' 
To achieve this objective the CFP may introduce specific measures in five 
areas: 
TACs and quota; 
technical measures; 
structural policy; 
market policy; 
access to third countries' waters. 
EC Reg. 3760/92 mentions specifically the possibility of introducing multi-
annual and/or multi-species measures for specific (groups of) fisheries. Further 
details of such new measures have been elaborated in a proposal of the Com-
mission to the Council. 
The present study is directly related to the multi-species and multi-annual 
measures. Its objective is: 
'bio-economic evaluation of the consequences of the introduction of 
multi-annual and multi-species measures, consisting of the formulation 
of an appropriate methodology and its application to three specific cases. 
The study intends to include in the evaluation biological, economic and 
institutional considerations relevant to the future implementation of 
these measures.' 
The research team was composed of a relatively large number of individu-
als - economists, biologists and industry representatives - who all have a proven 
experience with fisheries matters. The aim was to produce a profound appreci-
ation of the multi-disciplinary complexity of the questions raised and as far as 
possible a consensus on the consequences of the various measures. 
The research project was carried out in two main phases. In the first phase 
an appropriate multi-disciplinary methodology was formulated. Measures were 
specified and a method for their evaluation was developed. In the second 
11 
phase, the definitions and methodology were applied to three major EU fisher-
ies: North Sea flatfish, North Sea roundfish and a mixed fishery in the Celtic 
Sea. 
Multi-disciplinary methodology 
The methodology for evaluation of the measures is explicitly based on the 
need for a multi-disciplinary approach. Therefore economic, biological and 
institutional considerations are included. Furthermore attention is given to the 
relation between these points of view. 
The economic perspective is defined as the viewpoint of the firm. It is the 
fishing vessels and companies which pursue their objectives and interpret the 
management policy in that light. The economic criteria regard therefore: 1. 
short term flexibility to choose fishing grounds and/or target species.; 2. long 
term decisions regarding investment; 3. consistency with the market forces; 4. 
consistency with the daily practice of fishing; 5. influence on the race for fish; 
and 6. economic performance or profitability. 
The biological evaluation regards the measures from the perspective of 
stock preservation, not only for its economic potential but also for its intrinsic 
value. The specific criteria regard: 1. spawning stock; 2. fishing mortality; 3. 
high-grading; 4. discarding of non-commercial species or those of which the 
quota has been exhausted; and 5. effects on ecosystem. 
A number of different institutions are involved in fisheries matters -
government at local, national and EU level, industry organizations and local 
communities. These institutions have regularly diverging or even contradictory 
interests. Therefore inconsistencies may occur even within the institutional 
assessment. 
The institutional criteria used are: 1. political acceptance; 2. sectoral ac-
ceptance; 3. maintenance of relative stability; 4. feasibility of enforcement; 5. 
subsidiarity; 6. role of local communities; and 7. potential for CFP beyond 2002. 
Finally, the relations between the three perspectives are assessed in terms 
of: 1. mutual consistency; 2. transparency of the measures; and 3. potential new 
problems. Attention is also given to the conditions which are required for the 
successful implementation of a certain measure. 
Definitions of measures 
The feasibility of various specific definitions of multi-species, multi-annual 
and effort measures is explored. The definitions range between high degree 
of flexibility, for instance unlimited exchange (of TACs or effort allocations) 
between years or species and 'absolute stability' (fixing constant TAC or effort 
allocation for a period of several years). The potentially most interesting op-
tions are those which provide a limited possibility for adjustment. 
The general evaluation shows that it is rather difficult to develop defini-
tions which would not lead to inconsistencies, particularly between the short 
term interests of the fishing enterprises on one hand and the long term preser-
vation of the fish stocks. Certain existing problems, for instance race for fish, 
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will not be resolved by the proposed measures. In some respects the available 
knowledge is largely insufficient for a reliable scientific assessment - forecasting 
of future recruitment is impossible, inter-species relations are not well known 
and implications on the eco-system are difficult to assess. Various institutional 
or political considerations depend on specific conditions of the moment, for 
instance pressure by special interest groups. 
North Sea bottom trawling for roundfish 
The case discusses fishing on cod, haddock and whiting by eight European 
countries. The fishery is heavily regulated, with TACs being the main policy 
instrument. Despite this all three stocks are heavily exploited and the fishery 
is very dependent upon juvenile year classes. There is particular concern that 
North Sea cod could be on the verge of collapse. Attempts to conserve stocks 
by implementing restrictive TACs simply exacerbates the problem of illegal 
landings and wasteful discarding. 
The management problem lies in the excessive fishing mortality caused 
by a structural overcapacity of the fleets. In other words, the economic instinct 
of the vessels to survive in the short run puts the long run maintenance of the 
stocks in peril. 
Multi-annual and multi-species measures, if defined in terms of quantities 
of fish, are not considered very promising in this context. Prediction of stock 
abundance more than two years ahead is difficult. Multi-species measures com-
plicate even further the protection of individual stocks. Neither of these two 
types of measures addresses the major problem of overexploitation and overca-
pacity. 
Effort measures have been interpreted as 'days-at sea' limitations. These 
measures may be more attractive as they do affect the inputs and may be also 
administratively more simple to implement. Among the drawbacks, however, 
are the poor links between effort and mortality and the general problem of 
operational effort definition. In the medium and long run it is expected that 
input substitution will offset the positive effects realized in the short run. 
None of the measures under review consider long run economic solutions 
to the problem of overexploitation of roundfish stocks. The case study con-
cludes that to eradicate overfishing, it is necessary to change the cost function 
that the vessel is confronted with to include the full social costs of fishing. This 
suggests instituting some form of charging mechanism involving fishermen 
paying for their fishing rights. 
Wort/7 Sea beam trawling for flatfish 
The case discusses the exploitation of sole and plaice, mainly by the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom and Belgium. This fishery is mainly regulated by 
annual TACs, which are supported by various accompanying measures. In the 
past few years the stocks of plaice have deteriorated. The sole stock is tempo-
rarily in good shape due to a few strong year classes, but it is under high fish-
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ing pressure. Therefore the MAGPIII imposes a reduction of 15% on the beam 
trawl fleet. 
The general management problem is that the stocks have still allowed 
operators to attain reasonable economic results. The existing technical overca-
pacity has not yet become economically visible. However, if the sole stocks de-
teriorate as well, very serious economic problems can be foreseen. 
Multi-annual and multi-species measures are only considered realistic and 
feasible under well specified restrictions. Unlimited transfer of catching possi-
bilities from one species to another or one year to the next would be detrimen-
tal for the state of the stocks. Limited transfer would increase somewhat the 
needed flexibility of the fishing enterprises. 
Management by effort is already applied in this fishery, as the Nether-
lands operates a days-at-sea system. Setting a more or less constant effort for 
a period of several years will meet political opposition in the Netherlands. An 
acceptable method must be found to translate quota and ITQs into individual 
effort allocations so that the fishing companies do not loose the heavy invest-
ments made over the past years. Management by effort will require solid moni-
toring of its efficiency to take into account technological progress. 
Breton fisheries in the Celtic Sea 
The fisheries of the Celtic Sea (ICES area VII) are characterised by a large 
diversity in terms of métiers, target species, gears, seasons, etc. Commercially 
successful exploitation of fishing vessels is only feasible wi th a significant de-
gree of flexibility - allowing a choice of where, when and what to fish. 
Compared to the other two case studies, the dependence of the fleets 
operating in area VII on quota species is lower. Furthermore, the quota remain 
often underexploited. The management problem lies primarily in an overall 
high level of exploitation, leading to low catches per unit of fishing effort. The 
low catches are a threat to profitable fishing in the long run. 
Consequently multi-species and multi-annual measures specified in terms 
of quantities of fish which may be caught are of little relevance. First, the fleet 
does not face problems in these terms. Second, implementation of such mea-
sures would be extremely difficult and would face serious opposition from the 
industry because they would not be well adapted to the nature of the fishing 
activities. 
Overall management of fishing effort seems to be the most promising 
alternative. Flexibility could be maintained while at the same time the level of 
fishing effort (and fishing mortality) could be reduced. Selective fishing meth-
ods could be promoted. The new system would, however, put in question the 
principle of relative stability. Some resentment from the industry could be ex-
pected, as its activities would be more restricted and private property rights 
may have to be introduced. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Management of fish resources within the Exclusive Economic Zone of the 
European Union in the North Sea and in the Atlantic areas takes place within 
the legal framework of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). After the review of 
the CFP in 1991 a new basic regulation has come to force (EC Reg. 3760/92) and 
will be applicable until 2002. The objective of the CFP is formulated as: 
'to provide for rational and responsible exploitation of living aquatic 
resources and of aquaculture, while recognizing the interest of the fisher-
ies in its long term development and its economic and social conditions 
and the interest of the consumers taking into account the biological con-
straints wi th due respect to the marine ecosystem.' 
To achieve this objective the CFP may introduce specific measures in five 
areas: 
TACs and quota; 
technical measures; 
structural policy; 
market policy; 
access to third countries' waters. 
EC Reg. 3760/92 mentions specifically the possibility of introducing of 
multi-annual and/or multi-species measures for specific (groups of) fisheries. 
Further details of such new measures have been elaborated in a proposal of 
the Commission to the Council 1). 
The present study is directly related to the multi-species and multi-annual 
measures. Its objective is: 
'bio-economic evaluation of the consequences of the introduction of 
multi-annual and multi-species measures, consisting of the formulation 
of an appropriate methodology and its application to three specific cases. 
The study intends to include in the evaluation biological, economic and 
institutional considerations relevant to the future implementation of 
these measures. ' 
1) Proposal for a Council regulation (EC) fixing management objectives and strate-
gies for certain fisheries or groups of fisheries for the period 1994 to 1997, 
COM(93)663 final, EC Off. J. 94/C 17/06; and Communication de la Commission 
au Conseil at au Parlement Europeen, La mise en oeuvre des nouveaux elements 
de la PCP, COM(93)664 final of 15.12.1994. 
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Figure 1.7 Overall structure of the project 
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The research team was composed of a relatively large number of individu-
als - economists, biologists and industry representatives - who all have a proven 
experience with fisheries matters. The aim was to produce a profound appreci-
ation of the multi-disciplinary complexity of the questions raised and as far as 
possible a consensus on the consequences of the various measures. 
The research project was carried out in two main phases. In the first phase 
an appropriate multi-disciplinary methodology was formulated. Management 
measures were specified and a method for their evaluation was developed. In 
the second phase, the methodology was applied to three major EU fisheries: 
North Sea flatfish, North Sea roundfish and a mixed fishery in the Celtic Sea. 
The structure of the project is presented in figure 1.1 on the previous page. 
The report is composed in parallel manner of four main parts: elaboration 
of the methodology and three case studies. 
Methodology 
The first part, which deals with the development of the methodology is 
composed of four chapters. 
The first chapter is a brief evaluation of the past experiences with the 
CFP. It puts these experiences in the context of the current situation in the fish-
eries in the EU. The chapter demonstrates the need for explicit criteria in order 
to allow for a comprehensive assessment of any future situation. Twenty-one 
evaluation criteria are formulated to be used in the subsequent chapters. Fi-
nally, the characteristics of the basic situation are reviewed, i.e. the situation 
which is taken as a starting point and to which comparisons are made. The 
single most important characteristic regards the ownership of fishing rights. 
The second chapter discusses the multi-annual quantity measures. It ex-
plores the feasibility of various definitions of multi-annual TACs, but also of 
other multi-annual approaches to catch restrictions. Similarly, the third chapter 
analyses the multi-species quantity measures. A number of definitions are for-
mulated and evaluated on the basis of the 21 criteria. The fourth chapter deals 
with effort measures, which are considered as a combination of multi-species 
and multi-annual characteristics. 
The three chapters on new measures are set up in three sections. First, the 
measures are discussed in general terms - the reasons for the consideration of 
the given principle, its advantages and disadvantages. The second section pres-
ents a discussion and evaluation of a number of specific definitions of the mea-
sure under consideration. Finally, the evaluation is generalized and approached 
in terms of economic, biological and institutional considerations. Finally, atten-
t ion is given to the level of consistency among various points of view which 
may be achieved and to the potential problems which may arise. 
Three case studies 
The methodology is applied to three major EU fisheries: beam trawling 
for flatfish in the North Sea, trawling for roundfish in the North Sea and mixed 
bottom trawling in the Celtic Sea. These fisheries have been selected because 
of their diverse characteristics and the potential relevance which the new mea-
sures may have. However, they primarily serve for analytical purposes. The 
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study does not pretend to offer the 'final word' on the application of new 
management measures in these fisheries. 
The three case studies are all presented in a similar manner. The first four 
chapters are devoted to a general description of the fishery. After a brief intro-
duction, each fishery is characterised in terms of the composition of the coun-
tries and fleets involved. The biological base of the fishery is assessed reviewing 
the size of the stock, recruitment over past years, level of fishing mortality, etc. 
EU and national management regulations are presented. The general descrip-
t ion is concluded by a 'definition of the management problem', which is put 
in terms of the criteria used for the subsequent evaluation of the new manage-
ment measures. 
The second part of each case study (chapters 5-7) is devoted to the evalu-
ation of the multi-species, multi-annual and effort management measures. The 
most promising definitions selected in the methodological part of the report 
are scrutinized as to their applicability under the specific conditions of each 
case study. The findings are summarized in case specific conclusions. 
Final comments 
The approach followed during the execution of the project may be best 
characterised as an 'adjusted Delphi method'. The research team is composed 
of a relatively large number of individuals, who all have a proven experience 
wi th fisheries matters. A significant share of the available time has been de-
voted to meetings and discussions. Their aim was to produce an appreciation 
of the multi-disciplinary complexity of the questions raised and as far as possi-
ble, a consensus on the consequences of the various measures. 
Two general problems should be mentioned - perception and compari-
son. Fisheries problems are sometimes (if not often) perceived rather differently 
by fishermen, scientists, politicians and the general public as well as individuals 
within each of these groups. This applies to the appreciation of the gravity of 
any situation as well as to the assessment of the consequences of management 
measures. 
The report represents the perception developed by the research team. 
Making a well founded comparison of a hypothetical future situation wi th a 
real situation which exists is difficult because both situations may be perceived 
differently by the individuals involved. The perception may range from idealis-
tically positive to sceptically negative. Expectations/assumptions regarding the 
behaviour of fishermen as well as of the executing agencies play a crucial role. 
The comparison is further complicated because quantification presents prob-
lems in a multi-disciplinary analysis. Finally, the comparison is not between ex-
tremes, but much rather between 'degree/extent in which' an objective is or is 
not achieved. 
The study applies 21 criteria to evaluate the pros and cons of the various 
measures. It may be clear that specification of a scale of each of them would 
require a study in itself. This report is not meant to be read 'from cover to 
cover'. Rather it may be used as reference in respect to multi-species, multi-
annual and effort measures, to the three analysed fisheries, or to the various 
definitions of measures and evaluation criteria. 
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1. METHODOLOGY 
P. Salz (ed.) 
1.1 Evaluation of fisheries management 
1.1.1 Past experiences with the CFP 
The objective of the CFP stated in the first basic regulation 170/83 is al-
most identical to the one quoted above. It may be freely interpreted as: 
1. protection of stocks; 
2. promotion of viable fishing industry in the long term; 
3. regular supply of fish to the market. 
Various documents, including those of the European Commission, have 
pointed to the intrinsic inconsistency of these objectives 1). 
In order to evaluate the need for new management measures, it is neces-
sary to review first to what extent the past measures have or have not pro-
duced the results hoped for. This review is presented briefly in the fol lowing 
sections from three points of view - economics, biology and institutional consid-
erations. It is neither a complete nor an in-depth analysis. 
1.1.1.1 Economics 
Two objectives of the CFP are of economic or social nature. One regards 
the promotion of an economically viable fishery sector and the other regular 
supply of fish to the market. The failure or success of the CFP therefore has to 
be viewed in terms of these objectives. 
The term 'sector' is defined in this report as the 'fleet' only. Upstream and 
downstream activities are not included, as they are only partially dependent on 
fish resources in the European waters. Furthermore, the fleets of Mediterra-
nean countries (Italy and Greece) are excluded, as a comprehensive Mediterra-
nean CFP does not yet exist. 
Disregarding some significant statistical problems 2), the main indicator 
that may be considered is the gross value of landings. Between 1979 and 
1989/90 the real gross value of landings was maintained between 4.4 and 4.8 
bin ECU 3). However, between 1987 and 1992 there has been a continuous de-
1 ) For example: EC, COM(93)664 final. 
2) See Regional Socio-Economic Studies in the Fisheries Sector - Summary Report, 
EC, DG-XIV/243/93, pp. 6-9. 
3) These values include most of aquatic production, including fresh water and fish 
culture (mainly bivalves). They also include the Mediterranean areas of France 
and Spain. 
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dine from the peak of over 4.8 mln ECU to below 4 bin ECU in 1992 1). Prelimi-
nary figures indicate that this decline continued in 1993 and 1994. 
The decrease of value has been caused partly by the decrease in the total 
landed volume and partly by depressed prices. 
In order to evaluate the landed volumes in relation to the CFP it would 
be necessary to distinguish between catches for human consumption from the 
EU waters and other landings, i.e. fish meal and catches in non-EU areas. 
Within the landings from EU waters distinction may be made between quota 
and non-quota species. Quantitative analysis faces a number of problems in this 
respect. 
The precise volumes of fish destined for fish meal are not known. 
It is not possible to distinguish clearly the landings from EU and non-EU 
areas. 
For Spain and France landings from the Mediterranean need to be separ-
ated. 
Development of quota may not be representative because of the political 
influence in the final decision. 
Among the non-quota species there are significant and increasing vol-
umes coming from aquaculture (trout, salmon, bivalves), which again 
have to be separated from the 'wild fishing'. 
According to FAO 2) the total aquatic production of the nine EU Atlantic 
countries remained relatively stable between 6.2 and 6.6 mln tonnes between 
1982 and 1989 and it decreased subsequently to about 5.8 mln tonnes in 1991, 
i.e. 9%. (Some figures are still preliminary estimates only.) The catches of 
'seafish' 3) for human consumption represent about 50-60% of the total vol-
ume (circa 3.5 mln tonnes). The decrease of production of this group amounted 
to about 15% over the given period ('82-'91). A significant part of this decrease 
was caused by a drop in catches of the roundfish species 4) from 1.1 mln tonnes 
in 1982 to 460,000 tonnes in 1991. However, a certain part of this decrease 
cannot be ascribed to the EU waters, but rather it was caused by reduced fish-
ing opportunities in other North Atlantic waters. 
Evaluating the development of prices of fish is even more difficult as com-
prehensive statistics, comparable to FAO catches data, do not exist. Further-
more the market segmentation makes many different market trends possible. 
The interpretation of one aggregate average is ambiguous because of the 
many contrary trends which it may contain. The opening up of the EU fish mar-
1) The values of 1991 and 1992 are partially estimated, but the estimates do not 
affect the negative trend itself, only its extent. 
2) FAO Statistical Yearbook, Catches and Landings, Vol 72; data for 1992-'93 are 
not yet available. 
3) Adjustment has been made for fresh water fish, tuna, shellfish, landings from 
Mediterranean and fish meal. Fish meal production was assumed to be based on 
the Danish catches of sandeel, Norway pout, sprat, horse mackerel, capelin and 
blue whiting. 
4) Cod, haddock, saithe, pollack and whiting. 
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ket to imports from third countries has depressed the price level since about 
mid-1992. However, in this case it is clear that autonomous developments, be-
yond the reach of CFP, are of importance. 
Finally the economic viability of the sector depends not only on the reve-
nues, but also on the level of production costs. Labour and fuel are in the case 
of fisheries the main cost components. The price level of fuel decreased by 
about 50% in 1984 and has remained at low levels since. The larger vessels in 
particular, for which fuel costs represent an important share of total expenses, 
have profited from this. To draw conclusions on the aggregate level of the EU 
fleet would require an in-depth analysis, which is well beyond the present 
study. 
The varied trends described above have countervailing effects. The signifi-
cance of these trends to the large number of fleet segments has been different. 
Therefore it is not possible to draw general conclusions regarding the economic 
performance of the EU fishing fleet. 
As for the labour, the employment on board fishing vessels has been de-
creasing gradually. This is typical for primary industries. Although reliable time 
series do not exist, the trend in Spain underlines the general conclusion. There 
employment decreased from about 107,000 fishermen in 1982 to about 85-
90,000 in 1991. In view of the continuing decrease of the number of fishing 
vessels in many EU Member States, the overall employment on board fell prob-
ably by at least 5-10% since the beginning of the eighties. 
While the CFP has not produced a 'flourishing' fishing industry, it has 
contributed to a 'managed decline'. Given a certain natural resource base such 
decline (in terms of vessels and men) was unavoidable due to rising productiv-
ity. 
It may be questioned whether a greater restriction of fishing effort (and 
thus catches) would have improved the state of certain stocks significantly. It 
may also be questioned whether a restriction of catches which would have 
made an impact on the state of stocks would have been politically and socially 
acceptable. 
It seems essential to stress that a number of factors of significant impor-
tance to the economic health of the fishery sector are well beyond the scope 
of the CFP: 
trends in prices of fish as a result of world markets; 
trends in costs, mainly fuel; 
decreases of employment resulting from the given level of natural re-
sources and its value and the pursuit of ever higher standards of living 
through increases in productivity; 
adjustment of exchange rates. 
As for the regular supply of fish to the EU market, some of the above 
points are particularly relevant. The high net dependence on imports from non-
EU countries (estimated at about 50%) makes the role of CFP in this respect a-
priori limited. Even assuming that 70% of all landings for human consumption 
are quota species destined for EU market, this would represent about 35% of 
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EU consumption. If an improved state of stocks would allow an increase in 
catch of 20%, this would represent 7% of the internal EU consumption. 
1.1.1.2 Biology 
On the basis of landings data it could be concluded that the CFP has not 
succeeded in maintaining the natural resource base of the roundfish species, 
which represents the main group of species for human consumption. However, 
Holden 1) concludes that the deterioration of the landings of roundfish has to 
be ascribed to excessively high expectations on the part of the managers, which 
was based on high recruitment rates of cod throughout the seventies. Recruit-
ment fell again at the start of the CFP. 
Still, in the past decade many stocks managed by TACs showed an in-
crease in fishing mortality to historically high levels or remained at very high 
levels. The 'Mid Term Review' 2) gives the fol lowing classification of stocks 
which have been subject to TAC: 
Table 1.1 Level of exploitation of stocks under TAC 
Pre 1983 1990 
Lightly exploited 4 4 
Fully exploited 17 15 
Heavily exploited 32 41 
Depleted 0 5 
Unknown 24 12 
In general, the state of stocks has not improved and, in some cases it has 
deteriorated since the inception of the CFP. The stocks of roundfish (including 
hake and anglerfish) are all at least fully exploited. Many of these stocks are 
heavily exploited and some are approaching or are already in the state of de-
pletion. 
As for the small pelagics, herring stocks are generally fully exploited, de-
spite a considerable improvement of many stocks, compared to previous years. 
The Western mackerel stock is at present fully exploited. North Sea mackerel 
has been in a depleted state for at least 20 years. 
The state of many other stocks is unknown, but given the high level of 
fishing activity of all types in the EU waters, it seems probable that they are at 
least fully exploited and most are heavily exploited. 
Discarding has also contributed to the deterioration of a number of 
stocks. Discards are a general phenomenon in many fisheries. It occurs for two 
1) M. Holden, The Common Fisheries Policy, Fishing News Books 1994, pp. 151-156. 
2) Report 1991 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
on the Common Fisheries Policy, SEC(91)2288 def, 4.12.1991. 
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reasons mainly. First, there may be a legal obligation which prohibits landing 
of certain species or sizes. Second, it is sometimes more 'economic' to discard 
some catches rather than keep them on board, for instance because of inade-
quate space in the fish hold. High-grading is a special case of discarding for 
economic reasons. Although some progress has been made in the development 
of more selective fishing gears, in most fisheries there are no indications that 
discarding has been reduced significantly 1). 
Little is known about the impact of fishing on the ecosystem. Only the 
response of the commercial stocks to the level of exploitation is visible. How-
ever, bycatch species of fish, birds, marine mammals as well as other marine 
organisms are also affected. The changes in the composition of the catches may 
point to a changing composition of marine fauna. 
The Mid Term Review concludes that there is a general scientific and 
technical agreement that stocks are at risk owing to excess fishing mortality, 
which affects mainly juvenile year classes. Still, fishing is not solely responsible 
for this situation. It must be stressed that this overall picture has to be adjusted 
and assessed case by case, taking into account the various individual species, 
stocks, fisheries and regions. 
1.1.1.3 Policy and institutions 
The main achievement of the CFP has probably been the prevention of 
'fishery wars' within EU waters through well structured political negotiations 
towards an acceptable compromise. 
One of the serious points of critique of the CFP is the inconsistency be-
tween the conservation and the structural policy. While greater restrictions on 
catches may not have been politically feasible, the necessity of subsidising new 
investments is far from clear. This is a direct result of the formulation of a set 
of the CFP objectives which are mostly incompatible, while priorities are not 
specified. 
The decision making process at the Union level is a complex one. Not all 
decisions are arrived at in a comparable manner, which may be one of the rea-
sons for the complexity and inconsistency of some regulations. As for the deter-
mination of TACs and quota (biologic advice), the basic research is carried out 
within ICES, which provides its conclusions through the ACFM to the EC, DG XIV 
(Fisheries). The scientific value of the ACFM advice is reviewed by the STECF. 
STECF plays the role of a continuous scientific advisor to the DG XIV. It is ex-
pected to provide answers to various ad hoc questions which the Commission 
may have. As for special issues, the EU may also bring together an ad hoc ex-
pert group. The EU develops proposals (based on scientific advice or on its own 
analysis), which are destined in the end for the Council. However, these propos-
als are often discussed first in one of the Working Groups (Internal, External or 
Markets) or at a COREPER meeting. At this stage, the proposal may be altered 
1) Report from the Commission to the Council on the discarding of fish in the com-
munity fisheries: causes, impact, solutions, SEC(92) 423 final, 12 March 1992. 
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to the specific 'desires' of the Member States. Final adjustments may be intro-
duced during the Council meeting. 
The decision making process is a mixture of scientific analysis and political 
considerations. The results of the scientific analysis are expressed in probabili-
ties and therefore they are not unambiguous for policy makers. Political consid-
erations search for a compromise among contrary interests. This leads to 
inconsistencies within the totality of the management measures implemented 
under the CFP. 
At the institutional level, a number of issues in the area of interaction 
between the European Union and the individual Member States should be con-
sidered as they are of prime importance to the evaluation of failure of success 
to the CFP. 
The legislation formulated at the level of the Union is not always fully 
consistent with the national legislations 1). This fact has several consequences. 
First, there is necessarily a lag of several years between approval of EU legisla-
t ion and the necessary adjustments of the national one, despite the fact that 
the first overrules the second. Second, it takes even longer to adapt the na-
tional agencies charged with the implementation of the new measures. In a 
realistic analysis it seems essential to take these lags into account and accept 
them as institutionally unavoidable. 
Effectivenessof implementation depends on the political wi l l , the avail-
able economic means and the support/acceptance of the policy by the industry. 
The political will should make the necessary funds available and it should open 
the possibilities for the required organizational adjustments in the implement-
ing agencies. Policies which have little support from the industry require evi-
dently more pronounced political will in terms of funds and organization. 
Among the various Member States there are gradual to significant differ-
ences in the interpretation of the obligations which the EU legislation imposes. 
Such obligations may regard control of landings, application of technical mea-
sures or implementation of the structural policy. One extreme interpretation 
may be that the obligations must be implemented at full and at once. Another 
one, which seems also more realistic, is that the obligations must be imple-
mented in as far as feasible within a certain (or unspecified) time frame, given 
the political will/acceptance or means available. 
These differences in interpretation are illustrated in the EU report on 
Control 2). Unless it is clear at the outset which interpretation is given to cer-
tain obligations (policy objectives), it is not possible to evaluate success or fail-
ure of a policy. 
The Common Fisheries Policy is mostly formulated in Regulations. This is 
contrary to for instance Common Transport Policy where Directives prevail. 
1) Prof. J.A.E. Vervaele, Hands and teeth of the (Community) law, Oration at the 
occasion of accepting his Chair in Enforcement of National and European Law, 
University of Utrecht, 18 February 1994, Published by Kluwer, Deventer, 1994. 
2) Control report on the Implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy, SEC(92) 
394 def., 6 March 1992. 
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However, it could be maintained that the Regulations of the CFP are almost 
interpreted as Directives in the various Member States. 
The above considerations demonstrate that there is a trade-off between 
the pursued level of perfection and the feasibility of practical implementation. 
At the level of political decision making everything is 'possible' as it is assumed 
that what is decided can be also implemented. At the level of 'institutions' (e.g. 
ministries), the possibilities are limited by organization and available funds. 
1.1.2 Criteria for policy evaluation 
The required improvements of the CFP are discussed in the ECs Mid Term 
Review (section 8). The introduction of multi-annual or multi-species TACs is 
favoured for the following reasons: 
to make catch constraints more flexible and realistic; 
to incorporate the multi-species character of many fisheries; 
to allow for multi-species stock management; 
to reduce discards; 
to simplify procedures of annual TAC determination; 
to allow fleets timely adjustment to new conditions; 
to promote selective gear; 
to allow for implicit adjustment of the 'key' (relative stability) resulting 
from the development in the first decade of CFP. 
The reasons for the introduction of new measures do not regard so much 
the principles, but much rather the implementation of the CFP. The present 
study proposes to evaluate the potential improvements, which may be ex-
pected from new multi-annual and multi-species management tools, from four 
points of view: 
1. Economic/commercial/social - concerns the level of individual enter-
prises (vessels); 
2. Biological - approaches CFP from the point of view 
of stocks/fish species and ecosystem; 
3. Political/institutional - deals with sectoral, national or public 
interests; 
4. Other considerations - deal particularly with the consistency of 
the above three points, new problems 
and other remaining issues. 
These points of view are more or less explicitly contained in the general 
objective of the CFP. Several criteria may be applied within each of these 
points. These criteria may indicate that a specific measure may produce positive 
results in one area, while in another area the consequences may be unaccept-
able. This inconsistency problem is dealt with under the fourth point. 
A distinction needs to be made between objectives and criteria. Formula-
t ion of desirable policy objectives is a task for administrators and politicians 
who also bear the responsibility in this respect. An objective may be considered 
as a 'fixed point' to be attained. In a scientific analysis an evaluation of policy 
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measures may be based on criteria. A criterion is than a qualitative or quantita-
tive scale of a parameter. It allows one to indicate whether the value of the 
parameter goes up or down, without questioning the actual desirability of such 
change. Clearly, in many instances objectives and criteria may be formulated 
in similar terms, for instance employment or income. 
In the following sections a number of criteria are formulated. These crite-
ria may serve as guidelines to define a set of concrete and (as far as possible) 
consistent policy objectives for a specific fishery or a group of fisheries. The cri-
teria have to be interpreted in a certain time scale. Unless specified otherwise, 
a period of 3-5 years is assumed as a working hypothesis. 
The defined criteria are (overview is presented in appendix 3): 
Economics 
1. flexibility 
2. possibility of planning 
3. market consistency 
4. realism of daily practice 
5. race for fish 
6. economic performance 
Biology 
7. spawning stock 
8. fishing mortality 
9. high-grading 
10. discarding 
11. ecosystem management 
Policy and institutions 
12. political acceptance 
13. sectoral acceptance 
14. relative stability 
15. national enforcement 
16. subsidiarity 
17. local communities 
18. policy beyond 2002 
Other considerations 
19. consistency 
20. transparency 
21. new problems 
A few preliminary remarks on the criteria should be made. First, wi thin 
the short time available it proved impossible to formulate unique definitions. 
Consequently, various criteria are mutually linked or they overlap to a certain 
extent. Secondly, the criteria are presented in an arbitrary order. Their relative 
importance (hierarchy) is to be determined at a political level. Finally, an overall 
evaluation of a measure has to be based on a set of criteria which are selected 
in advance, unless an absolute priority is explicitly given to a single one. 
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1.1.2.1 Economies 
Economie criteria regard the policy consequences at the level of individual 
enterprises. They indicate the reaction or behaviour of the enterprises. A reac-
tion which goes against the objectives of the policy wil l evidently have conse-
quences for the effort required to impose the policy effectively. Three areas of 
reaction could be distinguished, although they are strongly interrelated: 
decisions within the enterprise - regarding short term and long term 
choices (flexibility = selection of fishery, planning = investment); 
actions related to natural environment - reality of the daily work at sea; 
direct competition with other fishermen - race for fish. 
Flexibility 
Long term survival of a commercially healthy enterprise requires sufficient 
operational flexibility to react to changing conditions and to make efficient use 
of the fishing opportunities. It regards the choices of time, species and space, 
i.e. when, what and where to fish. These are mostly short term decisions, partic-
ularly relevant for non-specialized vessels. 
Possibility of planning 
The fishing industry maintains that under the system of annual TACs and 
quota, it is not possible to plan the commercial operations sufficiently and 
consistently wi th the life span of investments, i.e. in the long term. 
Market consistency 
Management measures may have influence on the vessels as 
(des)incentives to act in a certain manner. They stimulate market (in)consistent 
behaviour, for instance (not) restrict investments when production possibilities 
are limited (low TACs) or when profitability outlook is poor 1). 
Realism of daily practice 
Fishing vessels are confronted wi th rather specific conditions of produc-
t ion. Their output cannot be planned in a similar way as in other land based 
production units. Abundance or scarcity of fish depends on factors beyond ves-
sel control. Effective policy will have to take these realities into account. Other-
wise significant effort and expense will have to be put into effective prevention 
of non-compliance with the regulations. The criterion of 'realism' regards the 
frictions between what is administratively desirable and what the natural envi-
ronment makes possible. Behaviour of fishing enterprises is crucial in this re-
1) The experience with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) demonstrates that 
in the long run it becomes financially unfeasible to support a sector through a 
system of subsidies. This applies even more strongly to fisheries than to agricul-
ture as the fishing industry will be always of much less public importance and 
thus subsidizing it will have less political support. Protection through restrictions 
on international trade, subsidies or price regulations create a situation in which 
the sector is not commercially viable in the long run. 
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speet. 'Accessible simplicity' of the regulations also seems relevant, i.e. policy 
should be easy to explain and well understood. 
Race for fish 
This is one of the serious problems of many fisheries, where each vessel 
tries to obtain as large a piece of the cake as possible. Other reasons for the 
race are uncertainty about future catches, expectations of bad weather, danger 
of closing of a fishery, etc. The race leads to irregularities in utilization of the 
fleet capacity, exploitation of the stocks, supply to the market and conse-
quently to fluctuations in price level. 
Economic performance 
The perception of economic results by the vessel owners and crews is evi-
dently a major driving force behind the fishing operations. It determines the 
decisions, behaviour as well as the expectations. It is of prime importance in 
relation to the reactions to management measures which may be restrictive. 
Greater fishing opportunities (more fish) will be interpreted as a short term 
improvement of economic performance. 
1.1.2.2 Biology 
The biological criteria concern aspects of the natural environment, i.e. 
catches of commercial and non-commercial species and effects on the ecosys-
tems in general. A solid natural resource base is a sine qua non for any fishing 
industry. Stock conservation is therefore an important component of the fisher-
ies policy. Effects on commercial stocks may be evaluated in terms of size of 
spawning stock, recruitment and fishing mortality; items which are closely re-
lated. 
The quality of the environment should not deteriorate through discards 
or other negative effects on the ecosystem. However, the 'precise' objectives 
in these two areas may be considered as exogenous to the fisheries policy. They 
are formulated within a much broader framework of environmental issues and 
subsequently imposed on fisheries. 
Spawning stock 
The spawning stock has to be maintained above a certain minimum level 
to allow for regular reproduction. 
Fishing mortality 
Stabilization of fishing mortality at a certain level contributes to regular 
reproduction and recruitment. 
High-grading 
Discarding of commercial species may occur either because of administra-
tive regulations (minimum sizes, TACs) or because keeping the fish on board 
is considered uneconomical. It leads to inefficient use of the available resource 
base. 
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Discarding 
Discarding of non-commercial species has potentially negative conse-
quences on the ecosystem (e.g. food chain). It is also politically sensitive (birds, 
turtles, marine mammals). The expected discarding behaviour of the vessels is 
an issue to consider. 
Ecosystem management 
This concept receives increasing attention, although it is not precisely 
defined yet. A possible interpretation may be in terms of ecosystem stability, 
prevention of fluctuations or irreversible processes caused by human interfer-
ence. Scientific ecosystem management would require in practice extensive and 
long term monitoring, but environmental concern of the public will determine 
acceptable level of fisheries influences, even without precise knowledge. The 
precautionary principle will set the standard. 
1.1.2.3 Policy and institutions 
Political and institutional criteria concern the private (sectoral) and public 
interests at aggregate level (regional, national or international). They touch 
upon the strengths and weaknesses of implementing institutions, sectoral orga-
nizations, political traditions and/or international arrangements. Short term 
and long term considerations are not always easy to separate. 
Political acceptance 
Severeness of measures taken under the CFP in the past has been diluted, 
first through the political negotiations at the level of working groups and 
Council in Brussels and subsequently at the level of implementation. In the 
latter case, the political will to implement effectively has not been always un-
ambiguous and the industry has had an irrational resentment of some mea-
sures. Political acceptance regards the will/commitment of politicians and exe-
cuting agencies to implement the measures as agreed upon. Pressure of public 
opinion is a factor to be reckoned with in this respect. This applies also to the 
feasibility of political compromise. 
Sectoral acceptance 
Currently the credibility of the CFP seems low, because the administra-
tions have put insufficient effort into its implementation. In other words scien-
tific objectives could not be achieved by the measures taken. Consequently the 
industry expects a benevolent approach in the future. Credibility can be only 
increased if the sector can be convinced that the taken measures contribute to 
an improvement and that they will be effectively implemented. Sectoral accep-
tance is partly linked to the above criterion of 'realism'. 
Relative stability 
Fixed allocation of TACs is the founding stone of the current CFP. As such 
it is valued highly as it maintains peace between the EU fleets. At the same 
time it goes counter to the principles of the EU and it is an obstacle to Euro-
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pean wide commercial development of the fishing industry. Therefore the con-
sequences on relative stability have to be considered seriously. 
National enforcement 
National and EU legislation determine the feasibility of effective imple-
mentation and control of any measures. The legislation has to meet principles 
far beyond the scope of the fisheries policy (e.g. proof of guilt). The expense 
of enforcement must be within acceptable limits, compared to prosecution of 
other offences. The feasibility of enforcement is given explicit attention, under 
the assumption that the executing agencies will not be provided with signifi-
cantly greater means. 
Subsidiarity 
This is a recognized principle regarding all EU policies. Measures may be 
evaluated in terms of the possibility to delegate the implementation to lo-
cal/regional institutions away from the national capitals, which may be more 
efficient. Local interests and specific conditions may be taken into account 
more directly through an integrated approach to regional problems 1). 
Local communities 
The socio-economic impact of restrictive fisheries management on coastal 
communities, which are dependent on fishing, requires explicit evaluation. The 
link between local communities and management may be especially clear when 
the measures affect only specific fisheries. 
Beyond 2002 
It may be expected that after the year 2002 the CFP will have to be refor-
mulated, as the derogation from the Treaty of Rome on which it is based may 
not be extended. In the long run measures will have to be more consistent wi th 
the principles of the EU (free access to resources, free movement of people and 
goods, etc.). New measures, like those considered in this report, may well be 
viewed in respect of their potential role in a new system. 
The last three criteria (subsidiarity - local communities - beyond 2002) are 
closely related. Free movement of fishing rights would put some communities 
in a particularly favourable position to maintain and support fishing as an inte-
gral part of their economy. The extent to which such local policies would be 
successful would depend significantly on the links between the community and 
the fishing companies. 
1) This has been stressed at the EC Conference 'Coastal Resources and Integrated 
Coastal Development', Porto, 7-8 October 1993. 
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1.1.2.4 Other considerations 
Consistency 
The past inconsistencies of policy objectives and measures have been criti-
cised broadly. Policy measures will be only effective if their economic, biological 
and political consequences are mutually consistent and when priorities have 
been defined clearly. New measures have to be consistent wi th the already 
existing ones. 
Transparency 
Clear justification and explanation of new measures is expected to im-
prove their acceptance. Simplicity of formulation of the measures (and their 
principles) allows for clear communication between the policy makers and the 
fishermen. 
New problems 
New measures may cause new problems which may not be identified un-
der the above criteria. It seems essential to search consciously and specifically 
for such pitfalls. These may regard such varied issues as quota swaps, technical 
progress as well as conditions under which a measure may or may not be effec-
tive. 
A special consideration which must be taken into account regards paper 
fish. Under the current decision process some quota are set 'too high', expect-
ing that the actual level of exploitation will be acceptable because some of the 
countries to which the quota is allocated do not in reality participate in the 
fishery. However, under a multi-annual or multi-species management scheme 
paper fish will allow additional fishing effort - either in a different period (e.g. 
next year) or aimed at other species - which is undesirable. 
Any new measures which may be considered within this study will be 
evaluated on the basis of the 21 above-mentioned criteria in order to assess 
their likely effectiveness in the various respects. As no one single measure wil l 
provide solution to any one specific problem, the required accompanying mea-
sures will also be given attention. 
The practical feasibility of such measures depends on the required eco-
nomic, biological and institutional conditions and expected consequences. An 
important component of the research is 'formulate conditions under which the 
measures may work and when will they not!' It is not only relevant to ask what 
the measures should 'look like', but also who will execute them and which ac-
companying measures need to be taken. 
1.1.3 Characteristics of the basic situation 
The effects of any new measures will evidently depend on the precise 
characteristics of the situation in which these measures are applied. These 
characteristics may be described in four elements: 
group of species concerned; 
technical measures; 
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ownership of fishing rights; 
fleet size and structure. 
The conclusions of any analysis will depend largely on the assumptions 
made about these characteristics. It is not possible to generalize. As for the 
general evaluation in chapters 2-4, the assumptions are specified below. Evi-
dently, the case studies wil l specify the actual situation. 
Regarding the species, it is assumed throughout that bottom species are 
discussed. Pelagic species have significantly different reproduction characteris-
tics, as occasional very large year classes may be produced by a weak stock. 
Fishing on pelagics as schooling fish is also different. Bottom species depend 
generally on a larger number of year classes and the fluctuations in abundance 
are not as great. The consequences of any management policy will depend on 
the actual state of the stock. In line with the Mid-Term Review it is assumed 
that the stocks under discussion are fully exploited. 
Short and medium term effects of management policy depend signifi-
cantly on the economic performance/situation of the fleet at the moment of 
the introduction of the new measures. If the fleet had faced poor results over 
the past several years, it wil l be more sensitive to policy incentives. On the other 
hand if the past results have been reasonable, the enterprises have built up 
certain financial reserves and they are able to withstand pressure from man-
agement policies (e.g. to decommission vessels). The role of the banks is in this 
respect crucial. Experience shows that the banks will support their clients at 
least for 2-3 poor years. It is assumed that the sector operates at its break-even 
point (no profit - no loss). Restriction of production opportunities wil l have 
socio-economic consequences only in medium term (4-5 years). 
A number of further economic assumptions have to be made: 
prices of fish and inputs are constant; 
variable costs per unit of fishing effort are constant; 
investments do not increase productivity within the time horizon of the 
analysis. 
Technical measures may be extremely varied, according to fishery, season 
or area. They cannot be dealt with in general but only on case by case basis. In 
the general discussion it is therefore implicitly assumed that 'appropriate' tech-
nical measures are taken. 
The issue of ownership of fishing rights is an essential one. The question 
is whether the fishing rights are privatized or not. Privatization may be at the 
level of individual vessel or fishing companies, but also at the level of groups 
of fishermen (producer organizations). This is contrary to the situation of a 
common property. Unless the individual (or groups of) fishermen are allocated 
specific fishing rights (in terms of quantity of fish or fishing effort), none can 
be made responsible for excessive exploitation of the available resources. Only 
effective guarantees of these production rights will prevent a continuous 
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racefor fish 1). It wil l be demonstrated that the problem of the 'race for fish' 
needs to be resolved in order to allow an improvement on certain other criteria 
discussed in section 1.2. In the general analysis two options will be discussed 
when necessary, i.e. with private fishing rights and without. Both situations will 
occur in the case studies. 
Structure of a national fleet may be described in terms of fisheries in 
which the fleet participates, i.e. combination of technologies and target spe-
cies. The speed and the extent to which the structure changes in short and long 
term may be restricted by the ownership of fishing rights and certain policy 
measures. A fair amount of flexibility is assumed. The intended and unintended 
structural changes as a consequence of policy measures form an essential part 
of the analysis. 
The (overcapacity in a certain fishery is determined by the size and struc-
ture of the involved fleet. Due to the dynamics of the fleet (changing fisheries), 
it is difficult to determine capacity unambiguously. Furthermore, a distinction 
needs to be made between 'technical' and 'economic' capacity. The first refers 
to the maximum fishing effort (fishing mortality) which the fleet is able to ex-
ert in relation to available fishing opportunities. The second represents the 
level of fishing effort (size of the fleet) with which the fleet can continue oper-
ating economically in the long run, assuming a certain price level. Economic 
overcapacity is usually smaller than the technical one. It is assumed that overca-
pacity exists in both respects. 
Technical overcapacity of the fleet is not easy to eliminate. Gradual reduc-
tion of the fleet capacity will improve the average economic results, assuming 
a given size of stocks and constant prices. However, the fleet may well become 
profitable before the technical overcapacity is eliminated, because a certain 
underutilization of the capacity is commercially acceptable. In other words it 
is possible to eliminate economic overcapacity, but further reduction of the 
fleet size may not be feasible. 
Technological progress increases gradually the average productivity of the 
fleet. In order to contain the technical capacity at a constant level, a continuous 
reduction of the size of the fleet would be required equal to the rate of tech-
nological progress. In the past an average technological progress of 2% per 
year has been applied. However, little is known about this issue. It is assumed 
that there is no (significant) technological progress in the medium term (see 
also chapter 4.1). 
Structural policy is based on the MAGP III (1993-1996). It distinguishes size 
and level of activity by fleet segment. Specific objectives are set: 15% reduction 
of the beamtrawl fleet and 20% reduction of the roundfish fleet. Other fleet 
segments do not have to be reduced. When necessary, it wil l be assumed that 
these objectives will be achieved and also maintained in the MAGP IV. Such an 
1) This is illustrated in various contributions in P.A. Never, R. Arnason and N. Mol-
lett (eds). Rights based fishing, NATO ASI Series no.169, Kluwer Academic Publis-
hers, Dordrecht, 1989 or in D.W. Bromley, Environment and economy: Property 
rights and Public policy. Blackwell, Oxford, 1991. 
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assumption is consistent wi th the statement of the Mid Term Review that the 
fishing mortality should be reduced by 40%. 
The diversity of real situations justifies the question as to the extent to 
which it is possible to apply one management system under differing condi-
tions and to what extent specific management systems need to be developed 
to meet the requirements of these conditions. Application of specific technical 
measures to various fisheries is an example of diversified management. It may 
be expected that a more direct link to the local conditions wil l improve the 
sector's understanding/appreciation of the management system. Consequently, 
the credibility and political acceptability wil l also improve. 
Forecasting of the effects of any fisheries management measures is fur-
ther complicated by the fact that the starting situation is not in equilibrium. 
Autonomous developments would have taken place in any case. However, it 
is considered infeasible to compare two hypothetical future situations - one 
wi th and second without the measure being introduced. Therefore it has to be 
assumed that the starting situation is in equilibrium, so that it can serve as a 
reference to the comparison. 
1.2 Multi-annual quantity measures 
1.2.1 General discussion 
Certain multi-annual measures (in a broad sense) have been used already 
for quite some time 1). These are: 
all technical measures (gear, closed seasons or areas) as they are adjusted 
only when the need arises, but not necessarily annually; 
structural policy (MAGP) specifies objectives and measures for a period of 
four to five years; 
the 'key' for division of the TACs and maintenance of relative stability has 
been set for a period of 20 years, 1983-2002; 
principles of market policy. 
Although some of these measures are disputed on details, their sensibility 
and principles have been generally accepted by the industry. 
The stress on a multi-annual approach originates from a rather specific 
interpretation regarding the annual character of the TACs and the wish of the 
industry to plan its production over several years. Therefore the term 'multi-
annual' relates particularly to TACs. The industry claims that multi-annual TACs 
(MATAC) would increase the intertemporal flexibility of the enterprises. 
An interpretation which may be less common, but is also in discussion 
relates to fishing effort. This approach is particularly favoured by the biologists 
as fixing fishing effort for several years would in principle stabilize fishing mor-
tality. This approach is discussed in Chapter 4. 
1) Very little documentation appears to exist on this issue. 
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Pope 1) states that MATACs can be only reliably quantified and imple-
mented if three conditions are met: 
stable stocks; 
sufficient biological information to develop analytical TACs; and 
no fleet overcapacity as otherwise it would remain difficult to contain the 
fleet to its fishing allocations. 
These three conditions are not easily achieved through institutional ac-
tions (policy or research). Stability of stocks depends on fishing but also natural 
conditions, which cannot be influenced. For some species analytical TACs are 
being calculated. For others it would require significant additional research 
effort and thus funding. 
Determination of future TACs will depend on the realism/accuracy of 
biological assumptions regarding the current and future values of: 
stability and rate of recruitment; 
size and age composition of the stock-
age composition of the catch; 
catch per unit of effort; 
annual degree of utilization of the TAC. 
In the case of lack of scientific evidence on the above biological or eco-
nomic indicators 'guesstimates' may be developed on the basis of: 
lowest or highest values realized over the past 'x' years; 
average values realized; 
stochastic distribution of the known values. 
These statistical approaches are likely to be correct over a long period of 
t ime, but a MATAC will be a measure for a medium term of maybe up to 3-4 
years. A serious error has to be expected, unless recruitment has been fairly 
stable. 
It is not very likely that a MATAC can be set correctly for the whole pe-
riod. There are in principle two possible situations: MATAC is set too high or it 
is set too low. 
If the MATAC is set too high the fleet will increase the total fishing effort 
to 'consume' the annual allocation. The situation of overfishing wil l occur, the 
average size of caught fish going down, and so also the average price. Average 
cpue falls which leads to falling ratio of profit/cpue when the ratio of variable 
costs/cpue is constant. However, the total aggregate profit may still be rising 
until the marginal costs/cpue exceed the marginal revenues. Total aggregate 
profit wil l remain positive until the total average costs exceed the average rev-
enues. This is a brief description of the movement along the well known 'pic-
ture of MSY and MEY'. 
1) J. Pope, Working document on multi-species and multi-annual TACs, STCF mee-
ting, October 1992. 
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The medium term economic consequences of a MAT AC which is too high 
will therefore depend very much on the actual state of the fishery. In a situa-
t ion of underexploitation the short term profits will increase. In the case of 
overexploitation the losses will increase. 
If the MATAC is set too low, the fleet will exhaust it within a shorter pe-
riod of time because of high cpue. In this situation cash f low must be positive, 
as otherwise it would not be feasible at all to make the fishery profitable. How-
ever, because the allowed landings could have been increased, a better eco-
nomic performance could have been achieved. 
The 'correctness' of the MATAC should not be interpreted as a fixed 
value, but much rather as a range within which the catches should fall. Such 
flexible interpretation is more consistent with the stochastic nature of biologi-
cal predictions. It wil l also make the implementation of the policy more realis-
tic. Relatively low fishing mortality will lead to a growing stock composed of 
a larger number of year classes. Consequently, improved forecasts of future 
MATAC should be possible for bottom species. 
1.2.2 Possible definitions 
MATAC may be interpreted in several ways: setting TAC for several future 
years or specifying the approach to be followed in setting annual TACs. In the 
latter case the approach may 'guarantee' that 'administrative fluctuations' of 
the TACs would remain within certain limits. 
MATACs may offer a new instrument for the period after 2002 if certain 
conditions are met: 
elimination of overcapacity in the concerned fisheries; 
intensification of biological research to allow for calculation and forecast-
ing of analytical TACs; 
individualization of fishing opportunities would prevent the race for fish. 
Economic, biological and political evaluation of each definition is pre-
sented below. It is also summarized in the evaluation matrices in appendix 3. 
Section 2.3 contains an evaluation of the MATACs explicitly in terms of the 21 
formulated criteria. The following definitions are elaborated: 
1. Equal quantity for several years 
2. Limited compensation 
3. Limited adjustment 
4. Minimum quantity 
5. Maximum quantity 
6. One total quantity for several years 
7. Anti-cyclical approach 
8. Minimum size of spawning stock 
9. Constant precautionary TACs 
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1.2.2.1 Equal quantity for several years 
A constant annual quantity of one species would be set for several (e.g. 
2-4) years. 
The economic performance or conditions would not improve significantly. 
The intertemporal flexibility would remain the same, although the fishing en-
terprises could make investment plans for the period, as at least administra-
tively the output would be given. Evidently the natural conditions would be 
more or less favourable than expected. Particularly because of this last point, 
the forecasts would be even less realistic than in the case of annual TACs as 
they would be made under greater uncertainty. The race for fish would not 
ease, unless the MATAC were allocated to individual producers. 
The political negotiations would not become easier. Firstly, multi-annual 
interests are greater, therefore the negotiations may be expected to be more 
intense. Furthermore, it may be expected that particularly when the MATAC 
was set too low, special interest groups would insist on reopening the discus-
sion. Relative stability on individual TACs would be maintained. However, if 
some TACs were multi-annual and others annual, a shift still might occur in 
terms of total fishing opportunities. Some countries may be faced with greater 
fluctuations than others. The required enforcement effort would probably 
remain at its original level. 
There is also little reason to expect that this approach would lead to 
better stock management. The scientific and practical conditions under which 
a MATAC could be formulated as specified by J. Pope are rather severe. Analyti-
cal TACs can be quantified only for a few stocks and those are often exploited 
by an excessively large fleet. Discarding may increase in certain situations. If the 
MATAC were fully utilised, then the fishing mortality would fluctuate inversely 
to the development of the stock. This would not contribute to a stabilization 
of the human impact on the ecosystem. 
New problems wil l certainly arise. It the MATAC is set at a wrong level 
economic, political and biological considerations will become incompatible. For 
example, a MATAC set too low will unnecessarily reduce the economic results 
while extra enforcement effort will be required to prevent excessive landings. 
It may be possible to consider applying MATACs to the stocks which are 
currently managed by precautionary TACs. These TACs often remain constant 
for many years. Paradoxically, in a situation of significant lack of biological 
knowledge, the TACs might just as well be set on a multi-annual basis. 
1.2.2.2 Limited compensation 
Either in the situation of the annual or of the multi-annual TACs it could 
be considered possible to allow overfishing (or underutilization) of the allow-
able catch of the current year (up to a certain maximum). A negative compen-
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sation 1) in the following year should discourage overfishing, while a positive 
compensation could encourage saving of the stocks for the future. Without a 
compensation, continuous overfishing can be expected. 
The precise results of such measures will depend significantly on its pre-
cise formulation regarding the extent to which overfishing can take place and 
the level of compensation to be accounted for. The allowed overfishing must 
be large enough to make a difference for the fleet concerned, but wi thout 
making too serious an assault on the state of the stock. Specific values would 
have to be set for a maximum annual 'deficit' as well as for a maximum accu-
mulation over several years. 
The level of compensation should be high enough to make it an explicit 
consideration of the vessel operators whether to fish this year or next. An inclu-
sion of a compensation seems essential. Extra revenues now wil l carry interest 
revenues in the future, so that it would be often 'economically logical' to fish 
as much as possible now and possibly less later. The price level may deteriorate 
due to high landings, but prices do not depend only on the landings of that 
specific fishery, so that the link between prices and landings is not straightfor-
ward. 
The system of compensations may be relevant in some special situations. 
One is for example when a new year class is recruited to the fishery towards the 
end of the year. Suddenly high catches may be realized, which were not fully 
accounted for when setting the TACs. This was the case for North Sea sole at 
the end of 1989. Overfishing of the quota is than acceptable as a strong fishery 
can be expected for the following year. The calculated compensation will pro-
vide the protection for the stock, while the fleet may not be affected. In a con-
trary case, underutilization of the quota may not be 'wasted' as the fleet could 
hope for a positive compensation later. 
A potentially interesting option of 'limited compensation' would be the 
shift of the quota year. Under certain conditions the various fleets could be 
allowed to develop a structurally new pattern of the utilization of the quota. 
For example, it is undesirable to close a fishery at the end of the year because 
of the fairly high price level. With a gradual shift it could be achieved that a 
quota which is set in December would in fact come into force only in March 
and be exploited until February next year. In this way it would be possible to 
develop a different quota years economically suitable for different fisheries. 
From the economic view point a system of annual compensations has 
some rationale. The flexibility of the vessels would be increased as they could 
take advantage of good catches at a given time. Economic performance could 
be expected to improve. They could also 'save fish' for later. It seems closer to 
the reality of fishing operations. However, measures would be essential to pre-
vent an intensification of the race for fish. Otherwise quota overfishing by 
1) It is more appropriate to consider a 'compensation', rather than an 'interest ra-
te'. The latter has an explicit time dimension, which is difficult to interpret in this 
context. It cannot be ascertained when the compensation takes place. 
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some vessels would have to be compensated for by the whole fleet later. The 
possibility to plan would improve only marginally, in the short run. 
Acceptance at the political level should not face significant obstacles. 
There are no direct adverse social consequences. Relative stability would be 
maintained, although not entirely on an annual level. The shift would be com-
parable to international quota swaps as long as the overfishing of a stock by 
some countries would not endanger the future fishing opportunities of others. 
Control of landings would have to be intensified as they would have conse-
quences for the future. 
If the conditions are set correctly, the biological requirements may be 
met. Discarding may be limited, as fishing would take place more in line wi th 
actual availability. This may also work towards the stabilization of the human 
impact on the ecosystem. As stated above, the precise quantification of the 
conditions (compensation limits, interest rate) would be of utter importance. 
Some specifications would lead only to a one time shift of the quota year. 
As annual adjustments could be made, the consistency between eco-
nomic, political and biological considerations would be taken into account 
regularly. 
A major new problem with limited compensation regards saving fish 
which is not there or 'paper quota'. If the quota is set too high (for political 
reasons or because of a biological overestimate) then the savings which may 
occur will not be justified by the biological reality. In that case the fleet wil l 
attempt at a later stage to catch fish which was never there. For this reason 
creation of a possibility to save must be viewed with great caution. 
1.2.2.3 Limited adjustment 
One of the objections against the annual TACs is that the industry is 
sometimes faced with 'excessive' adjustments from one year to the next, which 
are not 'understood' on the basis of their experience with the natural environ-
ment. Either the biological analysis arrives at certain conclusions too late or the 
conclusion are premature, produced by the applied methodologies. 
The principle of 'limited adjustment' would not allow the changes of an-
nual TACs to exceed a certain maximum value, for instance a percentage of the 
total of the previous year. The shift of fishing opportunities up or down would 
be only gradual. The question is how this percentage should be determined. 
Historical data may provide some indication. It would have to be determined 
whether such an approach is justified or whether in fact the natural fluctua-
tions are so large that a 'limited adjustment' is simply not realistic. 
A specific application of the principle of limited adjustment may be for 
example utilization of a 'moving average' or another mathematical formula to 
determine next years TACs. 
It may be that once in several years the basic level of the TACs may have 
to be adjusted. In this case, this approach would be a little more flexible than 
the first option of constant annual quantities. 
The only economic reason in favour of this approach is that it would offer 
greater administrative stability. Natural fluctuations would have to be accepted 
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as they come. While the industry would probably welcome this system if the set 
quota were higher than the traditional ones, it may be expected that the prin-
ciple would be disputed as soon as stock abundance would seem to offer grea-
ter fishing opportunities than the increase of quota would permit. Flexibility 
would barely change. Planning in the medium term could improve slightly. It 
is difficult to assert a-priori whether this approach would be more realistic. 
A fair acceptance may be expected at the political level. Relative stability 
would be maintained. Enforcement effort would not have to increase. If the 
margins were not too high, politicians would be left wi th only two choices: 
maintain quota at the original level or make the maximum adjustment (up or 
down) depending on the development of the stock. 
From the biological point of view, limited adjustment may not offer suffi-
cient scope for effective stock management under adverse conditions. 
Potential new problems would have to be expected. The speed of natural 
changes will probably be different to that of the administratively agreed ones. 
The question is whether this difference will be significant. If so, serious inconsis-
tencies between the three areas (economics, policy, biology) would occur. 
1.2.2.4 Minimum quantity 
It would be possible to set one minimum quantity for several years to 
come. This may be based on rather pessimistic expectations in terms of the low-
est experienced levels of recruitment over the past 'x' years. The industry would 
know the minimum level of production and subsequently there could be only 
'pleasant surprises'. 
This approach carries the 'precautionary principle' almost into extreme. 
It indicates the minimum level of production and thus also the minimum size 
of the fleet which could remain in operation. The discussion of the actual 
(higher) level of TAC would remain. However, this discussion would have to be 
structured in a way to make the 'minimum level' still meaningful. Otherwise it 
seems likely that the practice of traditional TAC negotiations would return. 
Economically, this is also a minimum option. It would impose restrictions 
which would, on average, probably be more severe than necessary. Flexibility 
of the enterprises would be restricted. At the same time the race for scarce 
resources would intensify, if the fishing rights were not be privatized. The real-
ism would depend on the extent to which the minimum level is adhered to. 
The possibility of realistic planning would not improve. Economic performance 
would deteriorate. 
Political acceptability is questionable. Relative stability would be main-
tained, but the administration and the industry would have to accept a size of 
sector which would be smaller than necessary. Consequently, control and en-
forcement would have to be expanded. 
From the biological point of view this option may lead potentially to an 
improved state of stocks which may allow an increase in the minimum allowed. 
Whether discarding would be limited is not certain. High-grading to achieve 
a higher value wi th the same volume could be expected. 
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As indicated above, new problems would arise on the political and eco-
nomic level. The principle of minimum quantity does not guarantee any consis-
tency of policy. 
In view of the above, evaluation of this measure is considered of little 
practical interest and therefore will not be included in the case studies. 
1.2.2.5 Maximum quantity 
This case is an opposite one to the above option 4. A maximum annual 
quantity would be set for several years, allowing for certain downward adjust-
ments. 
This seems a purely theoretical option mentioned for completeness, 
rather than for its relevance. While the fleet knows what its potential maxi-
mum production may be, it has to expect 'unpleasant surprises' annually. At the 
political level, the industry would probably always call for the maximum value, 
while this is undesirable for biological reasons. 
In view of the above evaluation, this measure is considered of little practi-
cal interest and therefore will not be included in the case studies. 
1.2.2.6 One total quantity for several years 
Setting one total quantity for several years without annual subdivision 
evidently entails the danger that the race for fish would be intensified. The 
fleet may land the whole quantity during the first year (or its part) and than 
have to stop. This resembles somewhat the 'pulse fishing' approach applicable 
for very large pelagic stocks composed of a specific year class where the recruit-
ment is rather independent of the size of the stock. 
Economically, this option does not seem to offer any advantages. Even 
more, unrestricted landings in a short period of time would certainly depress 
the prices. The total realized revenue would remain below the potential one. 
Professional management of enterprises in terms of planning, choices etc. 
seems irrelevant. Economic performance may improve in the short run, but that 
would only intensify the problems later. 
In political terms this is far reaching, but not necessarily unacceptable in 
the case of certain biological characteristics of the resource. Relative stability 
is not in danger as long as exceeding national TACs can be prevented. Regular 
supply to the market will be difficult to achieve. 
Biologically, pulse fishing is only acceptable for pelagic stocks, which are 
only of theoretical interest in this study as the cases presented in second part 
of the report all deal wi th bottom fisheries. 
In view of the above, evaluation of this measure is considered of little 
practical interest and therefore will not be included in the case studies. 
1.2.2.7 Anti-cyclical approach 
Setting anti-cyclical TACs would mean relative reduction of TAC when 
recruitment is good and an increase in poor years. In this way stabilization of 
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landings would be pursued while taking the annual fluctuations of stocks into 
account. A thorough methodology would be required. 
This approach seems possibly more unconventional than it is. In the cur-
rent practice the biologic advice may well be inclined to save stocks when they 
are already abundant. On the other hand at times of scarcity, TACs are set rela-
tively high for 'socio-economic reasons'. 
The economic viability is questionable. On one hand the fishing opportu-
nities may be stabilized, but at the same time the average medium or long 
term productivity would deteriorate. In years with a poor state of stocks (low 
productivity) the costs per unit of production (kg off ish) would be relatively 
high and thus profit limited. On the other hand in good years, the fleet could 
not take full advantage of high productivity because of the relatively low TAC. 
In this respect the management measures would not be consistent wi th daily 
fishing practices. Indeed commercial viability would only improve if stabiliza-
t ion of the stock (and TACs) could be achieved, which is not certain due to non-
fishery influences. Flexibility and possibilities of planning would improve only 
if stabilization were achieved. 
In the absence of unfavourable pressure on prices from imports from 
third countries, the anti-cyclical approach would probably lead to higher aver-
age prices in the long run. 
The political acceptance would depend largely on the actual level of fish-
ing opportunities. The relative stability (per stock) would be maintained, but 
a new issue would be raised regarding the extent to which anti-cyclical adjust-
ment should be applied. This may favour some countries and prejudice others. 
More vigilant control of landings would be required when the state of stocks 
were improving and consequently TACs would be relatively low. 
The biological consequences depend on the actual state of stock. A weak 
spawning stock (small size, few year classes) will be negatively affected. For a 
strong stock, the anti-cyclical system may be in fact beneficial. Discarding wil l 
be generally a greater problem. When the stock is in a good state, allowed 
catches are in fact too low and high-grading may be expected. In the case of 
a poor stock, effort will be high so that greater discarding of bycatches may be 
expected. 
The principal new problem would arise in determining the scale of the 
anti-cyclical component, particularly given the problems of forecasting changes 
in stock availability. 
In view of the above evaluation, this measure is considered of little practi-
cal interest and therefore will not be included in the case studies. 
1.2.2.8 'Minimum' size of spawning stock 
The traditional TACs are focused on the amount of fish which can be 
caught, i.e. a surplus. However, it would be also possible to aim the policy at 
the quantity of fish which should remain in the sea, i.e. a minimum size of 
spawning stock. This minimum may be defined in different ways according to 
the precise objective. One such definition could be related to the spawning 
stock which can assure a 'regular' recruitment. What is regular would have to 
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be determined on the basis of stochastic analysis which would provide various 
options relating the size of the stock to the likelihood of annual regular recruit-
ment. This approach should not be confused with maintaining the spawning 
stock at a minimum level to prevent the extinction of the species. The TAC 
would be set at a level of the excess of the existing stock over the set minimum. 
The recent EU management proposals specify in fact objective spawning 
stocks 1). 
In this situation the fishing sector would bear significant responsibility. It 
would be the sector organizations themselves which could decide whether 
indeed to exploit fully the allowed catches or whether the fishing should be 
restricted in the medium term in order to bring the minimum size of the stock 
to a higher level and possibly to greater fishing potential in the future. Since 
the size of the recruitment stock is not a central issue in the current quota man-
agement system, the above choice does not present itself as directly. 
The economic performance of the sector would depend almost exclusively 
on the fluctuations of nature rather than on the administrative decisions. In 
this way the realism of the policy would improve. The flexibility and the possi-
bility of planning would not increase necessarily. 
The political process may be improved. The minimum sizes of major stocks 
are set almost 'forever'. Annual negotiations would not have to take place, 
although it is possible that the attention would turn to the biological estima-
t ion of the total stock itself. The principle of relative stability may have to be 
redefined. Although the relative access to stocks could remain unchanged, the 
new system would undoubtedly have consequences for the actual fishing op-
portunities. The future of various fleets would therefore be affected. It is not 
clear whether the enforcement efforts would be affected. This depends largely 
on the possibility of monitoring the spawning stock rather than the fleet. Some 
accompanying measures would have to be taken to prevent the fleet from 
excessive fishing. Restrictions on effort seem particularly suitable. This concept 
does seem to offer interesting possibilities in the long run (after 2002) as it 
would globalise the approach to management. A possible disadvantage is that 
it gives complete priority to biological considerations. 
The biologic approach to management would depart from the notion of 
MSY. Maintaining certain 'objective' levels of stocks may contribute to a stable 
management of the ecosystem. Consequently however, the actual fishing op-
portunities (TACs) may fluctuate significantly from year to year. Two biological 
problems remain. First, there is the difficulty of determining the 'minimum' 
stock size, which may increasingly become a political figure. Secondly, not only 
the size of the stock, but also its age composition is of importance. 
1.2.2.9 Constant precautionary TACs 
A number of smaller stocks are managed currently wi th precautionary 
TACs. There is insufficient biological information to set analytical TACs. At the 
1) COM(93) 663 final. 
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same time it is considered necessary to impose limits on the exploitation of 
these stocks. The TAC is set on the basis of past recorded catches. However, as 
in previous years where the catches were restricted by a TAC, the future TAC 
is likely to remain at past levels. In this situation, one might just as well set the 
precautionary TACs on a multi-annual basis, coupled possibly with some annual 
compensations as presented in the first section. 
Of the 106 TACs fixed in 1995, 66 were precautionary 1). A full list is in-
cluded in appendix 2. 
Setting precautionary TACs on a multi-annual basis does not seem to face 
serious economic, political or biological objections. It would concern the man-
agement of a number of smaller fisheries. General evaluation is identical to the 
one presented in the first section 'Equal quantity'. 
1.2.3 Evaluation of the quantity measures 
Nine possible definitions are discussed in the previous section. Evidently 
this list is not complete. In specific situations other more appropriate defini-
tions may well be formulated. Overall the above definitions present a selection 
of the fol lowing choices: 
MATAC is constant or not; 
the possibility of adjustment may be based on: 
- catch in relation to TAC; 
- results of stock assessment in combination with a previously agreed 
institutional approach to the assessment (this is also the current prac-
tice); 
policy is defined in terms of TACs or spawning stock. 
1.2.3.1 Economics 
Flexibility 
MATACs may theoretically offer greater flexibility in the choice to fish 
now or later. The discussed options will increase the possibility of intertemporal 
choices only marginally. The only exceptions are option 2 'Limited compensa-
t ion' and 6 'One quantity for several years', although the latter one is not very 
realistic. Effective privatization of fishing rights is always a prerequisite. It is self 
evident that such flexibility is particularly relevant for specialized fleets, which 
would have to cease fishing otherwise. 
Due to the 'biology of fish' which is governed by annual reproduction 
cycles, high flexibility to fish now or later is not desirable. An exception may be 
a situation where significant incentives would be given to postpone catches 
into the future. Apart from administrative prohibition to fish, such incentives 
may be developed in terms of compensation for temporary laying-up of vessels 
or for underutilization of (individual) quota. 
1) Holden, p. 195. 
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Possibility of planning 
In most specified options the possibilities for medium term planning by 
the enterprises do not seem to improve significantly. The options 2 'Compensa-
t ion' and 3 'Limited adjustment' seem most promising in this respect. The de-
pendence on natural variations will continue. 
Market consistency 
Some MAT AC specifications do seem interesting in this respect. The possi-
bility of shifting fishing activities in time would allow the fleet to adjust to the 
seasonal changes in demand. Flexible adjustment of the quota year to the 
needs of particular fisheries appears the advantage. Other multi-annual defini-
tions would not affect the market process. 
Realism of daily practice 
Option 2 'Compensation' seems to offer an improvement in relation to 
fishing practice compared to the existing system. The major problem of 
MATACs is that there is a significant chance that the level of MAT AC wil l not 
be correct which would produce new frictions. 
Race for fish 
While the TACs are divided among countries, the national quota are of-
ten not explicitly divided among the individual fishermen. Consequently, on a 
national level, the producers compete with each other for a common resource, 
each one trying to get the largest possible share. The race for fish will only be 
restricted when the production is effectively managed at the level of the indi-
vidual producer/fishing vessel (or groups) through individual rights. 
The principle of MATAC does not contribute in this respect. In some dis-
cussed options the race for fish may be expected to intensify. 
Economic performance 
Multi-annual measures will improve short term performance in a s far as 
they may allow larger landings in the short run. However, this may be at the 
expense of the level of landings in the long run. The anti-cyclical approach 
would probably lead to an overall lower level of profitability. Under favourable 
biological conditions, limited compensation may offer an opportunity for 
improvement. 
1.2.3.2 Biology 
A multi-annual approach to stock management leads necessarily to a 
more generalized policy, in which it is recognized that controls to the last 
landed tonne are not feasible. In this respect the 'spirit' of stock management 
would change. 
Spawning stock 
A reliable biological quantification of MATACs requires stable stocks and 
sufficient knowledge to set analytical TACs. Only option 4 'Minimum quantity' 
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would be a-priori promising in terms of improvement of the state of stocks. 
Most other definitions contain the danger that the allowed catch would be 
(seriously) inconsistent with the biological reality, particularly in the years to-
wards the end of the multi-annual period. Spawning stock is then threatened. 
Charging an interest rate in some of the definitions may help to preserve 
the spawning stock. 
Fishing mortality 
Most of the definitions imply irregular fishing mortality. Especially in later 
years the fishing mortality cannot be well managed. Fishing mortality could be 
maintained at acceptable levels only in the case of minimum spawning stock, 
which allows for sufficient annual adjustments. 
High-grading 
The level of high-grading depends mainly on the relation between the 
actual fishing opportunities and the allowed catch as specified administratively. 
If the MATAC set is in fact too low, abundant catches will allow the crew to 
keep only the most valuable species/market sizes and still exhaust the quota. 
If the MATAC is set too high, high-grading will be restricted as it would be dif-
ficult to exhaust the available quota anyway. 
Discarding 
Discarding of non-commercial species will be a process opposite to high-
grading. Relatively too high MATAC will lead to an increased fishing effort and 
greater catch of non-commercial species. A low MATAC is expected to be cou-
pled with low catch of non-commercial species. 
Ecosystem management 
Too little is known about ecosystems to allow for a clear conclusions. 
Some options might contribute to a certain stabilization. 
1.2.3.3 Policy and institutions 
Political acceptance 
The weight of the political process would be shifted from the annual 
meetings of the Council of Ministers to the meeting where multi-annual deci-
sions would be taken. Once the decisions are taken, the process may be sim-
plified, though not in all cases. However, taking a multi-annual decision may 
be more difficult. 
Political acceptance depends on the pressure of various interest groups 
(mainly fishing sector and environmental movement). The definitions show 
clearly which policies would be supported by whom. An additional problem 
may be that in the case of adverse developments, multi-annual management 
approach in principle excludes expansion of fishing opportunities for socio-
economic reasons. 
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Sectoral acceptance 
Introducing new measures alone will not increase the credibility of the 
CFP. Political will needs to be demonstrated regarding the implementation of 
the new measures. MATACs do not seem easier to implement than annual 
TACs. 
Acceptance by the industry is likely as long as the fishing opportunities 
would improve. While the sector would mostly want to take advantage of situ-
ations where TACs have been underestimated and increase them, it is less com-
mon that the industry would ask for a decrease in TAC when catches seem low 
in relation to the set TACs. Consequently, there is always a push towards higher 
exploitation. A multi-annual approach in itself may be appreciated as the past 
experience demonstrates that annual management has not always produced 
the results hoped for. 
Relative stability 
Relative stability means traditionally the maintenance of the percentages 
for the division of TACs. Its implicit consequence is the maintenance of certain 
sizes of national fleets in operation. It is this second aspect which plays a major 
role in the considerations at the level of political negotiation. Thus the relative 
stability is about fleets, stocks being only instrumental. 
In this perspective the relative stability concerns also the size of individual 
TACs, as various countries depend differently on various stocks. It may not be 
politically feasible to impose one multi-annual system on some stocks/fisheries 
and maintain annual TACs in others as various fleets would be affected differ-
ently. 
Enforcement/control 
The enforcement effort may be affected under MATACs as compared to 
annual TACs. Under some options, which would restrict fishing opportunities 
relatively more severely, an intensification of controls would be needed. This 
would also be the case when the TAC was set too low in relation to the actual 
fishing opportunities, leading to landings of 'black fish'. 
The option 2 'Limited compensation' offers an important advantage as 
the threat of closing down a fishery strictly when a TAC is exhausted would be 
eased. However, the problem may present itself several years later anyway, 
when the allowed accumulation limit for overfishing is reached. 
Subsidiarity 
Bringing responsibilities down to low levels of administrative or profes-
sional organizations may be more appropriate on a multi-annual basis rather 
than on an annual one. Responsibility for annual changes in TACs puts institu-
tions in a similar position as the fishing enterprises. 
Local communities 
Effect on local communities seems rather uncertain. As long as these com-
munities are not allowed to manage effectively the natural resource on which 
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their industry survives, there will be no difference between annual or multi-
annual approaches. 
Beyond 2002 
In view of the above conclusions, MATACs specified in quantity do not yet 
seem an interesting option in the long run. The only positive aspect may be 
that the awareness of intertemporal choices may make the sector more sensi-
tive to certain management issues. Subsidiarity may profit as well, but its effect 
on stock is uncertain. 
1.2.3.4 New problems 
Consistency 
Evaluation of the consistency between economic, biological and political 
considerations depends on assumptions made regarding the actual situations 
which may be created, in terms of biological pressure on stocks or economic 
pressure on the fleet and consequently pressure at the political level. The pre-
sented options will potentially produce new conflicts of interest, but their ex-
tent cannot be assessed. 
Transparency 
The discussed definitions show that a multi-annual approach is composed 
of two steps. First, biological evaluation of stocks is required. Second, a transla-
tion into a multi-annual perspective takes place. In the current system, only the 
first step has to be taken. A multi-annual system seems therefore even less 
transparent. 
New problems 
Several new problems will arise. Forecasting over a period of 2-4 years is 
necessarily coupled with an increasing margin of error. Once this error becomes 
apparent, the credibility of the policy may seriously suffer. 
Multi-annual fisheries management may require adjustments at regular 
intervals. Such adjustments may create confusion for everyone involved. 
Political determination of the technicalities of the new system may be a 
problem in itself. 
A major problem may occur in the later years of the multi-annual period 
if unjustified savings of 'paper fish' have occurred. 
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1.3 Multi-species quantity measures 
1.3.1 General discussion 
Multi-species management is an ambiguous term. Three different inter-
pretations are possible: 
1. Taking the environment as a starting point, multi-species means the inter-
action between species, i.e. predator-prey relations 1). 
2. A fleet may have several target species. 
3. A fishery may be characterised by one target species and one or more 
bycatch species. 
The basis of the predator-prey relation is the place of the species on the 
trophic ladder 2). This place changes with the progressive age of every species. 
In different fisheries there is different competition between fishing and natural 
prédation 3). In principle vast knowledge of the predator-prey relations would 
be desirable to describe complete ecological processes. In practice this is not 
feasible. It has be questioned when and to what extent it is necessary to know 
the interrelations between the managed species and/or 'ecological place' of 
species during their life time in order to aim multi-species research in the direc-
t ion most needed. 
In multi-target fisheries, problems arise when the quota of the species 
concerned are exhausted at different rates due to differences in catchability. 
This leads to a closure of the fishery on one species, making it impossible to 
exploit the others. In order to avoid such closures fishermen may either discard 
catches or try to hide landings, depending on the particular situation. Both 
situations result in unreported catches, blurring the view of the biologists on 
the fishing mortality and development of the stocks. 
Similar situations may arise when quota of bycatch species are exhausted. 
Almost all fisheries are of multi-species character, i.e. various tar-
get/bycatch species are caught at the same time 4). 
Management relevance of the predator-prey relation lies primarily in the 
potential disequilibrium which may occur if one or the other is harvested too 
intensively, so that the predator-prey equilibrium is disturbed. Environmental 
as well as fishery considerations may be of importance. The relation between 
1) This interpretation is common in most of the 'multi-species' literature. 
2) Ecological system consists of different levels in which species feed on the same 
means of subsistence. These levels are called trophic levels. P.O. Eikeland, Distri-
butional aspects of multi-species management. Marine Policy, July 1993, pp. 256-
271, (p. 258). 
3) C.W. Clark, Strategies for multi-species management: Objectives and constraints, 
in R.M.May (ed), Exploitation of Marine Communities, pp. 303-312, Dahlem Kon-
ferenzen, Springer Verlag 1984. 
4) An exception may be some pelagic fisheries, but these are not included in this 
study. 
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the fishmeal fishery and some bird populations is an example of the first. The 
relation between herring and cod is an example of the latter. 
The problem of management of multi-species fisheries lies in the differ-
ence between desired and actual fishing mortalities per species. Each species, 
having different biological characteristics, can support different fishing mortal-
ity. However, these different mortalities are difficult to achieve when the spe-
cies are exploited concurrently. Therefore the question may be raised whether 
it should always be attempted to manage a number of species at the same time 
or whether the management should concentrate only on a small number of 
selected species. In fact in the current system a number of valuable species are 
not subject to TACs 1). The intensity of management may also differ and it may 
be partly determined on the expected effectiveness. This may be summarized 
in the fol lowing methodological table: 
Table 1.4 Intensity of management 
Qualification Feasibility of Target species Bycatch species 
of stock management 
Major acceptable ++ +/0 
difficult +/0 
Minor acceptable + +/0 
difficult +/-
The above table shows that, despite the fact that most bottom fisheries 
are multi-species 2), realistic management does not necessarily have to be a 
multi-species one. This should depend on the evaluation of each individual 
situation. Qualification of the stock as major or minor may depend on its total 
size (volume of catches), the economic importance or its role in the ecosystem. 
Feasibility of management depends on the expenses which have to be incurred 
for implementation, the consistency of the required management measures 
with other concurrent measures (mesh sizes), the biological knowledge of the 
stock and/or its dependence on natural phenomena. 
The policy maker is faced with a multi-species management problem 
when: 
1) 25-50% of the total value of landings of the individual Member States is compo-
sed of non-quota species, according to Regional, Socio-Economic Studies in the 
Fisheries Sector, Summary Report, Appendix 2, EC, XIV/243/93. 
2) Definition of a multi-species fishery could be formulated as follows: a fishery in 
which a group of vessels (not necessarily using the same techniques) exploits a 
group of species in a given area at a given time. The group of species is part of 
one ecosystem. One species or a group of species may be the target. Various 
vessels may have a different target, for instance according to gear. Volume of 
bycatches is significant. 
59 
1. A given level of fishing effort results in different fishing mortalities for 
different species caught. Some of these mortalities may lead to overfish-
ing and others to underexploitation. 
2. Management of major individual species seems feasible within a multi-
species package of measures. 
Multi-species management should ideally be based on biological as well 
as economic considerations, i.e. role of species in the ecosystem and the mone-
tary value of the catch. 
From the biological point of view, the volume/quantity is the starting 
point as it is linked directly to the stocks, fishing mortality, etc. Volume may be 
interpreted in several different ways in absolute (number, kg) or relative (%) 
terms. 
From the economic point of view the value of a given (group of) species 
is a relevant starting point. It is theoretically possible that a relatively small 
volume of a high valued species represents a major source of revenues and vice 
versa. The second economic consideration concerns an improved operational 
flexibility of the vessels to allow them to exploit new fishing opportunities. 
Management measures are either administrative regulations (quota, tech-
nical measures) or economic incentives (subsidies). Their effectiveness will de-
pend on the economic importance of the individual species. 
A significant number of (if not all) management measures currently in 
force have 'multi-species' consequences: 
structural policy is aiming at the reduction of the overall fishing effort in 
certain fleet segments; 
technical measures, for instance mesh size regulation, affect all species 
caught; 
a given level of TACs necessarily affects all bycatch species. 
However, these measures are not always considered as multi-species be-
cause they are either induced from single species considerations or their multi-
species effects are not explicitly elaborated. 
Certain current quantity measures are in a way multi-species, particularly 
the bycatch regulation. These may be expressed in absolute terms (kg of a spe-
cies) or relative ones (% of total catch on board). Their particular relevance 
within fisheries management may be quite different: 
conservation of quota; 
definition of fishery wi th consequences regarding technical measures (a 
certain minimum bycatch of sole in the North Sea as percent of total al-
lows using smaller mesh size); 
quota distribution between fleet segments. 
Particularly national regulations contain arrangements to distribute tar-
get and bycatch species among various groups of fishermen. 
Multi-species measures must be economically 'neutral' in order to prevent 
economically rational shifts from one species/stock to another which would 
lead to overexploitation of the first and under-exploitation of the latter. These 
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measures should be primarily aimed at 'gradual' adjustments to make some 
serious restrictions less stringent, but not to take them away altogether. 
In this respect the problem of 'paper fish' or biological overestimate of 
the size of the stocks has to be raised again. If the MSTAC is based on an unjus-
tified optimistic assessment of one of the species, the fleet may swap this spe-
cies for another one which offers better revenues. The method of deriving an 
MSTAC wil l be therefore of prime importance. 
The discussion of the definitions below assumes implicitly an annual ap-
proach to MSTACs. Annual changes in the definitions would be possible to 
meet changing biological and/or economic conditions. A combination of multi-
species species and multi-annual measures is discussed in chapter 4. 
1.3.2 Possible definitions 
Five possible definitions are discussed: 
1. Total quantity in a common denominator 
2. Limited transfer 
3. Bycatch arrangements 
4. Two tiers system 
5. Total value 
Definitions 1 and 2 allow swaps within a given group of species according 
to a specified key. In order to promote swapping in one direction and discour-
age that in the opposite one it may be considered possible to use entirely dif-
ferent ratio's instead of just the inverse. For instance one tonne of species A 
may be exchanged for 5 tonnes of species B, but 1 tonne of species B may not 
be exchanged for 200 kg of species A, but only 100 kg. 
1.3.2.1 Total quantity in a common denominator 
A common denominator would allow for an unlimited transfer from one 
species to another. In the past a common denominator of 'cod equivalents' has 
been used. The question is how such a denominator of 'fish equivalents' should 
be specified, for instance what is the relation between the individual species 
involved. There are two general approaches: a biological and an economic one. 
Once the denominator is specified, a total quantity (MSTAC) for the group of 
species could be set. 
The biological denominator would have to be specified starting from the 
'place/role in the ecosystem'. The knowledge will be in most cases insufficient. 
The autonomous dynamics of the ecosystems (e.g. changes in recruitment and 
prédation) will change this place/role and thus may require regular adjustment 
of the calculation. The changes in the relative composition of the species have 
to be taken into account. 
The economic denominator would have to be based on prices. This would 
be feasible in principle. Price relations are given at a given time and place, so 
that one species could be translated into another one in monetary terms. How-
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ever, such a static approach is less suitable when time and place are not fixed 1): 
average prices of fish are not equal in different geographic areas. Some 
ports are 'specialized' in certain species, attracting the sellers as well as 
the buyers. Consequently, the mix of species which would offer the opt i-
mum value of a given MSTAC may differ f rom one port to another; 
prices of fish change in time, due to the local production but also due to 
flows in world trade. Therefore the ratios between the individual species 
and the 'fish equivalent' would have to be reviewed and adjusted regu-
larly. 
Using one common denominator for a group of TACs implies that unlim-
ited transfer between the species would be possible. 
From the economic point of view of the individual enterprise, this seems 
an attractive option. The vessel would be able to pursue the apparently most 
profitable fishery at any time of the year. There would be a high degree of 
flexibility. The short term fishing tactics could be adjusted regularly to the pre-
vailing conditions (catches and prices). The race for fish may or may not inten-
sify depending on the perception of fishermen of the economic opportunities. 
This system has undoubtedly serious biological drawbacks. It would not 
be possible to determine in advance a desired level of fishing mortality of one 
species. Conservation of individual stocks would be virtually impossible. The 
fact that the biological relations change over time complicates the determina-
t ion of the denominator. The level of high-grading will depend on the total 
allowed catch in relation to the realized one and the weights applied to calcu-
late the denominator equivalents. In view of existing economic pressure, in-
creased high-grading may be expected. The effects on the ecosystem are un-
clear. 
The institutional acceptability is probably limited. The relative stability 
would be lost. It is not certain whether additional requirements on enforce-
ment would be required. Although a fair support from the sectoral organiza-
tions could be expected, environmental organizations would probably protest 
against the looming chaos. 
A special case of the 'common denominator' approach would be to allow 
for free exchange, but only to a maximum of 'fish equivalents' wi th a lower 
monetary value than the separate TACs. In this way the fleet would have an 
incentive to fish on individual TACs as those would potentially offer higher 
total value. This approach maintains flexibility, but at the same time it penal-
izes excessive transfer. 
One of the main questions in the case of the 'common denominator' re-
gards the 'stability'. It could be expected that a high level of effort on a profit-
able species/fishery will deplete the stock leading to low physical productivity. 
If price increase does not offset the productivity drop, profitability will deterio-
rate. Part of the fleet may than move to alternative fisheries and the stock may 
1) See P. Salz, Some considerations on multi-annual and multi-species quota, paper 
presented at V EAFE Conference, Brussels, 24-26 March 1993. 
62 
get a chance to recover. World trade in fish should indeed prevent excessive 
price increases in the long run. On the other hand, possible lack of experience 
in other fisheries may prevent the vessels from abandoning their activity. The 
question is whether the short run equilibrium which may occur could have ma-
jor consequences for the long term state of the stock. This cannot be answered 
in general. 
In view of the above evaluation this measure is considered of little practi-
cal interest and therefore will not be included in the case studies. 
1.3.2.2 Limited transfer 
A MSTAC could be formulated in a way so that the TACs of separate spe-
cies would only be interchangeable within certain limits, for instance maximum 
10% of any individual TAC. Instead of setting a maximum it would be also pos-
sible to require that a certain minimum percentage of a TAC would have to be 
used up before it could be exchanged into another species. Limited transfer 
would provide a little more flexibility and prevent unnecessary discards, but it 
would at the same time prevent large scale high-grading or unpredictable 
shifting of vessels/effort from one species to another. 
In general this approach would not have such extreme consequences as 
the one of common denominator. The economic advantages seem quite simi-
lar. The race for fish would be tempered as the advantage to shift from one 
fishery to another would be less pronounced. Extent of transfer possibilities will 
determine the economic advantages. 
The problem of biological conservation would not be as extreme. The 
danger of potential overfishing of one of the stocks involved would be con-
tained by the limits on transfer. To some extent the errors of TAC estimates 
could be compensated in this way. The problem of discarding remains. In a 
situation of abundant catches high-grading may still take place. 
Also from the institutional point of view this option seems more promis-
ing. The relative stability would be blurred, although not lost altogether. En-
forcement may require more attention. If fishing rights were privatized, it 
would be necessary to ensure that no vessels exceeded its 'transfer rights'. 
1.3.2.3 Bycatch arrangements 
In some situations one species may be a target species in one fishery and 
a bycatch in another. The multi-species character of the fishery may then be 
taken into account in various ways, which are listed here. 
Species are specifically allocated to the various fleets segments and man-
aged further as single species quota. 
Maximum and minimum 'bycatch' indications are set (e.g. minimum per-
centage of sole to qualify for smaller mesh size; maximum volume of 
bycatch species per trip, etc.). 
Recalculation of the bycatch in terms of the target species and its inclu-
sion in the target quota (this is comparable to common denominator). 
Introduction of ITQs for the species involved. 
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The bycatch arrangements must be conceived in such a way that the com-
position of the catch remains unchanged after the introduction of the new 
measures. The shift of the fleet toward other fisheries/species must be pre-
vented as far as possible. 
The main economic advantage of the bycatch arrangements is that the 
fleet can better exploit the stock of its target species. The fishery is not stopped 
as quickly when a given level of catches of bycatch species is achieved. The pol-
icy reflects better the daily practice of fishing. Economic performance would 
improve. 
ß/o/og/ca/acceptability of such an arrangement depends on the evalua-
t ion of the stocks as indicated in table 3.1. The bycatch species wil l often be 
exploited too intensively. If target and bycatch are expressed in common de-
nominator, the target species may in fact be saved if there is too much bycatch. 
Institutionally, bycatch arrangements seem fairly acceptable because they 
do not imply any far reaching adjustments. The approach couples the advan-
tages of the traditional mono-species stock management with a management 
by fleet, making it possible to utilise the available quota as much as possible. 
1.3.2.4 Two tier system 
In a multi-species fishery where the composition of the catch can be influ-
enced somewhat by the fishing skippers, a two tier system could be considered. 
The 'first tier' are the TACs for individual species. The 'second tier' is a total 
TAC, as a (weighted) sum of all species involved. 
The fishery can be closed in two situations. Either one individual TAC is 
fully exhausted, so that any continuation of the fishery will lead to excessive 
fishing mortality of that species. Or the MST AC is exhausted. Which of the two 
'moments of closure' is more attractive to the fleet depends on the catchability 
rates and prices. Setting MSTAC at an economically proper level (higher total 
value) may induce the fleet to attempt an equitable exploitation of all the spe-
cies involved, instead of concentrating on one species only. 
In the seventies a 'two tier system' had been used in codfish fishery in the 
NAFO area. 
£conom/ca//ythis approach would offer a little more flexibility and possi-
bility of planning. Fair market consistency and realism can be expected. There 
is no reason why the race for fish should intensify, but neither would it ease. 
Biologicallythere is a danger that the fleet would attempt to exploit all 
stocks to their upper limit, which would increase the potential danger of 
overexploitation. However, this danger could be accounted for when setting 
the limit. The need for discarding would be lessened. Looking at the original 
scientific analysis, there is no reason why a two-tier approach would not be 
acceptable. 
There may be some institutional problems - it wil l be less clear when a 
fishery is closed as two limits are applicable. Furthermore, a fishery would be 
closed in its entire scope, not leaving the vessels any room to attempt a 'clear 
fishery'. From a management point of view this in fact may be an advantage. 
The relative stability could not be maintained in its original form. Its principles 
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would have to be reformulated in terms of ranges by country according to the 
original division. 
1.3.2.5 Total value 
An economically interesting MS approach could be based on the total 
value of catch instead of its volume. The exploitable stock could be well valued, 
given its composition by age-class (market size) and some average prices. Simi-
larly the value of the biologically determined TAC could be also calculated. In 
a multi-species fishery a total value of all involved species would be accumu-
lated and their sum set as a production limit. Evidently, this is a very theoretical 
option, but it has some interesting practical consequences. 
Economically, the total fleet would know what its potential production 
could be, if the expected prices are realized. The vessels could only improve 
their results by greater efficiency. They would search for fishing areas with the 
highest financial productivity per unit of effort. There would be perfect consis-
tency with the incentives of prices. The measure in itself would not contribute 
to higher profitability. 
Biologically, the fishing mortality of one species could not be managed 
in detail. Some stocks may be fished more heavily than others. High-grading 
would be reduced to zero, as it would not offer any benefit. 
The main institutional drawback seems to be the departure from the prin-
ciple of relative stability. Given long term production costs, it would be fairly 
clear what size of the sector would be able to survive, or on the other hand 
what support is needed to maintain a certain number of the vessels in opera-
t ion, for instance because of short term fluctuations. 
In view of the above, evaluation of this measure is considered of little 
practical interest and therefore will not be included in the case studies. 
1.3.3 Evaluation of multi-species quantity measures 
1.3.3.1 Economics 
Flexibility 
If a number of species are put together in one MSTAC the vessel may 
choose more freely between going for one or another species. In general, 
greater flexibility may be expected, although choices between species may not 
always be relevant. If the catch is already composed of these species, the rela-
tive composition may be only marginally influenced by choice of fishing 
grounds in a given season. 
The vessel should theoretically pursue a composition of catch which offers 
the maximum contribution margin (gross revenues minus costs per unit of 
catch). The maximum contribution margin will depend on prices of individual 
species, physical productivity and costs/unit of catch (distance to fishing 
grounds). 
Whether flexibility of vessel operation will increase will depend on vari-
ous factors: 
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composition of MSTAC in relation to its average composition of catch; 
other regulations which may allow or restrict access to certain species 
involved (areas closed for certain types of vessels, mesh size regulations, 
etc.). 
MSTAC will not necessarily prevent early closure of fisheries. 
Possibility of planning 
MSTACs are mostly discussed on an annual basis. However, an MSTAC will 
contribute to long term planning in as far as the improved short term flexibility 
will also increase the likelihood of profitable exploitation of new investments. 
Market consistency 
Greater flexibility to shift within an MSTAC from one species to another 
will make the fishing operation more consistent wi th the prices offered on the 
market. 
Realism 
In fisheries where a group of species are caught concurrently, the applica-
t ion of an MSTAC seems more realistic. It may prevent closing fisheries when 
one TAC is exhausted but the other is not yet fully consumed. Discarding of 
certain species because the quota has been exhausted may be restricted. 
Race for fish 
Unless other measures are taken, a MSTAC in its own right will not pre-
vent or diminish the race for fish. All vessels will try to get the largest possible 
'piece of cake', but the pieces would be only differently specified. However, 
even if the fishing rights are privatized, the race for fish may intensify if the 
multi-species rights are not be specified by individual species. 
Economic performance 
The greater flexibility and realism of multi-species measures should con-
tr ibute to improved profitability in short and long run. 
1.3.3.2 Biology 
Stock conservation 
Conservation of one specific stock is in danger, particularly if vessel flexi-
bility increases substantially, so that high and unpredictable fishing mortality 
could occur. 
Fishing mortality 
Fishing mortality cannot be managed by individual species, but only for 
the total of all species included. The definitions which allow only limited trans-
fer offer better opportunities to control fishing mortality by stock. 
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High-grading 
High-grading will occur when transfer between species offers a higher 
revenue while production costs do not increase as much. Only under the Total 
value' definition will high-grading be banned. 
Discarding 
Discarding is expected to decrease as bycatch regulations may be eased. 
However, it was indicated above that bycatch regulations have also other rea-
sons than direct conservation of stocks, for instance distribution, definit ion of 
fishery. These reasons may have to be maintained. 
Discarding of truly non-commercial species wil l depend on the level of 
total exerted fishing effort. 
Ecosystem 
As long as ecosystem is not well defined it is not certain whether MSTACs 
would produce a positive contribution. 
1.3.3.3 Policy and institutions 
Political acceptance 
To determine an acceptable common denominator may pose significant 
political problems, because of the above mentioned differences in prices as 
well as differing physical composition of the catches in time and space. The 
weights to be used for various species would necessarily have a 'political' com-
ponent. 
Sectoral acceptance 
It is not clear whether the sectoral acceptance (credibility) would improve 
or not. Greater flexibility is a clear advantage. The moment of closing a fishery 
would not, however, be as uniquely determined, which may not be well under-
stood. A multi-species system may become rather complex and require exten-
sive international consultation. 
Relative stability 
The application of a MSTAC would blur the principle of relative stability, 
as that is based on a monospecies approach. The practical consequences wil l 
depend very much on the actual flexibility which would be possible within the 
multi-species approach, i.e. actual composition of catch and accompanying 
measures which would affect the composition of landings. 
National enforcement 
It is not certain whether it is easier to count kg of fish in general rather 
than of specific species. MSTACs could mean a more holistic approach to man-
agement instead of a rather administrative one, in which quantities would be 
followed, but not necessarily to the 'last kg'. Implementation would seem less 
demanding, although explicit species swaps would have to be administered. 
Again accompanying measures, like conjunctural adjustment and structural 
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reduction of capacities, would also contribute significantly to an effective exe-
cution. 
Subsidiarity 
If entire fisheries could be managed on a multi-species basis, it could be 
considered possible to delegate some of the management powers to lower 
administrative levels. This depends very much on the precise characteristics of 
the situation. 
Local communities 
Local communities may profit if certain definitions could be adopted in 
a way mentioned under 'Subsidiarity'. 
Beyond 2002 
A multi-species approach may become politically acceptable under two 
related conditions. The CFP would have to give up the principle of relative sta-
bility and preferably also that of national allocations (quota). In that situation 
TACs would be set at the EL) level only and allocated to individual vessels or 
groups of vessels. Management by fishery would become feasible and in some 
fisheries application of MSTACs may be applied. 
The multi-species problem could be particularly well resolved in the long 
run by introducing an ITQ system which would allow the individual skippers to 
adjust their fishing rights as farl as possible to their realized catches. 
1.3.3.4 Other considerations 
Consistency 
The multi-species approach offers more flexibility to the individual vessels. 
This flexibility is at the expense of certain individual stocks/species. The political 
process will improve only if certain other conditions are met as well. In general 
improved consistency is not a-priori certain. 
Transparency 
The determination of the relations between various species wil l be an 
additional complication of the system. It remains to be seen whether under 
specific conditions it wi l l be outweighed by advantages in other areas. 
New problems 
A number of new problems can be expected. Specification of the relation 
between the various species within an MSTAC may be in the end a highly politi-
cal issue as major economic interests may be involved. New conflicts of interest 
may arise as various fleet segments may f ind themselves in a new competitive 
position. Regular changes of weights used in the MSTAC will lead to confusion. 
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1.4 Effort measures 
1.4.1 General discussion 
Restriction of effort has almost always a multi-species and often also a 
multi-annual character. Currently, effort is already being restricted in the na-
tional regulations in several ways. 
MAGPs set objectives to reduce the size of specific fleet segments over a 
given number of years. 
Technical measures restrict the efficiency of vessels and gear. 
In some countries fishing time is limited by days-at-sea arrangements, 
weekend bans, temporary closures of seasons and/or areas, etc. 
The new proposals put forward by the European Commission 1) aim at 
the reduction of fishing mortality in specific fisheries particularly through re-
duction of fishing effort. Furthermore, allocation of standard effort units (stan-
dard vessel-days) has been proposed in connection with the new management 
regime of the access of Spanish and Portuguese vessels 2). 
Analysis of fisheries management by effort measures raises a number of 
questions, which are briefly discussed below. An exhaustive research of these 
questions would go far beyond the scope of the present study. Clear definition 
of fishing effort is an issue of major importance. The following issues illustrate 
that in practice 'one effort rule' may be required. 
Reduction of effort aims to reduce fishing mortality. The relation be-
tween the two is determined by the catchability (or catch per unit of effort as 
a percentage of the exploitable stock). In the biological analysis, fishing mortal-
ity and catchability are percentages related to stock, not absolute volumes of 
fish. Consequently, constant effort (fishing mortality) produces a volume of 
catches which fluctuates with the state of the stock. This is rather important 
from the economic and political point of view 3). 
Marginal fishing mortality is decreasing with the expansion of a fishery. 
There are rich and poor fishing grounds as well as there are more and less pro-
ductive vessels. The fleet will tend to operate preferably in the richer areas, but 
wi th increasing effort, the relatively poorer areas will also become gradually 
exploited. As long as a fishery is profitable, less productive vessels wil l be able 
to join it. Measures aimed at the reduction of fishing mortality through fishing 
effort will first affect the least productive vessels, i.e. those working on the 
poorest fishing grounds or wi th the least skilled crew. Therefore the relative 
1) EC, COM(93) 663 final. 
2) COM(94)308 def. 
3) The used terms can be defined as follows: 
- fishing mortality = percentage of exploitable stock (over a given size/year 
class) caught in one year; 
- catchability = percentage of exploitable stock captured by one unit of fishing 
effort. 
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reduction of fishing mortality will be smaller than the relative reduction of effort. 
In order to evaluate the likely effectiveness of effort measures, it is desir-
able to specify the relation between effort and fishing mortality. Biologically, 
reduction of effort will lead to a less than proportionate reduction of fishing 
mortality. Economically, assuming constant prices, the financial results will de-
teriorate more slowly than the restriction of effort, for instance vessels wi l l 
forego catches in the poorest fishing grounds but also save on some production 
costs 1). Therefore it is increasingly difficult to reduce fishing effort, as eco-
nomic pressure works in the opposite direction. 
A further question regards the consistency with the correct TAC. In other 
words, once an appropriate level of fishing effort has been reached, wil l it be 
necessary to adjust the fishing effort annually (similar to TACs) or not? If the 
TACs were be set at a fixed level of fishing mortality and there was a constant 
relation between effort and fishing mortality the TACs and TAEs (total allow-
able effort) would be perfectly consistent. But in practice, TACs are 'adjusted' 
for socio-economic reasons. And as indicated above, average fishing mortality 
changes wi th the level of exerted fishing effort. Technological progress and 
changes in the structure of the fleet are further complicating factors. Consis-
tency between TACs and TAEs is not straightforward. 
In a dynamic perspective over several years, technological progress has to 
be explicitly considered. It leads to an increased fishing power of an existing 
fleet, but this increase needs to be quantified. For example, a given vessel with 
an improved fishing technique will become more productive. However, the 
replacement of two smaller vessels by a large one of a size of the sum of the 
two in terms of kW or GRT may well lead to a reduced fishing power. This is 
because of the diminishing marginal productivity. If the policy objective were 
to maintain a constant level of fishing effort, the nominal size would have to 
be gradually decreased because of increasing average productivity due to tech-
nological progress. From the above it follows that the definition of effort itself 
is of major importance to effort based management. Fishing effort is in princi-
ple composed of two elements: size of fleet and its level of activity. However, 
these elements have both qualitative and quantitative characteristics which are 
not easy to define and to bring under the same denominator. As for the fleet 
the determinants are: 
number of vessels; 
gross tonnage; 
engine power; 
gear used; 
technological progress. 
As for the activity level: 
1) How quickly the results will deteriorate in the short respectively long term will 
depend also on the relation between fixed and variable costs. Certain savings of 
variable costs will be achieved due to less sea time. The precise initial situation 
and the characteristics of the fishery are therefore also of importance. 
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time at sea and time fishing; 
know-how of skipper and crew; 
fishing area. 
It seems clear that it is difficult to find fisheries which would be fairly ho-
mogeneous in all these respects 1). A common denominator for different fish-
eries may be developed on the basis of respective fishing mortalities, which 
requires a considerable research effort in itself. 
A particular problem related to effort and technological progress regards 
the possibility of input substitution. There are a large number of well-known 
examples where effort measures were circumvented by further development 
of those effort components which were not restricted. Restrictions on gear may 
be offset by adjustment of vessel or engine. Restrictions on engine may be com-
pensated for by changing the transmission ratio or the characteristics of the 
propeller. The only question is how fast such adjustments may be introduced 
and to what extent they are technically possible. 
Different measures affecting fishing effort have different consequences 
on stocks. Mesh size regulations changes affect especially the age composition 
(mortality by ageclass). Technical measures particularly affect the efficiency of 
effort. Sea time regulations affect the overall mortality, etc. Some measures 
may also be more acceptable to the fleet than others for traditional or social 
reasons. 
Traditional TACs implicitly contain a certain fishing mortality. They also 
indicate the potential earnings of the fleet, assuming a certain price level. How-
ever, a TAE does not by itself provide this information. Relations to fishing mor-
tality and to total potential landings have to be specified separately. 
Setting a TAE may also have significant multi-species effects. Without 
further accompanying measures the fleet may shift from one fishery/stock to 
another. While the TAE is maintained constant, the mortality of various stocks/-
species may be changing significantly. Therefore effort management is only 
applicable in specialized fisheries where the vessels cannot choose an alterna-
tive target species. Otherwise additional regulations are required to limit the 
fleet's mobility. 
The relevance of the issues discussed above is difficult to indicate in gen-
eral. It has to be evaluated in the specific conditions of the situations encoun-
tered in the case studies. The discussion of the definitions assumes that TACs 
are not applied alongside with the TAEs or that TAEs are more restrictive than 
TACs. 
1) See P. Salz, L'effort de pêche - les problèmes et l'utilité d'un concept, Paper pre-
sented at the Colloque 'Nouvelles Dimensions Concurrentielles et Financières des 
Pêches Maritimes', Nantes 7-8.3.1994 and J.W de Wilde, Some remarks on the 
ambiguity of tonnage measurement. Proceedings of the IVth EAFE Annual Con-
ference, Salerno, March 1992. 
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1.4.2 Possible definitions 
Four definitions are discussed below: 
1. Constant effort over several years 
2. Limited adjustment of effort 
3. Minimum level of effort 
4. Anti-cyclical approach 
1.4.2.1 Constant effort over several years 
Constant effort means that a given number of vessels using a given tech-
nology would be allowed to fish a given number of days-at-sea per year, dur-
ing several years. This would lead to a constant fishing mortality and conse-
quently to catches fluctuating with the natural changes of the exploitable bio-
mass, providing a constant mix of fisheries. 
In a multi-annual perspective, a constant level of allowed effort and thus 
fishing mortality may be set too high or too low. Stocks wil l then be continu-
ously over or under exploited in a constant manner. However, there is a signifi-
cant difference from the MATAC case, which produces fluctuating over- or 
underexploitation. 
The gross revenues will fluctuate parallel to the catches and depending 
on the change in prices and catches, economic results of the sector will improve 
or deteriorate accordingly. As long as the effort is set for the whole fleet and 
not for individual vessels, the race for fish will continue. Improvement regard-
ing the operational flexibility or possibilities of planning would depend very 
much on the scope of the fishery for which the effort allocation is introduced. 
If the scope is narrow (e.g. few species/limited area) there would not be any 
improvement. There would be a gain in terms of 'realism' as within the effort 
allocation fishing could take place fairly efficiently. Stopping a fishery because 
of exhaustion of bycatch species would be avoided, but an early exhaustion of 
the TAE remains possible. 
Improvements would be achieved from the biological point of view. Fish-
ing mortality would be kept fairly constant, if shifting from one species to an-
other could be prevented. Human impact on the ecosystem would be stabi-
lized. Discarding would lead to a direct economic loss and is therefore unlikely. 
The political acceptability would pose problems. New international agree-
ments would have to be achieved to define 'fishing effort'. The current relative 
stability may be jeopardised. National enforcement would have to be reorgan-
ised to fol low effort instead of landings. 
It could also be possible to develop incentives to steer fishing effort to 
certain species and away from others, for example by offering extra effort allo-
cations. 
1.4.2.2 Limited adjustment of effort 
Once a basic level of fishing effort is set, for instance the current one, 
regular (annual) adjustments according to the state of stocks or other consider-
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ations may be required. In principle downward as well as upward adjustment 
should be possible. 
Economic activity of the fleet would partly depend on the scope of the 
possible adjustment. In general an improvement may be expected compared 
to the current situation as the vessels can pursue a greater efficiency. 
A possibility of adjustment offers biologically greater protection for 
threatened stocks, for instance recruitment failure may require reduction of 
fishing mortality. The impact on the environment is less stable than in the 
above case. 
Allowing for (annual) adjustment may be institutionally appreciated by 
policy makers as well as by the sector as it offers a certain political flexibility. 
At the same time the process of negotiations may become more burdensome. 
1.4.2.3 Minimum level of effort 
In order to achieve a good protection of the stocks, it would be theoreti-
cally possible to set the level of effort at some minimum. Minimum level of 
effort would mean a broad application of the 'precautionary principle'. This 
case is comparable to the 'constant effort over several years', but at a low level 
of activity. 
Short run economic performance would deteriorate. The sector would 
become profitable only in the long run after a significant reduction of the size 
of the fleet. Flexibility, possibility of planning and market consistency will be 
seriously reduced. A large discrepancy between the regulations and daily prac-
tice can be expected. The race for fish will intensify, even if effort rights are 
allocated to individual producers, in an attempt to survive under the new re-
strictions. 
Optimum biological protection of the stocks is achieved. Fishing mortality 
is reduced to a minimum as is the effect on the ecosystem. High-grading should 
be negligible. 
Severe problems may be expected at the institutional level. Political and 
sectoral acceptability will be low due to the short term socio-economic conse-
quences. Relative stability is lost just like in all other cases of effort based man-
agement. Enforcement would have to be intensified to contain the 'illegal' 
attempts of the fishing companies to survive. The precise definition of the 'min-
imum' would be of crucial importance. 
In view of the above evaluation, this measure is considered of little practi-
cal interest and therefore will not be included in the case studies. 
1.4.2.4 Anti-cyclical approach 
This option is comparable to the anti-cyclical MAT AC option. At times of 
good recruitment, the allowed increase of fishing effort would remain below 
the biologically allowed possibilities. On the other hand at times of poor re-
cruitment relatively high fishing effort (and mortality) would be permitted. 
Good stocks would therefore be spared, while recovery of poor stocks would 
be slowed down. Such a system could be particularly applicable to stocks which 
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have been maintained at a fairly good level and are characterised by regular 
recruitment. 
Increasing effort at times when the stock goes down would deteriorate 
the average economic results due to depressed average productivity. Short 
term flexibility is reduced in good years, when it may not be so essential. But 
it is greater in poor years when correct choices may be crucial to a firm's sur-
vival. Long term (investment) planning will be based on a more stable effort 
level, which will, however, be coupled with a sub-optimal level of productivity. 
New investments will be discouraged. Stabilization of effort and supply should 
lead to good market consistency. The regulations do not mirror well the daily 
practice of the vessels, as it is not possible to take full advantage of abundant 
stocks. The race for fish will not be affected. 
Biologically, the anti-cyclical approach is not logical as it protects more 
the good stocks and less the poor ones. Fishing mortality goes contrary to the 
desired trends. The precise characteristics of the stocks concerned and the speci-
fication of the anti-cyclical approach will determine in the end the biological 
acceptability of the system. 
Institutional considerations lead to mixed conclusions. Political and sec-
toral acceptance could be reasonable because of the pursued stabilization. 
Relative stability would have to be completely redefined. The consequences in 
terms of subsidiarity and the impact on local communities seem uncertain. 
In view of the above evaluation, this measure is considered of little practi-
cal interest and therefore will not be included in the case studies. 
1.4.3 Evaluation of effort measures 
1.4.3.1 Economics 
Flexibility 
Effort measures increase vessels' short term flexibility 'when' and 'where' 
to fish. A new problem which arises is that it may be necessary to impose re-
strictions as to 'what' to fish, i.e. species/stocks in order to prevent an excessive 
fishing mortality of certain species on which a fleet may concentrate. 
Planning 
Independently of the precise definition, effort management implies a 
certain stabilization of the fleet's activity in the medium and long term. It may 
also pursue a specified trend, as is the case under the MAGP III objectives. 
Therefore the possibility of long term (investment) planning is expected to 
improve, although the outlook may not be in all situations equally favourable. 
Evidently, the natural fluctuations of stocks will remain as a main component 
of risk. 
Market consistency 
Effort measures will be market consistent as the vessels will be in the posi-
t ion to decide when, where and how much to fish, according to the incentives 
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of the market. Special arrangement are required to prevent large scale shifts 
of effort from one species to another. 
Daily practice 
To what extent an effort based policy will be experienced as realistic will 
largely depend on the precise situation of stocks and the specification of the 
effort measures. The fleet could operate fairly freely within its effort allocation. 
Certain inconveniences, for instance bycatch regulations, could be eliminated. 
Early closure of the fishery still remains possible when the effort allocation is 
exhausted. 
Race for fish 
If the allocation of effort is made on a vessel by vessel basis, the race for 
fish would be avoided. Allocations by countries or groups of vessels, without 
further arrangements, will lead to an internal competition and a continued 
race. 
Economic performance 
A general conclusion on economic performance cannot be drawn. Catches 
and revenues will depend on the change in size and composition of the stock. 
At the same time changes in production costs will occur. 
1.4.3.2 Biology 
Stock conservation 
Constant/stabilized fishing mortality could be pursued, which is desirable. 
However, shifts of the effort from one species to another would have to be 
contained within certain limits. Short term adjustment of effort needs to re-
main possible in order to allow for specific natural developments, for instance 
recruitment failure. 
Fishing mortality 
Effort measures allow stabilization of the fishing mortality within speci-
fied ranges. One of the main biological conditions for effective stock manage-
ment is met. 
High-grading 
High-grading makes no sense under effort based management. Discard-
ing commercially valuable species will always represent a loss of revenues for 
the vessel. High-grading may still occur under some conditions, for instance 
when the volume of the fish hold would impose a restriction on fishing opera-
tions. 
Discarding 
Discards of non-commercial species are directly linked to the level of ef-
fort. Setting this level, the discarding problem may be explicitly included 
among the considerations. 
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Ecosystem management 
Fixing fishing effort to a (fairly) constant level would contribute to stabili-
zation of the human impact on the ecosystem. Setting the level of TAE may 
also account for protection of the ecosystem, particularly for specific marine 
areas. 
1.4.3.3 Policy and institutions 
Political acceptance 
Political acceptance is uncertain. Introducing a new system may raise new 
conflicts between fleets and countries. Complex negotiations between Member 
States as well as between administrations and the sector have to be expected. 
A set of accompanying measures will have to be developed, for instance access 
to stocks. The link to the TACs is not straightforward. 
Sectoral acceptance 
Sectoral acceptance will depend on the perception of achieved economic 
advantages and the likelihood of effective implementation. Several economic 
considerations allow for 'careful optimism', which should be reflected in the 
position of the professional organizations. On the other hand, any new man-
agement regime offers not only new opportunities but also new (unknown) 
threats which may lead to scepticism on the part of the industry. 
Relative stability 
Relative stability will be lost unless an unambiguous link between effort-
units and TACs/quota could be established. However, this does not seem very 
easy. Therefore the principle of relative stability would have to be fully re-
viewed and reformulated, which will require extensive negotiations. 
Enforcement 
To control fishing effort in terms of days-at-sea of a certain fleet segment 
seems relatively more simple than counting precisely the landed tonnes. The 
method of control of presence in port or at sea is also less direct, which should 
lessen the potential frictions between the controlling institutions and the fleet. 
The total EU-12 fleet is composed of some 100,000 vessels (including 
coastal small scale). Its total activity will be in the order of 15 mln vessel-sea-
days. This number may be compared to about 6-7 mln tonnes of landed fish of 
a large number of species. 
Subsidiarity 
Implementation of a TAE system at a low administrative level does not 
seem to pose any special new problems as long as the legal 'rules of the game' 
specify the rights and responsibilities of the involved institutions at various 
levels. 
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Local communities 
The local communities will probably profit from the general stabilization 
which is the core of an effort based management. However, this does not imply 
an increase in the economic role of the fisheries sector. Regional distribution 
of fishing rights and their transferability will determine the future potential of 
fisheries for specific communities. 
Beyond 2002 
Effort measures seem to offer an interesting option for fisheries manage-
ment beyond 2002, assuming that a completely new system will be put in place 
in which national allocations will not play a role. Clearly, an EU system of fish-
ery specific licences and allowed activity allocations (e.g. days-at-sea) would 
need further analysis. 
It seems likely that management by effort would be particularly suited for 
vessels beyond a certain minimum size. The total EU fishing fleet is composed 
of some 100,000 vessels, but taking the 12m limit, only about 25,000 would 
have to be controlled. Furthermore, activity of larger vessels can be more easily 
monitored as most of them rely on a relatively small number of harbours. 
Separate attention would have to be given to the small coastal fleet. 
While its catches may not be very significant, in some areas it operates in the 
biological reproduction zones, so that its effect on the stocks may not be negli-
gible. 
1.4.3.4 Other considerations 
Consistency 
Some specifications of effort measures will provide a high degree of con-
sistency between stock management, economic considerations and manage-
ment of the structure of the fleet. 
Introducing a fairly new concept into the existing fisheries management 
system will call for withdrawal of certain regulations which have become obso-
lete. Otherwise new inconsistencies can be expected. 
Transparency 
Several transparency problems will have to be expected. Specification of 
a common denominator of effort in fisheries where different technologies are 
used will require special attention. The link between fishing effort, fishing mor-
tality and the current TACs will have to be quantified. A fair transparency can 
be expected only after operating the system for several years. 
New problems 
The new problems may arise in particular conditions. Technological prog-
ress or changes in fleet structure may require a continuous restriction of fishing 
effort. Shifting of the effort from one species to another may aggravate stock 
fluctuations. New conflicts between fleets can be expected. 
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1.5 Methodology - summary and conclusions 
General 
1. The methodology explores unknown situations. The main method ap-
plied to develop and apply the methodology can be characterised as an 
'adjusted Delphi method', i.e. development of gradual consensus of the 
Research Team. 
2. Evaluation of specific situations and their comparisons depend heavily on 
the assumptions made. These are specified as far as possible in the text. 
3. Although the CFP needs to be improved, some unfavourable trends in EU 
fisheries should not be interpreted solely as CFP failures. Economic prob-
lems are partly a result of world trends (trade, exchange rates, etc.). Bio-
logical expectations were too optimistic at the outset of the CFP. The 
political and institutional will to implement the CFP was 'constrained by 
other considerations'. 
4. An important number of multi-annual and multi-species measures are 
already included within the existing management system. 
5. Introduction of new measures should be only considered if they are fully 
consistent wi th other measures in force and if there is full commitment 
to effective implementation within a well defined time frame. 
6. Different sets of measures will be effective in different situations. There 
is no generally valid blueprint for management. 
7. The specified measures are evaluated on the basis of 21 qualitative crite-
ria. Their effects are different depending on the characteristics of the 
actual situation. 
7. The Mid-Term Review formulates specific expectations regarding multi-
species and multi-annual measures. The general analysis indicates that 
these expectations are at best only partly justified. 
8. Nine specifications of multi-annual measures are presented, five multi-
species measures and four effort measures (combination of multi-species 
and multi-annual). Not all specifications are equally realistic so that only 
some are treated in the case studies. The aim is not to solve all problems, 
but rather to develop a framework of thinking about the new measures 
to be applied in the case studies. 
Multi-annual quantity measures 
9. Multi-annual measures will meet certain objections of the sector and 
prevent early closure of a fishery. However, simple shifting of the quota 
year for some species may produce a comparable result. 
10. Unlimited transfer of catches from one year to another has to be pre-
vented by setting a limit, possibly the introduction of an 'interest rate' as 
a 'fine' for fishing now rather than later (or to promote postponing fish-
ing to later years). Otherwise a multi-annual approach does not seem 
biologically feasible. 
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Multi-species quantity measures 
12. Multi-species management may be an approach to resolve certain bycatch 
problems. However, free transfer between species may lead to unpredict-
able shifts of fishing mortality and consequently to collapse of some 
stocks. There is a serious danger of large-scale high-grading of catches. 
Effort measures - combination of multi-annual and multi-species 
13. Management by effort offers potentially interesting possibilities in the 
long run, after 2002. However, until then it seems institutionally unac-
ceptable because the relative stability would be completely lost. 
14. Technological progress, input substitution and ambiguous effort defini-
tions may dilute the effects of effort management in the long run. 
New measures and old problems 
14. Potential effectiveness of the new measures will depend on the condi-
tions under which they are implemented. The ownership of fishing rights 
(common property vs. private ownership) is the single most important 
issue, which will affect the pressure from the fleet to avoid the regula-
tions and the possibilities of prosecution. 
15. High-grading wil l only be eased if greater flexibility can be achieved. 
16. Discarding of non-commercial species and the effect on the ecosystem are 
not related to multi-species or multi-annual measures, but rather to the 
level of allowed fishing activity. 
17. Involvement of professional organizations in fisheries management and 
the role of local communities (subsidiarity) can only be achieved by speci-
fying the fishing rights at the appropriate levels. 
New problems 
18. When introducing new measures various new problems have to be ex-
pected, for instance formulation of the new definitions or new conflicts 
between fleets or countries, with a consequent complex political negotia-
t ion process. 
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Appendix 1.1 Summary of the criteria and their content 
Economics Level of individual enterprises 
FLEXIBILITY 
PLANNING 
MARKET CONSISTENCY 
DAILY PRACTICE 
RACE FOR FISH 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
short term decisions - where, when and 
what to fish 
long term decisions - investment 
(dis)incentives - policy in line with market 
forces 
frictions between what is administratively 
desirable and what the natural environ-
ment makes possible 
irregularities of production process 
change in profitability due to volume of 
landings 
Biology Natural environment 
SPAWNING STOCK 
FISHING MORTALITY 
HIGH-GRADING 
DISCARDING 
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 
minimum level 
stabilization 
discards of commercial species 
non-commercial species and commercial 
species when quota is taken 
prevention irreversible processes - precau-
tionary principle 
Policy/institutions Private (sectoral) and public interests at 
aggregate level 
POLITICAL ACCEPTANCE 
SECTORAL ACCEPTANCE 
RELATIVE STABILITY 
NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 
SUBSIDIARITY 
LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
BEYOND 2002 
will/commitment to implement 
credibility, scientific objectives vs. measures 
taken 
fixed allocation of TACs 
feasibility of effective implementation and 
control, given available funds 
delegation of the implementation to lo-
cal/regional institutions 
socio-economic impact 
principles of EU - free movement 
Other considerations 
CONSISTENCY 
TRANSPARENCY 
NEW PROBLEMS 
economic, biological and political objec-
tives and consequences 
clear justification and explanation 
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Appendix 1.2 List of precautionary TACs in 1995 
A total of 106 TACs was set at the beginning of 1995 (excluding arrangements 
w i th third countries - Greenland, Faroes, etc.) 67 TACs were precautionary. 
Species ICES-area Species ICES-area 
Herring 
Herring 
Herring 
Herring 
Herring 
Herring 
Herring 
Anchovy 
Anchovy 
Cod 
Cod 
Cod 
Cod 
Megrim 
Megrim 
Anglerfish 
Anglerfish 
Anglerfish 
Haddock 
Haddock 
Haddock 
Whit ing 
Whit ing 
Whit ing 
Whit ing 
Whit ing 
Whit ing 
Blue whi t ing 
Blue whi t ing 
Blue whi t ing 
Blue whi t ing 
Blue whi t ing 
Norway lobster 
Norway lobster 
Norway lobster 
4c, 7d 
5b, 6aN, 6b 
6aS, 7bc 
6a Clyde 
7a 
7ef 
7ghjk 
8 
9, 10, Copace 34.1.1 
3a Skag. 
3a Kat. 
5b, 6, 12, 14 
7b-k, 8, 9, 10, Copace 34.1.1 
5b, 6, 12, 14 
8c, 9, 10, Copace 34.1.1 
5b, 6, 12, 14 
8e 
8c, 9, 10, Cecaf 34.1.1 
3abcd 
5b, 6, 12, 14 
7,8 ,9 , 10, Cecaf 34.1.1 
3a 
5b, 6, 12, 14 
7a 
7b-k 
8 
9, 10, Cecaf 34.1.1 
2a, 4 
5b, 6, 7 
8abd 
8e 
8c, 9, 10, Cecaf 34.1.1 
3a-d 
2a, 4 
5b, 6 
Norway lobster 
Norway lobster 
Norway lobster 
Norway lobster 
Norway lobster 
Plaice 
Plaice 
Plaice 
Plaice 
Plaice 
Plaice 
Plaice 
Pollack 
Pollack 
Pollack 
Pollack 
Pollack 
Pollack 
Pollack 
Pollack 
Saithe 
Mackerel 
Common sole 
Common sole 
Common sole 
Common sole 
Common sole 
Sprat 
Sprat 
Sprat 
Horse mackerel 
Horse mackerel 
Norway pout 
7 
8a b 
8c 
8de 
9, 10, Cecaf 34.1.1 
3a Skag 
3a Kat. 
3bcd 
5b, 6, 12, 14 
7bc 
7hjk 
8,9, 10, Cecaf 34.1.1 
5b, 6, 12, 14 
7 
8a b 
8c 
8c 
8d 
8e 
9, 10, Cecaf 34.1.1 
7,8,9,10, Cecaf 34.1.1 
8c, 9, 10 Cecaf 34.1.1 
3a-d 
5b, 6, 12, 14 
7bc 
7hjk 
8cde, 9,10, Cecaf 34.1.1 
3a 
2a, 4 
7de 
2a, 4 
5b, 6, 7,8abde, 12,14 
2a, 4 
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Appendix 1.3 List of abbreviations 
ACFM Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management 
ANOP Association Nationale des Organisations de Producteurs 
bin billion 
CFP Common Fisheries Policy 
cpue Catch per unit of effort 
DAS Days-at-sea 
DG Directorate General 
EAFE European Association of Fisheries Economists 
EC European Commission 
ECU European currency unit 
F Fishing mortal i ty 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
FEDOPA Federation des Organisations de Producteurs de la Pêche Artisanale 
GR Gross tonnage 
GRT Gross registered tonnage 
HP Horse Power 
ICES International Council fo r Exploration of the Sea 
IFREMER Institut Francais de Recherche pour l 'Exploration de la Mer 
ITQ Individual transferable quota 
kW kilowatt 
LEI-DLO Agricultural Economies Research Institute 
LOA Length over all 
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (UK) 
MAGP Multi-Annual Guidance Programme 
MAM Multi-annual measures 
MATAC Multi-annual total allowable catch 
MBAL Minimum biologically acceptable level 
MEY Maximum economic yield 
mln Million 
MSM Multi-species measures 
MSTAC Multi-species total allowable catch 
MSY Maximum sustainable yield 
NAFO North Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
RIVO-DLO Netherlands Institute for Fisheries Research 
SFIA Sea Fish Industry Authority 
SFO Scottish Fishermen's Organization 
SOAFD Scottish Office Agriculture and Fisheries Department 
SSB Spawning Stock Biomass 
STECF/STCF Scientific, Technical (and Economic) Commission for Fisheries 
TAC Total al lowable catch 
TAE Total al lowable ef for t 
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2. NORTH SEA ROUNDFISH FISHERY 
C. Egner, J. Pope and P. Rodgers. 
Summary 
Fishing effort in the North Sea roundfish fishery focuses on the cod, had-
dock whit ing and saithe species. While the fishery is predominately mixed in 
character, the fishery for saithe is relatively distinct geographically, being lo-
cated close to the Norwegian coast. It is fished mainly by France and Norway. 
Analysis in the case is directed at the mixed aspects of the fishery and thus 
cod, haddock and whit ing. Eight European countries have been identified as 
participants in the fishery (i.e. on cod, haddock and whiting) and by order of 
landings volume are Scotland, Denmark, England, the Netherlands, France and 
Germany. The Belgian and Norwegian share of the fishery is very small indeed. 
While there appears to be a great deal of international interest in landing 
cod, the fishery for haddock and whiting is almost exclusively targeted by Scot-
tish vessels. 
The fishery is fairly heavily regulated at present through both national 
schemes and those promulgated at the EU level. National regulations are 
largely directed toward the control of capacity via licensing systems and restric-
tions on vessel replacement. However, some countries are also imposing days-
at-sea limitations on their fleets. EU regulations consist of technical measures, 
structural measures and the implementation of TACs. 
Despite the management regulations, all three species of North Sea 
roundfish are currently being heavily exploited with some 50-60% of each be-
ing removed annually by fishing. Recruitment is in most cases, highly variable 
(particularly for haddock) and as a result, there is considerable variability in the 
abundance of each species and in resultant landings. The fishery has become 
very dependent upon juvenile fish. 
TACs, which are the principal instrument of fisheries management, do not 
appear to have excercised restraint on the exploitation rates of roundfish. It is 
generally recognized that there is currently excessive fishing capacity in the 
fishery. As a result, more recent attempts to reduce TACs to attain reductions 
in fishing mortality appear to have simply exacerbated the problems of illegal 
landings, mis-reporting and discarding. 
There is particular scientific concern about North Sea cod which is cur-
rently perceived to be on the verge of collapse. The spawning stock biomass 
(SSB) is currently well below the 'safe' level considered appropriate to avoid 
recruitment failure. 
The concerns about the abundance of roundfish have prompted the Advi-
sory Commitee for Fisheries Management (ACFM) to recommend that the ex-
ploitation rates for all three species be reduced by an amount corresponding 
to a 30% reduction in fishing mortality. The issue therefore is whether the al-
ternative measures under review can in fact achieve this aim. 
95 
TAC-based multi-annual measures suffer from similar defects to the exist-
ing TAC management system and cannot be expected to achieve the required 
reduction in exploitation rates. They do not address the issue of fleet overca-
pacity which is contributing to excessive fishing and do not force vessels to bear 
the marginal social costs of overfishing which manifest themselves in higher 
fishing costs for other vessels (because of congestion) and a reduction in fishing 
opportunities (and revenues) for the fishermen of the future. 
The problems of overfishing are therefore economic in character and 
stem from the incorrect price signals being sent to fishermen regarding the 
true costs of fishing. 
Many variants of multi-annual measure (MAMs) considered involve set-
t ing TACs a number of years in advance. The variability in recruitment of 
roundfish makes it extremely difficult to predict actual stock abundance more 
than two years ahead. It is therefore very likely that a multi-annual TAC 
(MATAC) for roundfish species would fail to track changes in stock abundance. 
This would cause particular conservation problems in years where there was 
unexpectedly poor recruitment during a multi-annual period. 
While many forms of MAM eradicate the need for annual negotiations 
in December to set the TAC, they would be replaced by an altogether more 
contentious negotiation process every three or four years. 
TAC-based multi-species measures (MSMs) remove the requirement for 
individual species TACs and do acknowledge the realities of fishing in a fishery 
which is mixed in character. However, once again they are variants of the exist-
ing management regime to the extent that they rely upon TACs to constrain 
the fishery and do nothing to address the issue of excessive capacity which is 
the cause of overexploitation. MSMs which involve interchangeability of TACs 
between species are likely to create numerous negotiating difficulties given the 
difficulties associated with agreeing at what rates individual species TACs can 
be swapped (i.e. exchange rates). In addition the MSTAC weakens the ability 
of managers to protect individual species. 
As is the case with the current system of TACs, any attempt to attain the 
required reduction in fishing mortality through a restrictive multi-species TAC 
is likely to exacerbate the problems of illegal landings, misreporting and dis-
carding. It is difficult to be optimistic about the conservation benefits of such 
measures. 
Effort measures have been considered in the context of days-at-sea (DAS) 
limitations in the case study. They differ from the other two forms of manage-
ment regime in controlling inputs as opposed to outputs. There are obvious 
attractions associated with the implementation of a DAS scheme in terms of 
the administrative simplicity of the measure and the relative ease of enforcing 
it. 
If the DAS scheme was effectively enforced and allocated days were set 
at the correct level, there would undoubtedly be some conservation benefits 
in terms of reduced fishing mortality. However, establishing the correct level 
of effort is problematic. DAS are very imprecise conservation instruments and 
are likely to prove poor predictors of catches and landings given the scope that 
they offer vessels for input substitution. Moreover the link between effort 
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(measured in days) and fishing mortality is likely to be notoriously difficult to 
predict and unstable over time. The catch capabilities of vessels naturally vary 
according to size and technical specification and this emphasizes the difficulties 
associated with defining effort in a way that facilitates comparison across fish-
ing fleets. 
'Capital stuffing' to increase catch (i.e. investing in equip-
ment/technology) is likely to be the long-run industry response to days-at-sea 
allocations in efforts to make the best use of available sea time. Allocated days 
would therefore have to be progressively reduced to compensate for more 
powerful vessels. This suggests financial hardship for a number of vessels a fac-
tor that cannot be ignored, given that the promotion of an economically viable 
fishing industry is a CFP objective in addition to the more familiar conservation 
of stocks. 
Thus days-at-sea, which will force an increasing degree of idleness, are 
not long-run economic solutions to the problems of the fishery which really are 
economic in character. 
None of the measures under review consider long-run economic solutions 
to the problem of overexploitation of roundfish stocks. To eradicate overfish-
ing, it is necessary to change the cost function that the vessel is confronted 
wi th . This suggests instituting some form of charging mechanism involving 
fishermen paying for their fishing rights. These are the sorts of issues which 
future research should be addressing. 
Part A Description of the fishery 
2.0 Introduction 
Fishing effort in the North Sea roundfish fishery is mainly directed at cod, 
haddock, whiting and saithe. In reality, the roundfish fishery comprises of two 
relatively distinct segments i.e. a mixed fishery on cod, haddock and whit ing 
and the more geographically distinct saithe fishery which is located in close 
proximity to Norway and is exploited by both Norway and France. 
Because management problems appear particularly acute in a mixed fish-
ery, it was considered appropriate to limit much of the analysis to the mixed 
aspects of the fishery and thus the cod, whit ing and haddock species. 
North Sea TACs and Landings Trends 
The 1994 TACs for cod, haddock and whiting were set at 102,000 tonnes, 
160,000 tonnes and 100,000 tonnes respectively. Only around half of the whit-
ing TAC is allocated to Member States for the purposes of human consumption, 
the remaining 50% accounts for industrial bycatch. At average 1994 prices the 
fishery is valued at approximately 320 mln ECU per year. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates how annual TACs for each of the roundfish species 
have fallen over the past decade since their establishment. The TAC for cod has 
been reduced by almost 150,000 tonnes from its 1985 peak whilst the haddock 
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Figure 2.1 TACs in ICES area IV, 1984-1994 
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities, various issues 1984-94. 
TAC for 1994 is only around 70% of its 1986 peak. It is evident that the TAC for 
haddock has been particularly volatile over the decade having been cut by over 
60% between 1988 and 1989. 
The reductions in TACs in more recent years reflect increasing concern 
about species availability given poor and variable recruitment and excessive 
levels of fishing mortality. Indeed, the ACFM has consistently recommended 
that fishing effort be reduced by the order of 30% in order to conserve both 
cod and haddock as well as whit ing. 
Despite this, and as will be discussed in section 2.2, TACs have proved 
ineffective in reducing the exploitation rate of cod and haddock stocks which 
have been subjected to very high levels of fishing mortality. 
Figure 2.2 plots international catches of North Sea cod, haddock and 
whiting for the last 35 years. From a brief review, it is clear that there has been 
a considerable degree of variability in the catches of the three round-fish spe-
cies being considered. The variation is most marked in the case of haddock 
where catches rose to exceptionally high levels in the late 1960s and early 70s 
but subsequently fell over the latter half of the 1980s. 
Similar trends are evident in the catches of North Sea cod where landings 
rose fairly markedly over the period from the mid 60s to the early 80s and de-
clined rapidly thereafter. 
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Figure 2.2 Human consumption landings of North Sea roundfish, 1958-1993 
Source: ICES Bulletin Statistique des Pêches Maritimes, Volumes 43-65 and Reports of the Work-
ing Group on the Assessment of Demersal Stocks in the North Sea and Skagerrak. ICES CM 
1993/Assess 5, 1994/Assess 6, 1995/Assess 8. 
The surge in landings of cod and haddock over the 60s and 70s has come 
to be recognized as the gadoid outburst and appears to have been attributable 
to record levels of recruitment probably induced by environmental factors. The 
precise reasons for this phenomenon have never been adequately explained 
but its policy implications are quite profound. 
Many fishermen originally cited the depressed catches and their coinci-
dence wi th the introduction of TACs as evidence of the excessive restrictions 
placed upon them by fisheries managers. However, examination of figure 2.2 
suggests that catches in the latter half of the eighties may simply have returned 
to the more normal levels last seen in the early sixties i.e. levels consistent wi th 
more normal recruitment patterns. 
This said, catch levels of cod and haddock in the 1990s are sufficiently low 
to give rise to concerns about their longer term availability. Consistently high 
levels of fishing mortality and variable recruitment have left these species 
heavily pressured (see later). 
One of the most damaging legacies of the gadoid outburst is the effect 
that it has exerted on the catch expectations of fishermen prosecuting North 
Sea roundfish. Catch expectations subsequent to the ending of the outburst do 
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not appear to have been adjusted downwards and are accordingly unrealisti-
cally high at present. This has not only fuelled conflict between the industry 
and fishery managers but has undoubtedly contributed to excessive levels of 
effort being applied to the fishery. 
The reductions in species availability coupled with successive reductions 
in TACs have also effectively exacerbated the problems of overcapacity in the 
North Sea roundfish fishery given the fact that a consequent reduction in EU 
fleet size has not been achieved. 
2.1 Countries and fleets involved 
Table 2.1 profiles the characteristics of the North Sea roundfish fishery in 
terms of the countries and fleets principally involved. The data was sourced 
from the database of the North Sea roundfish working group and as such does 
not have complete information for all the countries concerned. In particular, 
no effort data was available for the trawl and seine fleets of Denmark. Effort 
data associated with the activities of Belgian and German vessels was also un-
available. 
The effort figures presented in table 2.1 should be viewed with caution 
given that definitions of effort vary from country to country. Some countries 
record effort in terms of hours fished (e.g. UK, Norway and France) whilst oth-
ers (e.g. Netherlands and Denmark) use more arbitrary measures based on days 
and kW. For this reason, it is not possible to compare effort directly between 
countries. To give some measure of the relative importance of each fleet in the 
fishery however, total landings of roundfish in 1993 have been presented. 
Table 2.1 identifies 8 countries of significance exploiting the North Sea 
roundfish fishery. On the basis of aggregated 1993 landings (by weight) of cod, 
haddock, whit ing and saithe. Scotland is clearly the dominant player in the 
fishery accounting for some 41 % of fish landed. Norway is the next most im-
portant country, followed by France, Denmark, England & Wales, Germany, the 
Netherlands and lastly Belgium. 
The inclusion of saithe in the analysis of effort makes a considerable 
difference to the ranking of countries. Whilst the dominant Scottish fishing 
fleet is largely involved in the mixed cod, haddock and whit ing fishery (chiefly 
in the northern and middle North Sea), the Norwegian fleet is predominately 
involved in fishing for saithe in close proximity to the Norwegian coast. Saithe 
is also targeted in the northern North Sea by French freezer and high sea trawl-
ers as well as German cutters. 
As indicated earlier, the proximity of the saithe fishing grounds to Nor-
way, suggests that it can almost be considered a separate fishery in the North 
Sea, distinct from the mixed gadoid fishery in which cod, haddock and whiting 
are exploited. Given that management problems are particularly acute in the 
latter sub-fishery most of the remaining analysis of the case focuses on the cod, 
haddock and whit ing species. 
Scottish vessels still exert the dominant influence in the mixed gadoid 
fishery accounting for over half of human consumption landings. Denmark is 
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the next most important country wi th around 11 % of human consumption 
landings although it should be noted that the actual Danish share of the fish-
ery is somewhat higher given that a substantial whit ing bycatch is taken by 
Danish industrial trawlers (section 2.2). The other countries of significance in 
order of catch volume are England & Wales, the Netherlands, Norway, France 
and Germany. The participation of the Belgian fleet is of relatively small magni-
tude. 
Figure 2.3 presents information on the catch origins of the three 
roundfish species respectively. The landings pattern for North Sea cod is rela-
tively international in its dimensions with Scotland, Denmark, England & Wales 
and the Netherlands all being significant participants. By contrast, there is 
much less international interest in landing haddock and whit ing for human 
consumption purposes and as a result the bulk of landings of both species are 
made by Scottish vessels. 
Scottish fleet 
The Scottish fleets presented in table 2.1 mainly deploy seine or trawl 
gears in the exploitation of roundfish. The demersal trawl (heavy towed gear) 
and seine fleets tend to prosecute fishing grounds along the east coast of Scot-
land and Shetland while the larger vessels in the light trawl and pair trawl 
fleets often fish as far out as the Viking Bank (Norwegian coast) and also fish 
for cod, haddock and whiting in the central North Sea. 
The pair trawl fleet is essentially a component of the light trawl fleet and 
together these fleets account for the largest share of roundfish landings by 
Scottish vessels. Seiners also land a large volume of roundfish although they 
tend to target haddock taking a significant bycatch of cod and whit ing in the 
process. 
Landings from the heavy trawl fleet are now very small indeed given the 
uneconomic nature of trawling using heavy ground gear. The number of ves-
sels in the fleet has accordingly declined to a very low level. 
Denmark 
From the Danish perspective. North Sea roundfish is predominately tar-
geted by Danish gill netters with the principal onus being on the landing of 
North Sea cod. Cod is also landed by the Danish seine fleet although these ves-
sels tend to target plaice. 
While the larger Danish trawlers target pelagic fish, the smaller trawlers 
also direct their operation to the landing of cod and haddock. The industrial 
trawl fleet catch a significant volume of whit ing as bycatch. 
England & Wales 
There are two major fleets prosecuting the North Sea roundf ishery i.e. the 
seine and trawl fleets respectively. The latter in fact consists of vessels adopting 
pair trawl and otter trawling methods. There are possibly around 400 otter 
trawl vessels targeting mixed demersal finfish (e.g. cod, haddock, saithe, whit-
ing and plaice) principally operating around the north east coast of England. 
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The pair trawl fleet by contrast, tends to target cod and operates in the west-
ern segment of the mid North Sea. 
Cod is also the target species for the seine fleet (around 40 vessels) which 
tends to operate in the central portion of area (IV(b)). 
Netherlands 
Otter trawl and pair trawl are the main gears being deployed by the 
Netherlands in the targeting of North Sea roundfish. The Dutch roundfish fleet 
has been reduced from about 216 vessels (300-1,500 HP) in 1987 to 72 vessels 
in 1993, mainly as a result of decommissioning. Vessels remaining in the fleet 
segment also fish for flatfish and operate in both the southern and central 
North Sea. 
The pair trawl fleet operates in a similar region to the otter trawlers and 
the catch composition is also much the same, wi th the exception of plaice 
(which is only caught in very small quantities). 
1,000 tonnes 
Scotland Denmark England & Wales Netherlands Norway Germany Belgium 
Figure 2.3a International Landings of North Sea Cod, 1993 
Source a,b,c Report of the Working Group on the assessment of Demersal Stocks in the North 
Sea and Skagerrak. ICES CM 1995/Assess 8. 
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Figure 2.3b International Landings of North Sea Haddock, 1993 
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Figure 2.3c International Landings of North Sea Whiting, 1993 
Note: Danish figures for whiting include industrial bycatch. 
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France 
The bulk of French roundfish landings are made by the various trawl 
fleets listed in table 2.1. The bottom trawlers and freezer trawlers tend to tar-
get saithe and ling wi th cod, haddock and whit ing usually being taken as a 
bycatch of these fisheries. The freezer trawlers operate in both the northern 
and central North Sea. 
The French high sea trawlers which took the largest volume of cod, had-
dock and whit ing amongst the French fleets do most of their fishing in the 
northern North Sea, west of Scotland and the Faroes. Again the principal target 
species is saithe, wi th a significant bycatch of cod and whit ing. 
Other Countries 
The other countries worth mentioning are Belgium and Germany. The 
larger German cutters (36 m) operate almost exclusively in the northern North 
Sea and predominately target saithe. However, the smaller vessels in the cutter 
f leet exploit cod and their operations extend to the central North Sea (ICES 
area IV(b)). 
The Belgian fleet is not all that significant in the roundfishery in terms of 
landings volume. The Belgian otter trawl fleet principally targets cod (bycatch 
of plaice and whiting) wi th around 35 vessels operating in the central and 
southern North Sea. There is also a directed pair trawl fishery for cod which 
tends to operate in close proximity to the Belgian coast. 
Fishing capacity 
It is widely conceded that there is substantial overcapacity in the fishing 
fleets exploiting the North Sea roundfish fishery. In an attempt to address this 
issue, all EU countries are subject to MAGP targets specifying required reduc-
tions in the capacity of beam trawl and demersal trawl fleets. The reduction 
targets are 15% and 20% respectively and require to be met by the close of 
1996. The effectiveness of the MAGP targets are, however, likely to be eroded 
to some extent by technical progress in the fleet (possibly of the order of 2% 
per annum). 
The UK fishing fleet which has the dominant stake in the fishery mainly 
on account of the size of Scottish interests is overcapitalized and may have sub-
stantial problems in meeting its MAGP targets despite the extra 28 mln pounds 
which the government has pledged to the decommissioning programme. 
The adoption of scientific advice to cut roundfish mortality by 30% wil l 
undoubtedly exacerbate capacity problems. Thus overcapitalization is likely to 
remain problematic. This factor coupled with observed fragility in North Sea 
cod and haddock stocks (see next section) indicate that the problems faced by 
the North Sea roundfish fishery are likely to become acute. 
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2.2 Biological base 
Cod, haddock and whiting are all members of the same family of fishes, 
the gadoids. Although haddock are more or less absent from the southern 
North Sea, the distribution of the species overlaps considerably and all three 
species are commonly caught together in the same gears. While there are simi-
larities in their biology and there are predatory interactions between them, it 
is convenient to discuss their population dynamics separately. The overview of 
the stocks given below is drawn predominantly from assessments made by the 
ICES Working Group on the Assessment of Demersal Stocks in the North Sea 
and Skagerrak (Anon, 1995). Detailed data on these stocks are available from 
the early 1960s. 
Cod 
This is the largest of the three species commonly growing to over a metre 
in length. The fish mature comparatively late, at about age 4, spawning annu-
ally in the first quarter of the year. They are highly predatory, feeding on fish 
and invertebrates. They are also cannibalistic. 
Figure 2.4 summarizes the stock trends for cod since 1963. The fishing 
mortality rate, F, which measures the proportion of the stock removed by fish-
ing annually, has risen gradually over the period. The magnitude of F is such 
that about 50-60% of the stock in weight is removed each year. The removals 
have to be replaced by new fish entering the stock if the population is to be 
sustained. These new fish, the recruits, are the fish of a single spawning which 
later enter the fishery. For cod these recruits are aged about one year when 
they are first taken by the fishery. Figure 2.4 shows these recruits for the last 
three decades. It is noticeable that there are large fluctuations in recruitment 
from year to year and this inevitably leads to variability in the stock. The stock 
variability is most clearly seen in the total stock biomass but is less apparent in 
the biomass of mature fish, the spawning stock biomass. An important feature 
of recruitment is that although recruitment is variable, there has been a period 
of relatively low recruitment since 1986. This is related to a decline in the 
spawning stock which reached its lowest recorded levels in the early 1990s. 
Something which is not immediately obvious from the figure 2.4 is the 
extent to which the fishery is dependent on immature fish. Figure 2.4 plots the 
total stock biomass and the spawning stock biomass. The separation of these 
two lines is testimony to the fact that most of the fish in the sea are immature 
since the spawning stock is a subset of the total stock. The fact that the land-
ings closely follow the trajectory of total stock biomass (which is mostly imma-
ture) shows the dependence of the fishery on these young fish. It means that 
most fish are caught before they have a chance to spawn and is inevitably a 
cause for concern. 
A major question when assessing fish stocks is whether a declining spawn-
ing stock leads to a declining level of recruitment. Clearly, if erosion of the 
spawning stock through high exploitation occurs and this in turn results in 
lower recruitment, then the stock faces a serious problem. It is usually very diffi-
cult to discern these so-called stock-recruitment relationships but in the case of 
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cod there is some evidence of lower recruitment at low spawning stock sizes. 
Figure 2.5 shows the stock recruitment data plotted with a fitted conventional 
Shepherd stock-recruitment curve. The points are joined as a time series and it 
can be seen that the more recent and low recruitment values lie to the left of 
the graph. Also shown in the figure is the 'replacement line' for the present 
survival rate of the stock (labelled F 93). This line shows the level of recruitment 
required for a particular spawning stock size to sustain itself. 
The significant feature to note is that the realized recruitment for any 
spawning stock size is typically below that required for sustainability at the 
present survival rate. This means the stock is expected to decline in the long 
term and may well collapse. The only way to rectify this situation is to increase 
the survival rate by decreasing the fishing mortality rate. This would lower the 
slope of the replacement line on the graph. A 'safe' level would be a replace-
ment line which separated the recruitment values in such a way that 50% of 
the points lay above the line. This is the so-called Fmed level. It is the level at 
which the stock would be expected to be able to sustain itself. 
Fishery managers have attempted to reduce the exploitation rate of cod 
(and the other two species) by setting TACs since 1989 which have corre-
sponded to a reduction in fishing mortality rate. From 1991, the Advisory Com-
mittee on Fisheries Management (ACFM) recommended a reduction in fishing 
effort of 30% (Anon, 1990). The hope was that when the TAC was taken, the 
fishery would close. Figure 2.6 shows the time series of the TAC, landings and 
the exploitable biomass since the beginning of the CFP. While the TAC mirrors 
the trend in exploitable biomass well, and is close to the realized landings, the 
TAC has actually failed to constrain the exploitation rate. This is because the 
TAC has generally been somewhat above the actual landings and is indicative 
of the fact that over this period there was a tendency for the stock assessment 
to overpredict the likely landings. However, in 1993 the TAC was set at a level 
which clearly was restrictive but this simply resulted in landings being made 
illegally and no reduction in the exploitation rate appears to have occurred. 
Haddock 
Of the three species considered here, haddock are of intermediate size 
typically reaching a maximum size of about 60 cm. They mature between the 
ages of two and three. Spawning begins during the first quarter of the year 
and lasts into the second quarter. Haddock are benthic feeders; that is they 
feed on the sea bed eating a variety of small animals, mostly invertebrates 
which inhabit the mud. 
Figure 2.7 shows the historical stock trends determined from the most 
recent ICES assessment. Unlike cod, where most of the catch is landed, a large 
proportion of the catch is discarded. This is seen in figure 2.7 where discards 
may on occasion exceed the landed component. A small proportion of the 
catch is taken in the industrial fisheries, mainly targeted at Norway pout. The 
fishing mortality rate is high and results in about 60% of the stock being re-
moved each year. The level of exploitation has remained at a similar level for 
a number of years but wi th some indication of a long-term increase. Recruit-
ment in haddock shows extreme variability. There appears to be a weak cyclical 
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effect with high recruitment followed by about four years of much lower val-
ues. This leads to substantial variability in the stock biomass. Notwithstanding 
the exceptionally large 1967 year class, there has been a tendency for recruit-
ment to be lower in recent years and successive 'good' year classes have tended 
to be smaller than their predecessors. This in turn has led to a long term decline 
in the spawning stock. Because haddock mature at a younger age, the fishery 
is less dependent on immature fish, and most of the landed catch is of mature 
fish. However, the discarded portion of the catch is large and most of these fish 
are immature. This means that the mortality of juvenile fish as a result of fish-
ing is large and, as with cod, a high proportion of f ish never reach spawning 
age. 
The analysis of stock recruitment data for haddock does not reveal the 
same problems as that seen with cod. Thus, at present, there is not the same 
concern that the stock is being fished unsustainably. It is clear however, that 
the level of exploitation is high and as a result the fishery is highly dependent 
on young (albeit mature) fish. The dependence on young fish of just a few year 
classes means that the stock fluctuates considerably from year to year in tune 
with recruitment. Thus the landings are highly variable and difficult to predict. 
A lower exploitation rate would result in more year classes in the stock at any 
one time, dampening the fluctuations and leading to lower variability. 
The haddock stock reached its lowest recorded level in 1991 fol lowing a 
series of poor year classes. The decline by 1989 was such that, in line with other 
roundfish, the TAC was set at a level corresponding to a reduction in fishing 
mortality rate. Since 1991, however, landings of haddock and the TAC have 
been rising. The time series of TACs, landings, and exploitable biomass are 
shown in figure 2.8. The TAC has reflected biomass trends but clearly up to 
1989 was well above the realized landings and did not have any constraining 
effect on the exploitation rate. This was partly the result of political pressure 
to set high TACs and partly the result of assessments over-predicting the catch. 
From 1989, the TACs were set at lower levels. However, as can be seen from the 
figure, the actual landings exceeded the TAC. This is because the catch in excess 
of the TAC was simply mis-reported or was landed without record. Thus there 
has been no effective control of the exploitation rate. 
Whiting 
Whiting are the smallest of the three species, typically reaching a maxi-
mum length of 40 cm. They mature at an early age and many fish are capable 
of reproduction during their second year of life. Spawning takes place over a 
longer period than the other two species beginning in March and lasting as 
late as June. Whiting are predatory fish feeding on a wide variety of other fish 
including haddock and cod. 
Figure 2.9 shows the stock trends estimated by ICES. A substantial compo-
nent of the total catch comprises the industrial bycatch. This bycatch is taken 
in fisheries directed at Norway pout, sandeel and sprat and may exceed the 
part of the catch landed for human consumption. The fish in the bycatch are 
mostly small, resulting in a sequential competition with the human consump-
tion fisheries which take large fish. This is because the smaller fish are removed 
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before they have time to grow large enough for the consumption fishery. De-
spite this, the consumption fishery itself, is responsible for a large quantity of 
discards. The fishing mortality rate shows no obvious trend and, on average, 
is somewhat lower than that for cod and haddock. Recruitment is less variable 
than the other two species, possibly due to the longer spawning period. Recent 
recruitment appears to have been lower than earlier years and as a conse-
quence the stock biomass has declined latterly. 
The analysis of stock recruitment data for whit ing does not reveal any 
problems and the current exploitation rate is believed to be close to the 'safe' 
level of Fmed. Although the present exploitation regime could be improved in 
biological terms, there are no major concerns about the stock. The principal 
difficulty when evaluating appropriate TACs for whit ing is related the nature 
of the mixed fishery. Because whit ing are taken along side cod and haddock, 
any TAC needs to be consistent with the other species. Thus the TAC for whit-
ing should be exhausted at the same time as that for cod and haddock. If this 
was not done, the cod and haddock TACs may be taken before that for whit-
ing. This would allow a fishery for whit ing which would take an unacceptable 
bycatch of cod and haddock that in theory would have to be discarded. As a 
result, the TAC for whiting in recent years has been set corresponding to a re-
duction in fishing mortality of the same magnitude as the other two species. 
Figure 2.10 shows the time series of exploitable biomass, TAC and land-
ings for the period of the CFP. The most notable feature in this figure is that 
the TAC, despite recent attempts to set it at lower levels, has been well above 
the landings. This means the fishery is effectively uncontrolled. The reason for 
the mismatch between the landings and the TAC is twofold. Firstly, for many 
years political pressures have resulted in much higher TACs than were recom-
mended. Even in the most recent years, the TAC was set at the so called status 
quo level as opposed to the recommended 30% reduction level. Secondly, the 
assessment for whiting has a history of being unreliable and recent analysis by 
ICES (Anon, 1995) suggests the conventional assessment is biased. This appears 
to be because the estimated catch is unreliable. As is indicated above, the catch 
is made up to a large extent by industrial bycatch and discards. These by their 
nature are difficult to measure and are subject to incomplete sampling. 
Multi-species considerations 
Many of the major exploited fish stocks in the North Sea interact biologi-
cally as a result of prédation by one species on another. Both cod and whit ing 
are major predators not only on other fish species but on themselves. Thus the 
way a fish stock is exploited will have a biological effect on the stocks by alter-
ing the relative balance of predators and prey. One argument often advanced 
is that since whiting are a low value species and are highly predatory on had-
dock and cod, the stock should be kept at a low level to improve the level of 
the more valuable species. It is a matter of opinion whether this is desirable, 
and in any case, the predictive power of existing multi-species models is uncer-
tain which means it would be very difficult to determine an optimal exploita-
t ion level precisely. An important conclusion from multi-species work, however, 
is that simply reducing exploitation levels does not necessarily lead to very 
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large increases in the stocks concerned. This is because the reduced level of 
exploitation allows fish to survive longer, grow bigger and become more effec-
tive predators. The higher abundance of big predators counteracts to a greater 
or lesser degree the effect of reduced exploitation on young fish. 
Summary 
All three stocks are heavily exploited with about 50-60% of stock re-
moved by fishing annually. This high removal rate has to be balanced by incom-
ing recruitment which in most cases is highly variable. This means the stocks 
themselves are very variable and the fishery has become dependent on young 
recruiting fish. The dependence of the fishery on recruiting fish and the ab-
sence of a precise stock-recruitment relationship means that it is very difficult 
to forecast future stock sizes and catches. It also means future supply is unpre-
dictable. Paradoxically, both the cod and haddock stocks are presently increas-
ing after a period of decline as a result of recent good year classes. However, 
the underlying problem with cod is serious and there are reasons to expect this 
stock to decline further in the long term or even collapse. Landings trends were 
outlined in figure 2.2 and it is interesting to note that the value of roundfish 
landings has more than halved in the period 1980-1993. 
During the early period of the CFP, TACs were set at levels which did not 
restrict the fishery. More recent attempts to reduce the exploitation rate by 
setting TACs at levels corresponding to a 30% reduction in fishing mortality 
rate have simply resulted in a component of the catch above the TAC being 
landed illegally. Thus there has been no effective managerial control of the 
fisheries. Recent scientific recommendations have been for managers to reduce 
effort directly rather than rely on TACs (Anon, 1990) to control exploitation 
rate. 
For figures 2.4 - 2.10 the following source has been used: 
Report of the Working Group on the Assessment of Demersal Stocks in the North Sea and 
Skagerrak (ICES, 1995) and Extract of the Report of the ACFM on the Stocks in the North Sea to 
the NEAFC (ICES, 1995). 
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2.3 Regulations 
Existing regulations governing fishing activity in the North Sea are formu-
lated at both national and EU levels. However, enforcement of each of the 
regulations is the responsibility of Member States. 
2.3.1 EU Regulations 
The major EU regulations can be considered under the fol lowing head-
ings: 
TACs and quota; 
structural policy; 
technical conservation measures. 
TACs and quota 
Total Allowable Catches and associated Member State shares form the 
core of fisheries management in the North Sea and govern how much of each 
pressure stock Member States are permitted to catch. Cod, whit ing and had-
dock are all subject to TACs which are formulated annually on the basis of 
scientific advice. 
The total cod TAC for 1994 was set at 102,000 tonnes. The UK received 
the largest share of this quantity wi th an allocated quota of 43% followed by 
Denmark 19%. Germany's quota for 1994 was approximately 12%, the Nether-
lands 11 %, Norway 9% and France 4%. 
The haddock TAC for 1994 was set at 160,000 tonnes of which approxi-
mately 138,000 tonnes was allocated to the human consumption fishery. The 
remainder of the TAC constitutes an unallocated allowance for industrial 
bycatch. The UK was allocated the largest portion of the human consumption 
TAC (67%). Norway was the next most important country (15%) fol lowed by 
France (7%), Denmark (6%) and Germany (4%). 
The whit ing TAC for 1994 was 100,000 tonnes. However, only around 
77,000 tonnes was allocated to countries involved in the human consumption 
fishery, the remainder being the unallocated industrial bycatch allowance 
largely taken by Danish industrial trawlers. The UK quota share of the TAC 
after deduction of the industrial bycatch component was 46%, France had just 
over 17%, Norway 13%, Denmark 12% and the Netherlands 7%. 
Structural policy 
The principal tool of the EUs structural policy is the Multi-Annual Guid-
ance Programme (MAGP) which specifies targets for the reduction of fishing 
capacity in each Member State by fleet segment. The targets do not apply to 
Norway. The reductions which are specified in terms of both GRT and kW are 
required to be met by the close of 1996. 
Roundfish in the North Sea are caught using the trawl or seine method. 
MAGP III, which outlines capacity reductions for the period 1993-1996 acknowl-
edges there is excessive capacity in the trawl and seine fleets of the UK and 
Denmark and also overcapacity in the French trawl fleet. Each of these fleets 
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is required to reduce capacity by 20% from their 1992 levels by the close of 
1996. The trawl fleets of Belgium and Germany are also required to meet the 
same percentage reduction targets. However, their fleets are much smaller in 
terms of kW and GRT, hence the capacity reductions are of much smaller signif-
icance (e.g. the combined GRT of the Belgian trawl fleet is only 7% of the cor-
responding UK fleet). 
The Netherlands has no specified capacity reductions to attain for its 
trawl fleet although capacity in its cutter fleet is to be reduced by 15%. How-
ever, these vessels are largely involved in catching flatfish. 
Technical conservation measures 
A plethora of technical measures is currently in force in the North Sea to 
support the TAC-based management regime and structural measures listed 
above (see table 2.2). 
The minimum permitted mesh size for fishing nets deployed in the North 
Sea is currently 100 mm (diamond mesh). However, nets of 100 mm or greater 
can legally be equipped with a panel or window in the upper part of the cod 
end (attached to the joinings or selvages) consisting of square mesh netting 
with diameter equal to or greater than 90 mm. Nets with minimum mesh sizes 
greater than 90 mm are prohibited to have circumferences of more than 100 
meshes excluding the net joinings and selvages. 
Technical measures are complicated by the existence of a number of mesh 
derogations which permit the use of smaller mesh sizes if certain species are 
targeted. The principal mesh derogations are outlined in the table overleaf and 
are associated with whiting (90 mm), nephrops (70 mm), sole (80 mm), pelagic 
stocks (40 mm), prawns (40 mm) and industrial fisheries (16 mm). 
It should be emphasized that vessels fishing under a mesh derogation are 
required to observe specified bycatch rules to ensure that excessive quantities 
of other pressured species are not landed. 
The fol lowing minimum landing sizes are currently being enforced for 
cod, whit ing and haddock: 
cod 35 cm; 
haddock 30 cm; 
whit ing (UK) 27 cm; 
whit ing (EU) 23 cm. 
A number of closed/restricted areas in the North Sea have been desig-
nated with the aim of protecting certain species and spawning stocks. The fol-
lowing merit brief comment: 
the Shetland box; 
the Plaice box; 
the Norway pout box. 
Shetland box 
This covers an area of sea to the north of Shetland into which fishing 
access is restricted. All vessels fishing in this area must be licensed and regis-
tered with the UK government. 
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Norway pout box 
The Norway pout box is an area of some 30,000 square miles wi th in the 
British 200 mile fisheries limit off the coast of Scotland in which it is prohibited 
to fish for Norway pout using small mesh nets. The box was designated in 1977 
wi th the aim of reducing fishing mortality on juvenile haddock and whit ing. 
Plaice box 
The regulations associated with the Plaice box are enforced by the Dutch 
government. Beam trawlers with engine powers of more than 221 kW are pro-
hibited from fishing in the box between the 1st of April and the 31st of Decem-
ber. The box was designated with the aim of protecting juvenile plaice. 
Table 2.2 Existing mesh derogations in the North Sea 
Target species 
Sole b) 
Whiting 
Mackerel 
Horse mackerel 
Herring 
Pelagic cephalopods 
Pilchards 
Blue whiting 
Norway lobster 
Prawns 
Argentines 
Eels 
Norway pout c) 
Sandeels d) 
Minimum mesh 
size (mm) 
80 
90 
40 
• 
• 
•• 
" 
* 
70 
40 
30 
16 
16 
16 
Minimum % a) 
target species 
5 
70 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
30 
30 
50 
20 
50 
50 
or 80% 
cumulative 
Maximum % a) 
protected species 
100% of which not 
more' than 10% is 
cod, haddock and 
saithe 
100% but plaice 
must not exceed 
10%. 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
60 
50 
10 
10 
10 
10 
a) Relates to permitted catch on-board; b) Except Pout box; c) Minimum mesh size only operates 
from 1st of November until the last day of February. Bycatch restrictions are enforced outside 
this period; d) Applies to North Sea south of latitude 55° N. 
Sources: Sea Fisheries Protection Agency, Scottish Office; Agriculture and Fisheries Department. 
2.3.2 Local/national policies 
United Kingdom 
In the UK, all boats fishing commercially require to hold a fishing licence. 
While previously this legislation only applied to vessels over 10 metres in 
length, it has now been extended to all vessels irrespective of length. 
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Rules governing licences are rather complex and one vessel may in fact be 
required to hold a number of licences to fish legally. Pressure stock licences 
have been used as the principal mechanism to constrain capacity in the pres-
sure stock sector. Under existing licence aggregation rules, vessel owners wish-
ing to replace a vessel wi th a newer craft of greater capacity must effectively 
purchase licences equivalent to 120% of the capacity of the new vessel. The 
aggregation penalty is reduced to 110% if the new vessel is of the same capac-
ity as the one leaving the fleet. 
Responsibility for the management of quota is delegated to POs (Pro-
ducer Organizations) who are allocated fishing quota by the UK government 
on the basis of track record and then left to distribute fishing rights to their 
member vessels. The UK government is, however, responsible for allocating 
quota to vessels who are not members of Producer Organizations. These vessels 
belong to the 'Non Sector'. 
The UK has a number of MAGP targets to attain by the end of 1996 and 
so far has organised two annual decommissioning rounds based on a tendering 
process. A total of £ 53 mln in decommissioning money has been allocated to 
the process over a five-year period. 
Netherlands 
In the Netherlands the legislative regime governing the allocation of 
quota is fairly elaborate. A days-at-sea regime is also enforced. 
Currently vessels engaged in the North Sea roundfishery must be in pos-
session of a 'document' which is essentially the equivalent of the UK pressure 
stock licence. Three such documents now exist: 
Cod document - These were first issued in 1981 and reserved for a small 
group of vessels deemed totally dependent upon roundfish. 
Roundfish/Year document - First issued in 1988 these documents were 
issued to vessels which had been over 65% dependent upon roundfish in two 
of the years 1984-86. 
Seasonal document - For those who had been dependent on roundfish 
for over 25% in 1987. 
Since the beginning of 1994 an ITQ regime has been in operation 
whereby document holders are allocated individual roundfish quota which may 
be traded subject to certain rules. Quota may also be pooled within a PO-
group. In 1994, non-document holders were permitted to land 2,200 kg of cod 
and 2,000 kg of whit ing per month. 
Dutch fishing effort is currently controlled by additional days-at-sea re-
strictions which in 1994 allowed cod and year document holders to fish for 172 
days and seasonal document holders 152 days. In addition to the Dutch decom-
missioning scheme, fleet capacity is restricted by HP-licences which constrain 
engine power. On transfer these are reduced by 10%. 
While the ITQ system in the Netherlands is fairly elaborate, it would ap-
pear that the effort controls limiting days-at-sea have in fact exercised the prin-
cipal constraint on the fleet. 
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Denmark 
In Denmark, the government controls the allocation of quota. In the case 
of vessels fishing for cod and haddock, quota is set on a quarterly basis to avoid 
a 'run' on the species and an Easter stop is imposed on fishing for both species. 
Cod quota is also distributed on the basis of vessel length. It should be empha-
sized that Danish regulations governing minimum landing sizes for cod and 
haddock are somewhat more stringent than those imposed by the EC. Restric-
tions on bycatch of protected species are also tighter. 
To attain the goal of capacity reduction, capacity is managed by a 'Com-
mittee for Capacity'. 
France 
There is not an elaborate system of quota management for vessels in-
volved in fishing for roundfish in the North Sea. Vessels fish against a national 
quota. 
France is currently engaged in a process of decommissioning in order to 
attain its MAGP targets. It also operates a permit system entitled PME (Permis 
de Mise en Exploitation). Under this regime, investment in fishing capacity 
(measured in kW) must be accompanied by a higher reduction in capacity of 
the existing fleet. 
Norway 
Norway not being a member of the European Union does not have any 
MAGP targets to attain to eradicate overcapacity. It is, however, currently oper-
ating a decommissioning scheme. 
Norwegian vessels are predominately involved in the saithe and industrial 
fisheries and consequently cod, haddock and whiting tend to be taken as a 
bycatch of these fisheries. Vessels involved in the saithe trawl fishery must be 
in possession of a valid licence. 
While there is no national days-at-sea legislation in operation, discarding 
is currently banned by the Norwegian government. 
Germany 
In the deep sea fisheries in which Germany is involved fishing quota tend 
to be allocated to fishing companies. Similary to Norway, the larger vessels in 
the cutter fleet tend to target saithe and individual saithe quota are issued to 
each vessel. However, for the remainder of the cutter fleet in the North Sea 
fishing for cod and other roundfish there appears to be no formal system of 
quota management and as a result, vessels are entitled to fish against general 
quota. 
In order to control capacity, Germany does operate a formal decommis-
sioning scheme and vessel licensing system. All vessels which have fished during 
the period 1986/87 have a legal claim to hold a fishing licence. Access is only 
permitted in the case of vessel sinkings, replacements, constructions or 
modernizations if the MAGP fleet segment target has been attained. 
The above measures are deemed sufficient to constrain national fishing 
effort and hence there are no formal days-at-sea limitations. 
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Belgium 
The Belgian impact on the roundfish fishery is small in terms of landings 
volume. While special arrangements exist for vessels fishing for sole, there does 
not appear to be any formal quota management system for vessels fishing for 
cod, haddock or whit ing. 
Capacity is controlled through a decommissioning scheme and the opera-
t ion of a vessel licensing system; the latter came into force in 1988. No new 
licences have since been issued and new constructions must be replacements 
of old vessels in terms of horse power and gross tonnage. This said, since mid 
1994, the Belgian government has been permitting the aggregation of licences 
to entitle vessel owners to build a larger vessel. However, the new construction 
is limited to a maximum of 385 GT, 1,200 HP and 38 m in length. 
There are currently no days-at-sea restrictions in Belgium. This instrument 
of effort control was dispensed with at the end of 1992. 
Conclusion 
From an examination of the EL) and national regulations it would appear 
that the North Sea roundfish fishery is very heavily regulated. The regulations 
are, however, very difficult to enforce and do not appear to have substantially 
reduced the overexploitation of roundfish stocks. 
2.4 Definition of the management problem 
The management problems which exist in the North Sea roundfish fishery 
are best examined in the context of the evaluation criteria which are discussed 
in the chapter on Methodology. As the UK exerts the dominant influence in the 
roundfish fishery, it would seem appropriate to examine the management 
problems from the perspective of this country. 
2.4.1 Economic considerations 
Flexibility 
While theoretically TACs should have a constraining effect on the opera-
tions of North Sea fishermen they have not, in practice, been effective in fulfi l l-
ing this function. As discussed in section 2.2, attempts to reduce fishing mortal-
ity by reducing TACs have exacerbated the practices of mis-reporting, discard-
ing and illegal landings. It is therefore questionable to what extent the existing 
management mechanisms have constrained the activities of fishermen. 
Planning 
The annual December Council meetings at which TACs are set, undoubt-
edly cloud the planning horizon for fishermen. This is likely to be particularly 
problematic for the Scottish fleet, given its dependence on the haddock TAC 
which has been relatively more variable than that set for cod in successive 
years. 
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Investment in fishing capacity is further constrained by a number of fac-
tors including the requirement to hold a pressure stock licence and the rules 
governing new and replacement vessels (i.e. 120% of capacity must be pur-
chased to secure a licence for a new vessel). 
While the above may constrain investment, planning is enhanced by the 
system of quota management which effectively allows Producer Organizations 
to manage quota and allocate it to member vessels. 
Market consistency 
The existing extent of overcapacity in the fishery and consequent 'race to 
fish' undoubtedly serve to destabilize the supply of fish to the market. It is ar-
guable that 'racing to fish', constitutes rational behaviour at the level of the 
individual vessel. For example, there is a strong reason to fish heavily at the 
beginning of the year if it is believed that the full quota will not be fully taken 
due to inadequate levels of stock abundance. Moreover, there is a time prefer-
ence associated with catching fish sooner rather than later given that income 
has an opportunity cost with respect to forgone interest and there is reason to 
suspect that fishermen may operate with high discount rates. Lastly, bad 
weather towards the end of the year makes it rational to fish harder for cod, 
haddock and whit ing in earlier months. 
Daily practice 
The mixed nature of the roundfish fishery inevitably makes it difficult to 
manage individual species particularly when they have different characteristics 
in terms of size, spawning age and abundance as do the gadoids. To that end, 
individual TACs may not appear to be all that realistic in terms of their consis-
tency with the daily operations of fishing vessels.There are further problems 
associated with applying technical measures to the fishery. The 100 mm mini-
mum mesh size has proved ineffective in protecting stocks of juvenile cod and 
it is possible that a mesh size of 130-140 mm would be required to ensure ade-
quate protection. Clearly the imposition of such a measure would have serious 
of implications for the ability of the Scottish fleet to capture significant quanti-
ties of haddock and whit ing. 
Race for fish 
The current quota management system does have an attenuating influ-
ence on the race to fish given that many Producer Organizations allocate quota 
to individual vessels. This is significantly preferable to fishing against a general 
quota. However, there are factors in the fishery which still serve to cause vessels 
to race for fish which are discussed under 'market consistency'. 
Economic performance 
It is difficult to make a judgement on the effects of the current manage-
ment system on economic performance without detailed analysis of cost and 
earnings information. However, excess capacity does suggest that there may be 
a depressing effect on the earnings of individual vessels, given the large num-
ber of vessels competing in the fishery. 
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The factors which contribute to this capacity problem and the associated 
excessive levels of exploitation of roundfish are economic in character and are 
caused by the existence of an inherent market failure. The market failure mani-
fests itself in the divergence of the marginal private and marginal social costs 
of fishing with the latter being the higher of the two. This is also a cost which, 
in the current regime, is not borne by the individual fishing vessels in the 
course of their activities. These costs are commonly known by economists as 
externalities. 
Congestion cost externalities are particularly prevalent in the North Sea 
roundfish fishery and exist because there is substantial overcapacity in the fleet 
relative to the abundance of the stock. The activities of one vessel therefore 
raise the marginal fishing costs for others in the fleet which exploit the fishery. 
A potentially more prominent cost externality is the inter-generational 
cost externality associated with the current levels of fishing. Excessive exploita-
tion of North Sea stocks at present has serious implications for the catching and 
consumption of fish by future generations and thus for those generations to 
derive an income and employment from fishing. The inter-generational costs 
of current fishing practices are thus the potential revenues lost by future gener-
ations of fishermen. 
None of the existing management regimes being implemented in the 
North Sea involve the above costs being implemented into the cost functions 
of fishing vessels, the price signals which govern fishing behaviour and the 
decision to enter/exit the industry are fundamentally distorted. Overfishing is 
the result and the fishery is economically inefficient. Those inefficiencies mani-
fest themselves in rent dissipation, rising average fishing costs and excessive 
fishing capacity. 
2.4.2 Biology 
Spawning stock/fishing mortality 
The spawning stock biomass (SSB) for North Sea cod is currently estimated 
to be only a third of the 150,000 tonnes which the ACFM contends is the safe 
biological level. The SSB for haddock also declined to an historic low in 1991 
but has since made some recovery and is currently estimated to be in the region 
of 80,000 tonnes. There do not appear to be serious concerns at present about 
the abundance of whit ing. 
The North Sea roundfish fishery is in general, very heavily exploited wi th 
around 50%-60% of the stock being removed annually by fishing. These prob-
lems are compounded by the variability of recruitment (particularly for had-
dock) which in turn explain the variability of landings. 
High-grading 
This is discussed at length in section 2.5. The dependence of the fishery 
on juvenile fish, however, and therefore lack of mature fish suggest that a con-
certed strategy of high-grading is unlikely to occur in the fishery at present. 
This is not, however, to say that high-grading will not occur on an ad hoc basis 
from time to time. 
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Discarding 
There is a fairly high incidence of discarding in the North Sea roundfish 
fishery at present which may partly be a symptom of the more recent reduc-
tions in the levels of TAC which have been implemented with the intention of 
achieving a reduction in the levels of fishing mortality. Although cod does not 
appear to be heavily discarded there are fewer countries involved in the fishery 
for haddock and whiting with the Scottish fleet being the only major country 
exploit these species. As a result there is a fairly high level of discarding of 
these two species of roundfish. 
Ecosystem management 
The environmental implications of the existing fisheries management 
measures in the North Sea are as yet unclear although it is notable that there 
has been a switch away from using the more destructive heavy ground gear to 
a lighter more economical trawl which may potentially have environmental 
benefits. 
The incidence of discarding undoubtedly has environmental impacts to 
the extent that it is both wasteful and may serve to swell the population of 
scavenging sea birds. 
As discussed in section 2.3, a number of restricted fishing areas in the 
North Sea have been created with the intention of protecting juvenile 
roundfish stocks. They are: 
the Shetland box; 
the Norway pout box; 
the Plaice box. 
2.4.3 Policy and institutions 
Political acceptance 
The responsibility for implementing the current management system 
based on TACs and technical measures belongs to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food (MAFF) and the Scottish Office Agriculture and Fisheries 
Department (SOAFD). In the UK as a whole, some 230 shore-based and adminis-
trative staff are involved in the enforcement process. In Scotland, most success-
ful prosecutions involve the application of a fine or the confiscation of gear. As 
many as 300 cases may go to the Procurator Fiscal every year wi th around a 
third going to court and successfully convicting the offender. Licence suspen-
sion does not appear to occur in the UK as a penalty for breaking management 
regulations. 
Sectoral acceptance 
The current system does give rise to numerous disagreements between 
the government and the industry and therefore sectoral acceptability is often 
tenuous. There are frequent verbal conflicts when TACs are reduced and it is 
probable that these would increase in intensity if TACs were reduced in line 
with the ACFM recommendations seeking a cut of 30% in the level of fishing 
mortality for roundfish. 
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The quota management system (i.e. via POs) appears to have been ac-
cepted by the industry but there are some concerns with respect to the com-
plexity of the licensing system. In addition licences have been extended to ves-
sels smaller than 10 metres in length. 
In addition there were serious disagreements between the UK govern-
ment and the industry over the proposed 1992 Sea Fish Conservation Bill 
whichsought to limit days-at-sea for UK fishermen. The fishermen took their 
case to the European Court. 
National enforcement 
On the basis of resources devoted, enforcement in the UK appears to be 
fairly stringent. Scottish waters are the responsibility of the Sea Fisheries Protec-
tion Agency while the English segment of the North Sea is policed by the Minis-
try of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. In England & Wales enforcement is 
strengthened by the existence of thirteen Sea Fisheries Committees responsible 
for enforcement within the six mile limit (four of these oversee inshore activity 
in the North Sea). 
Total government expenditure on enforcement in 1992/93 totalled £ 6.5 
min (MAFF, 1995). Of the 230 shore-based staff, 170 are shore-based inspectors. 
A squadron of 5 aircraft performs aerial surveillance duties and some 17 vessels 
are involved in surface surveillance, 9 belonging to the Royal Navy and 8 to the 
respective Departments. 
Subsidiarity 
As indicated in previous sections, the current management system does 
facilitate subsidiarity given the role of Producer Organizations in the manage-
ment of quota. 
Local communities 
Many locations (particularly in Scotland) are heavily dependent upon 
fishing given a lack of employment diversification in their local economies. 
Large swings in haddock TACs may fall very heavily on those communities. 
Beyond 2002 
This does not seem to be a particular issue at present amongst fishermen 
although there is a movement in the industry which now supports full wi th-
drawal from the CFP. 
While it is likely that the fishing sector would like to see some increase in 
its flexibility to fish, this is unlikely to happen until the problem of overcapacity 
and resultant overfishing is eradicated. 
2.4.4 Other considerations 
Consistency 
The current management system is reasonably consistent given that there 
is a clear division of responsibilities in respect of its implementation. 
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Transparency 
The quota management system does add a degree of transparency to the 
existing regulatory regime given that in most cases, vessels who are members 
of POs will receive an allocated quota. The licensing regime, however, is more 
complex as are the rules governing new construction or replacement. Technical 
measures can also become relatively complex. 
New problems 
Given the way in which the existing management regime in the roundfish 
fishery functions, the problem of overexploitation is unlikely to weaken. While 
there are measures in place which ensure that access to the fishery is not totally 
unrestricted (e.g. requirement to hold a pressure stock licence, rules governing 
vessel replacement in which a replacement to the fleet must buy-out 120% of 
the capacity it replaces), the vessels already fishing are not in current circum-
stances forced to bear the marginal social costs of their activities and as such, 
the true costs of overfishing are not apparent to them. 
Further attempts to reduce fishing mortality by restricting TACs alone are 
unlikely to prove effective in conserving roundfish stocks. They will instead, 
given current fleet overcapacity, further worsen the problems of misreporting, 
illegal landings and discarding. This will place further pressure on finite en-
forcement resources. In addition, the age structure of the stock is likely to nar-
row further a particularly worrying issue for North Sea cod given scientific con-
cerns about trie possible collapse of the stock. 
Part B Evaluation of management measures 
2.5 Multi-annual quantity measures 
Five variants of MAMs are explicitly evaluated in appendix 2.1. Most such 
measures involve the setting of annual TACs for each species a number of years 
in advance (possibly 2-4 years ahead of the data available). 
Under a hypothetical MAM regime, the annual process of negotiation 
associated with the fixing of TACs is eradicated but the necessity of forecasting 
changes in stock abundance and obtaining accurate scientific advice becomes 
ever more apparent. 
The five forms of MAM regime considered in appendix 2.1 are listed be-
low. Definitions of these measures can be found in the methodology section 
of the report: 
annual equal quantity; 
limited compensation; 
limited adjustment; 
minimum size of spawning stock; 
constant formula. 
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2.5.1 Economic implications of MAMs 
Setting a TAC a number of years in advance reduces its ability to track 
unexpected annual changes in stock availability. While this is less problematic 
in fisheries where stocks have been historically stable, for instance in the case 
of North Sea flatfish, clearly it is inappropriate in the case of the mixed 
roundfish fishery where catches and recruitment of haddock and cod have 
been very variable in the past. 
It is anticipated that the application of most forms of MAM to the North 
Sea roundfish fishery would impede the flexibility of the fishing operation rela-
tive to existing regimes. Observed variability in the availability of North Sea 
haddock and cod stocks (and the problems of forecasting changes) together 
with the removal of the annual TAC setting process suggest that MATACs for 
these species would become increasingly misaligned with stock availability thus 
resulting in an increasing mis-match between the permitted levels of fishing 
and fishing opportunities. 
Limited compensation MAMs might well alleviate these problems to the 
extent that they would permit a limited degree of borrowing of the fol lowing 
year's TAC if stocks proved to be more buoyant than forecast. In the short term, 
this would avoid early exhaustion of certain TACs (for administrative reasons) 
and would probably have some short term beneficial influence on the eco-
nomic performance of the fishing fleet. It also appears a more realistic manage-
ment regime in terms of adherence to daily practice. It is to be expected how-
ever, that there would be a multitude of longer term problems associated with 
this measure which are discussed below. 
Excessive EU fishing capacity relative to the availability of roundfish stocks 
could lead to excessive borrowing and it is thus to be expected that in the me-
dium to longer term, economic conditions for vessels would become increas-
ingly t ight as TACs for future years were progressively reduced. The implica-
tions for the economic performance of vessels in the medium to longer term 
are likely to be detrimental. This factor coupled with the scientific advice seek-
ing a 30% cut in the level of fishing mortality suggests that the level of permit-
ted borrowing per vessel would in fact be very small, the positive impacts on 
vessel flexibility are therefore likely to be marginal. 
It is conceivable that MAMs might serve to enhance market consistency 
in the longer term by ensuring some degree of annual supply stability over 
several years. In most cases, however, MAMs still involve the setting of annual 
TACs; early quota exhaustion (e.g. as happened with the haddock TAC towards 
the end of 1991) is still possible with the attendant problems of supply scarcity 
and rising price levels. These problems are magnified if TAC measures alone are 
used to achieve the required cut in fishing mortality without directly restricting 
the effort applied to the fishery. 
The compensation scheme differs slightly from the type of MAM discussed 
in the paragraph above. However, given the fact that there is a time prefer-
ence for taking catch now as opposed to later, excessive fishing capacity in the 
North Sea is likely to result in an acceleration in the race for fish wi th associ-
ated market gluts and poor prices. Any form of MAM allowing quota to be 
131 
transferred would either require to charge interest on borrowing or would 
have to set administrative ceilings on the extent of permitted borrowing. Still, 
borrowing would not solve the problem given the overcapitalized nature of 
the fleet. The current rigidities would remain. 
MAMs in the North Sea would be economically beneficial to the extent 
that they would enable vessel operators to plan more effectively as they would 
be spared the annual uncertainties associated with the December Council 
meetings and subsequent changes in TACs (assuming allocation at the level of 
individual vessels). Of course it would not be possible to plan the effort re-
quired to take the quota. 
While MAMs have been evaluated on the basis of economic criteria, it 
must be emphasized that none of the measures considered even address the 
economic problems which are endemic in the fishery. To recall, the problem of 
overcapacity and excessive exploitation of roundfish are undoubtedly ex-
plained by the failure of vessels to internalise the ful l social costs of fishing in 
their production decisions. The wrong signals are sent, fish are viewed as a free 
resource by those already involved in the sector and excessive fishing occurs. 
The race for fish problem remains and may even intensify under an MAM re-
gime if the scheme and the forecasting advice of scientists are not viewed by 
fishermen as credible. 
One variant of a MAM regime discussed only briefly involves the applica-
t ion of a constant formula to the fishery (e.g. achieving an x% reduction in 
fishing mortality per annum). It is difficult to make a generalization as to the 
economic benefits of this type of regime as the economic implications are ulti-
mately dependent upon the rule that is implemented. 
2.5.2 Policy and institutions 
In many ways the MAMs under consideration are similar to the existing 
conservation regimes operating in the North Sea. It is very unlikely that their 
application would have a detrimental impact on relative stability in the EU (ie. 
the quota shares allocated to each country). It is also conceivable that the mea-
sures would depoliticize aspects of the decision making process by eradicating 
the annual meetings which set the TACs. 
In the longer term, it is possible to envisage MAMs running into problems 
of sectoral and political acceptability because of factors specific to the North 
Sea round fishery. 
The observed variability in recruitment and catches of haddock and cod 
over the years increases the chances of TACs failing to track unpredicted 
changes in stock availability. In years where the species are particularly scarce, 
the retention of a TAC agreed a couple of years earlier is unlikely to be resisted 
by the industry. Although it would present numerous conservation problems. 
Problems would arise where a particularly good year class emerged but 
the TAC was not raised to compensate for the improvement in the availability 
of the species. While this may have obvious conservation benefits, particularly 
in such an overexploited fishery, the industry is likely to resist it, possibly in-
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creasing the volume of juvenile fish landed illegally. This would exacerbate 
enforcement difficulties. 
The political acceptability of MAMs is also likely to be weakened in the 
longer term. While in the short term the removal of the annual December ne-
gotiations might appear to depoliticize the TAC setting process, it would un-
doubtedly politicize the decisions of scientists and lead to an even more con-
tentious and protracted debate every three or four years to replace the annual 
negotiating process. The overexploitation of North Sea cod in particular makes 
it imperative that scientists set the MAT AC at a sustainable level. 
Change becomes ever more complicated to implement as a fishery be-
comes more heterogeneous in nature. As evidenced in section 2.1, despite the 
relative dominance of the UK, the North Sea roundfish fishery is fairly diverse 
in terms of the variety of countries involved and the diversity of fishing meth-
ods employed. This increases the likelihood of conflicts arising as a manifesta-
t ion of different fleet and country objectives. 
In considering the compensation variant of the MAM, the pressured na-
ture of most of the roundfish stocks under consideration and the relative over-
capacity in the fleets prosecuting the fishery suggests that there would be ex-
cessive borrowing of quota between years. In light of the heterogeneity of the 
fishery, an elaborate transfer system with the possibility of introducing an in-
terest charge on inter-year borrowing of TAC is likely to lead to ever more com-
plex negotiations between countries. The administrative complexities (i.e. the 
extensive paper chase) associated with borrowing would be apparent as would 
the enforcement difficulties. 
MAMs which fail to track changes in stock abundance (e.g. equal quanti-
ties, limited adjustment) would possibly have negative implications for 
subsidiarity in years where the TAC was low in relation to stock abundance. As 
the problem of blackfish emerged it is to be expected that local enforcement 
would be made more onerous for POs. A Limited Compensation MAM could 
have positive implications for subsidiarity as there is no reason why the borrow-
ing of quota between years could not be administered by POs. 
MAMs which allowed TACs to become misaligned with stock abundance 
would have detrimental implications for local communities particularly given 
the heavy dependence on fishing in many areas of Scotland and the lack of 
employment diversification. While a TAC borrowing facility might alleviate this 
problem in the shorter run, longer run constraints would emerge given the 
large numbers of vessels involved in the fishery. 
Most of the TAC based MAMs are unlikely to be particularly relevant to 
management after 2002. The only possible exception might be a form of lim-
ited compensation scheme which could give vessels an additional degree of 
flexibility if capacity in the fishery were reduced and a charging mechanism was 
introduced. 
Such a scheme could permit vessels to carry over unused quota from one 
year into the next. Even under a system of individual vessel quotas, there is still 
a tendency to race for fish given concerns that the full vessel quota will not be 
taken because of bad weather towards the end of the year. This problem could 
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be attenuated with a 'carry-over' mechanism with consequent benefits for sup-
ply stability. 
2.5.3 Biological considerations 
The necessity of ensuring a biologically sustainable fishery is of para-
mount importance in considering the application of any of the MAMs to the 
North Sea roundfish fishery. Section 2.2 shows quite clearly that there have 
been considerable swings in recruitment and landings for haddock and cod 
over the years. The swings in availability are impossible to forecast more than 
two years ahead. 
The fact that cod is perceived to close to collapse supports the contention 
that current management regimes have proved ineffective in constraining the 
fishery and underlines the importance of implementing a management regime 
which wil l succeed in reducing fishing mortality. 
The specific conditions within the roundfish fishery suggest that annual 
TAC settings are in fact necessary but also not sufficient within themselves to 
protect stocks. Variability in recruitment for cod and, more significantly, had-
dock is such that TACs set for a number of years wil l become misaligned wi th 
stock abundance. 
On the one hand, failure to alter the TAC because of an unexpected 
downturn in the state of the fishery is likely to have serious implications for 
spawning stock biomass with consequent scarcity and price rises. On the other 
hand, failure to make an interim adjustment to the TAC because of unantici-
pated improvements in species availability would lead not only to opposition 
and unpopularity wi th the fishing industry, it would also result in an increase 
in the incidence of discarding which could have detrimental implications for 
the ecosystem. These problems are more than likely to arise in the North Sea 
roundfish fishery given the large swings that have been seen in TACs in past 
years as a result of changing recruitment levels. For example under a MAM, the 
large increase in the 1993 haddock TAC which emanated from particularly 
healthy recruitment may not have occurred. Given the high catching capacity 
relative to resource availability, this could have exacerbated discards. 
Linked to the practice of discarding is that of high-grading. It is feasible 
to envisage the occurrence of two distinct forms of high-grading in the North 
Sea roundfish fishery. In the first instance, high-grading might involve different 
size grades of the same species, for example, the discarding of smaller less valu-
able cod in order to increase the average size of cod retained on board and 
thus the value of landings. 
Alternatively in a mixed fishery such as that of North Sea roundfish where 
there are sizable and volatile price differentials between the constituent spe-
cies, high-grading might result in excessive levels of discarding of lower value 
species (e.g. whiting) in the quest for a higher catch of the more lucrative spe-
cies of fish. 
To determine whether these problems would worsen visibly under a 
MAM regime, it is necessary to examine the degree to which high-grading is 
economically viable in the current North Sea climate. The economic incentives 
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for high-grading effectively turn upon the bio-economic realities in the fishery 
itself. These realities encompass the availability of the larger fish, the marginal 
costs of fishing, prices of the varying grades or species of fish, and the respon-
siveness of those relative prices to the change in quantity landed. 
Implicit in the perceived high-grading problem is the fact that vessels are 
not able to land all the fish that they catch because of space limitations on 
board the vessel or because of restrictive TACs. Restrictive TACs may have had 
some impact on the extent of discarding, some countries will have exceeded 
their quota while others will have undershot it. 
However, it is necessary to examine the price differentials between differ-
ent species and grades as well as the estimated marginal costs of fishing for 
these species to assess the extent to which high-grading is likely to be problem-
atic. 
Dealing with the first form of high-grading, i.e. between different sizes 
of the same species, table 2.3 below shows price differentials between grade 
1 and grade 5 cod (1992-1994) and also between grade 1 and grade 4 haddock. 
Table 2.3 Price differentials between high and low grad 
Year Cod (1) 
1992 1,541 
1993 1,512 
1994 1,413 
Cod (5) 
1,214 
975 
977 
Margin 
327 
537 
426 
e roundfish (£) a) 
Hadd (1) 
1,655 
1,479 
1,311 
Hadd (4) 
726 
591 
649 
Margin 
929 
888 
662 
a) Average marginal trawling costs (1992) £ 370 per tonne. 
The table does show that there are significant price differentials between 
the higher and lower grades of haddock and to a lesser extent cod. Using Scot-
tish cost and earnings survey information, a marginal trawling cost per tonne 
off ish landed has been calculated (this consists mainly of fuel and omits costs 
of a more fixed nature, for instance gear expenses and vessel insurance costs). 
Superficially, a comparison of margins relative to trawling costs suggests 
that the practice of high-grading is economically rational. However, this ig-
nores the fact that the fishery is heavily dependent upon juvenile fish wi th 
larger more mature fish being relatively scarce. An examination of annual land-
ings data for the Scottish fishing fleet indicates that around 50% of cod land-
ings and over 60% of haddock landings comprise of small juvenile fish. The cod 
figure was derived by calculating the share of total cod landings accounted for 
by un-graded fish and grades 4 and 5. The haddock figure was computed by 
expressing the share of ungraded and size 4 fish as a proportion of total land-
ings. 1993 data was used in both cases. 
It is not unrealistic to assume that the structure of North Sea landings in 
terms of size grades broadly reflects the age structure of the North Sea had-
dock and cod stocks themselves. High-grading implies the discarding of lower 
value fish to accommodate fish of a higher commercial value. The discarding 
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involved in this practice usually occurs because of space limitations in the vessel 
itself or quota constraints. 
The UK cod quotum in 1993 was more than 100% utilised. On the basis 
of the Scottish data examined, it is not unreasonable to assume that around 
50% of those landings comprised of small fish (i.e. grades 4 and 5). In this re-
spect, it seems completely infeasible to imagine that this quantity could itself 
have been discarded and a similar quantity of larger cod located to utilise the 
UK quota. 
High-grading as a persistent problem is unlikely to arise in the North Sea 
cod fishery on account of the level of overcapacity in the fishing fleet and the 
resulting scarcity of mature cod. The Scottish landings data indicate that only 
around 8% of 1993 landings consisted of grade 1 cod. 
The idea of high-grading for haddock appears to be even more untena-
ble given the fact that in the UK only 90% of the haddock quota was taken in 
1993. The fact that over 60% of haddock landings consisted of the smallest 
grade suggests that it would be impossible in the fishery to discard this portion 
of fish and successfully locate sufficient larger haddocks to utilise the UK quota. 
High-grading is unlikely to be problematic in instances where the ful l quota is 
not utilised by the fishing fleet. 
The high quayside prices for the larger grades of cod and haddock are 
symptomatic of the relative scarcity of mature fish in the North Sea 
roundfishery. If high-grading was attempted to any level of intensity, the mar-
gins would simply shrink as price adjustment took place. More importantly, the 
marginal costs of fishing would quickly accelerate as vessels incurred greater 
degrees of effort in searching for scarcer higher grades of fish. 
In conclusion, the heavily exploited nature of the roundfish fishery ap-
pears to render high-grading relatively uneconomic. The very high levels of 
fishing capacity relative to species availability have resulted in a fishery heavily 
dependent on small (juvenile) fish. All grades are, as a result, likely to be scarce 
given the current bio-economic realities in the fishery but particularly so for the 
higher grades of fish. While there may be cases of high-grading on an ad-hoc 
basis, it seems unlikely that a concerted high-grading strategy would emerge 
on a significant level. In short, conditions within the fishery are such that fisher-
men are likely to be only too happy to land whatever fish they are able to 
catch. 
There are no strong reasons for believing that this conclusion would 
change significantly if MAMs were instituted. While theoretically it is possible 
to envisage improved recruitment occurring during the period of the MAM and 
hence (given overcapacity) the potential for high grading, the length of time 
it takes cod and haddock to reach maturity coupled wi th the intense competi-
t ion for fish still appears to render high-grading uneconomic and infeasible. 
It is still assumed that the concept of individual species TACs would be 
retained under a MAM regime and hence the second form of high-grading, 
(ie.between species) is likely to be less problematic. In contrast, this is more 
likely to worsen under a MSM, where individual species TACs are dispensed 
wi th . 
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Table 2.4 below examines average price differentials between the three 
constituent roundfish species for the years 1992-1995. 
Table 2.4 Price differentials between roundfish species a) 
Year Cod/haddock 
1992 483 
1993 442 
1994 374 
Haddock/whiting 
309 
215 
235 
Cod/whiting 
792 
657 
609 
a) Marginal trawling costs = £ 370 per tonne. 
The table suggests that the only potentially economic high-grading 
possibilities are between haddock and the more valuable cod and also between 
cod and whiting. For the reasons discussed above the increasing scarcity of cod 
in the North Sea as a result of overfishing is likely to render such a strategy 
relatively infeasible. In any case, it seems unlikely that the institution of MAMs 
would have any effect upon the level of high-grading between different 
roundfish species. 
Given that MAMs in themselves do nothing to deal with the problems of 
overcapacity and the subsequent race for fish, it is to be expected that the 
introduction of MAMs would do nothing to reduce the persistently high levels 
of fishing mortality experienced by North Sea roundfish stocks. TACs in them-
selves do nothing to restrict a fishery where catching capacity is misaligned 
with resource availability, they only result in a proliferation of illegal landings 
and complicate the tasks of enforcement. The institution of TACs in themselves 
have been shown to be consistently ineffective in reducing the level of fishing 
mortality. 
2.5.4 Other considerations 
Other considerations relate to the simplicity of the MAM under consider-
ation, its consistency wi th existing EU measures and potential new problems 
that could emerge as a result of applying it to the North Sea roundfish fishery. 
Potential problems associated wi th MAMs are considerable given the 
characteristics of the fishery i.e. stock variability, diversity of players, overcapac-
ity etc. and have already been discussed at some length. 
Superficially, the scheme may seem advantageous given that the annual 
negotiation process associated with setting the TAC would be eliminated. How-
ever, this would be supplanted by an altogether more complicated process 
every 2-4 years. 
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2.5.5 Applicability of MAMs to the North Sea roundfish fishery 
The applicability of MAMs in general have been assessed on four broad 
sets of criteria: economic, political/institutional, biologic and additional. To 
evaluate the measures in the context of the North Sea roundfish fishery, it is 
necessary to understand the problems facing the fishery and then question 
whether or not these can be alleviated by instituting MAMs. 
In short, the answer appears to be no. 
Because of excessive capacity and consequent overfishing. North Sea 
roundfish stocks are under sustained pressure and recruitment is very unpre-
dictable. The reliance of the fishery on juvenile fish suggests that conservation 
factors must assume precedence over economic and political considerations in 
its management. While the necessity for setting annual TACs is clear (to ensure 
that the TAC tracks closely changes in stock abundance), these mechanisms in 
isolation are insufficient to restrict and manage the fishery effectively. This 
must be achieved by restricting effort through the use of economic instruments 
which incorporate a charging element. This effectively alters the cost function 
faced by the fishing enterprise. 
While superficially the MAM regime might appear to depoliticize the TAC 
setting process by eliminating the requirement for annual negotiation, this is 
effectively supplanted by an even more contentious negotiation process every 
two or three years. 
The information demands placed on scientists in terms of forecasting 
changes in stock availability more than two years ahead are beyond the current 
state of knowledge and the heterogeneity of the fishery in terms of countries 
involved and methods used, makes a compensation scheme seem highly im-
plausible. In all, MAMs appear to be completely inapplicable to the North Sea 
roundfish fishery failing to deal with the fundamental problems of overcapac-
ity and overexploitation. The latter problem manifesting itself in declining ves-
sel earnings, smaller fish caught and smaller stock size. 
2.6 Multi-species measures 
The North Sea roundfish fishery is the prime example of a mixed fishery 
where cod, whiting and haddock co-exist and where, despite the existence of 
single species TACs, resulting catches tend to be mixed in character. The key 
problems associated with managing a mixed fishery are the differing exploita-
t ion rates of each constituent species. 
MSMs attempt to alleviate the apparent inflexibilities associated wi th 
single species TACs by allowing for a degree of transfer between species 
caught. This typically can involve TACs being interchangeable within certain 
limits between species thus enhancing flexibility and attenuating the problems 
of illegal landings, misreporting and discarding. 
Appendix 2.2 has evaluated in detail the fol lowing variants of an MSM 
regime in the context of the North Sea roundfish fishery. 
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One common denominator. 
Limited transfer. 
Bycatch arrangements. 
Two tier system. 
These are defined in the Methodology section of the report. 
2.6.1 Economic evaluation 
The installation of most forms of MSM in the North Sea would undoubt-
edly have a beneficial impact on the flexibility of individual fishing operations 
relative to the existing position. The enhancement of flexibility (what to fish) 
would, however, be critically dependent upon the allowance governing the 
interchangeability of TACs for individual species. Limited transfer, cod equiva-
lent and quota by value regimes all facilitate interchangeability between spe-
cies. 
There are reasons to believe that MSMs could have some beneficial 
implications for market consistency. While MSMs would still involve TACs being 
set annually, a TAC involving a 'sum' of individual species is likely to be less 
variable than its individual components. In addition, an allowance for some 
degree of interchangeability between target species might reduce the possibil-
ity of supply dislocation associated with early quota exhaustion. 
In reality however, the heavy exploitation of North Sea haddock and cod 
suggests that interchangeability between these stocks and the lower value 
whit ing would have to be severely restricted. This said, section 2.6 suggested 
that the possibilities for profitable high-grading were fairly limited anyway 
despite the fact that the price differentials between cod and haddock and also 
cod and whiting are fairly significant. The bio-economic realities of the North 
Sea roundf ishery appear to render a concerted high-grading strategy relatively 
infeasible on account of the increasing scarcity of high value species such as 
North Sea cod. 
The MSM in the context of the North Sea is most definitely a more realis-
tic form of management operation (i.e. consistent wi th daily practice) to the 
extent that it acknowledges the mixed nature of the fishery and that in any 
catch there is always going to be a significant bycatch to augment the target 
species be it cod or haddock. Premature quota exhaustion in the fishery might 
be marginally less likely although the competition for fish caused by the large 
number of vessels in operation will not in any way remove this possibility. 
Implicit in the MSM is the acknowledgement that scientific advice cannot 
always be expected to be exact and a degree of flexibility is introduced to 
compensate for potential margins of error in the recommended TAC. This is 
particularly applicable in the case of North Sea cod and haddock where there 
is a considerable degree of variability in recruitment, and catch levels are thus 
highly variable. The adoption of an MSTAC is an acknowledgement of the con-
fidence limits associated with scientific advice. 
Again the race for fish problem can only be attenuated by an economic 
method which ensures that quota is allocated to individual vessels and capacity 
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is reduced substantially. MSMs based on TACs do not address these important 
issues. Indeed the race for fish may in fact be exacerbated if the new regime is 
not seen to be particularly credible. 
2.6.2 Policy and institutions 
Superficially, the apparent flexibility offered by MSMs to fishermen might 
enhance the political acceptability of such a scheme. However, the potential 
complexities associated with the annual process of negotiation and the setting 
of appropriate rates of exchange (or weights) between North Sea roundfish 
stocks are likely to undermine its acceptability in the longer term. 
Many of the potential political problems arise because of the heterogene-
ity of the fishery in terms of the diversity of players and consequently the dif-
fering objectives (eg target species, fishing method, interaction of other spe-
cies). Deciding upon rates of exchange between species is likely to be extremely 
contentious and detrimental to relative stability in the CFP arrangements. 
Political considerations must also encompass issues of enforcement. In the 
North Sea roundfish fishery, given the diversity of players and the potential 
complexity of the scheme, it is likely that there would be a sizeable paper chase 
associated wi th enforcing the regime and policing the transfer of quota. 
Sectoral acceptance is contingent both upon the degree to which the 
flexibility of the fishing operation is enhanced and the work involved for the 
POs in ensuring the smooth running of the revised scheme. The enhanced flexi-
bility of the scheme is not in doubt but POs might be more concerned about 
the paperwork involved in a scheme which facilitated the transfer of TACs be-
tween species. 
It is possible that the greater degree of flexibility which facilitates the 
transfer of TAC between fisheries may have a beneficial impact on local com-
munities particularly in Scotland where there is a considerable degree of fisher-
ies dependence. This improvement would stem from the reduced possibility of 
early quota exhaustion. In addition the MSM could have beneficial effects on 
subsidiarity given that local management of 'total fisheries' may be preferred 
to a stock by stock approach. If fleet capacity and fishing mortality were effec-
tively reduced, it is possible that an MSM approach to fisheries management 
could become an interesting management concept post 2002, if the principal 
of relative stability were dispensed with. 
2.6.3 Biological considerations 
As indicated earlier, the heavily exploited nature of roundfish stocks in 
the North Sea makes biological considerations paramount in the evaluation of 
alternative management measures. Any scheme which allows the transfer of 
TAC between species which have sizeable price differentials (i.e. North Sea 
roundfish) can have detrimental impacts on the conservation of high value 
species. This said, it is not evident that the problem of high-grading would 
worsen considerably under a MSM regime. 
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However, the current extent of overfishing of cod and haddock stocks in 
the North Sea suggests that there would have to be fairly stringent limits gov-
erning the transferability of TAC between roundfish species. Section 2.5 indi-
cated that there were sizeable price differentials between North Sea haddock 
and cod and also between North Sea cod and whit ing. The scarcity of cod in 
particular suggests that high-grading is unlikely to be widespread, but, by the 
same token, scientific concerns about the very low spawning stocks suggests 
that it would be very unwise to take the risk of further 'running-down' the 
fishery. Given the large number of vessels prosecuting the fishery, the actual 
permitted level of transfer between species is likely to be very small. 
It is unlikely that MSMs which continue to rely on TACs as the principal 
constraint on the operations of fishermen will be any more successful than the 
current management mechanisms in halting excessive fishing mortalities of 
roundfish. The impacts of MSMs on the ecosystem are difficult to predict. Some 
degree of interchangeability in TACs could reduce discarding with the atten-
dant ramifications for the seabird population. However, with a TAC-based 
MSM, there is also a danger of environmental imbalances being created as 
vessels target one particular species more heavily. 
Transfer allowances might also exacerbate the race to fish for commer-
cially more valuable species, further increasing already high levels of fishing 
mortality. 
2.6.4 Other considerations 
The transparency of an MSM system in the North Sea could be under-
mined by the rules governing transfer of quota between species. It is possible 
that these rules could become increasingly difficult to communicate to the in-
dustry. Linked to these issues are the potential new problems that would mani-
fest themselves in the annual negotiation process governing exchange rates 
given the number of countries involved in the fishery and the diversity of fish-
ing objectives therein. Moreover the increasing incidence of mis reporting by 
species is a distinct possibility under this type of regime. 
2.6.5 Applicability of MSMs to the North Sea roundfish fishery 
One of the principal stumbling blocks associated with the operation of an 
MSM regime in the North Sea roundfish fishery is the potential complexity of 
such a scheme given the heterogeneity of the fishery in terms of players in-
volved and objectives. It is likely that the annual process of negotiation to de-
termine at what rates TACs for species could be swapped would become in-
creasingly contentious. This difficulty cannot be understated. 
Biological considerations also tend to militate against the introduction of 
MSMs. MSMs recognize that there are confidence limits associated with scien-
tific advice. This consideration must be balanced against the potential for al-
lowing excessive degrees of transfer between species, particularly where there 
is a sizeable degree of variation in the abundance of the species constituting 
the MSM and accordingly a sizeable price differential. While the economics of 
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high-grading are questionable, it must again be stressed that TACs in them-
selves are not sufficient mechanisms to conserve this fishery as long as those 
currently involved in fishing it do not incur the marginal social costs of their 
activities. 
Given the high levels of effort being applied to the fishery which is induc-
ing persistently high levels of fishing mortality for roundfish, it is clear that 
measures which fail to address the issue of fishing capacity are likely to exacer-
bate the conservation problems faced by the fishery and effectively exacerbate 
the hardship faced by those remaining in the sector. 
In addition, any attempt to achieve the required cut in fishing mortality 
through the use of an MSM alone based on a TAC, is likely to enlarge the ex-
tent of the imbalance between catching capacity and catch opportunities in-
creasing the proliferation of illegal landings, misreporting and discarding. 
A further problem associated with the MSM is likely to arise when an 
MSTAC is set according to the condition of the most fragile species' spawning 
stock in the fishery. This reduces the scope for landing other less fragile species. 
2.7 Effort measures 
Effort measures are more familiar regimes for managing fisheries and 
have been used in the past by a number of Member States. However, none 
have been a complete success. 
Effort restrictions can take the form of activity limitations (e.g. days-at-sea 
restrictions) or structural measures (MAGP targets). For the purposes of the case 
study, only activity restrictions have been considered since structural measures 
are already in force in the form of the MAGP. 
Appendix 2.3 evaluates the fol lowing two forms of effort measures: 
constant effort over several years; 
limited adjustment. 
2.7.1 Economic impact of days-at-sea restrictions 
To be at all workable in the context of the North Sea roundfish fishery, 
a DAS scheme would require effort allocation at the level of the individual 
vessel. If this allocation was not secured, the race for fish problem would be-
come acute wi th potentially disastrous implications for already heavily ex-
ploited North Sea roundfish stocks. 
It is conceivable that the application of effort restrictions in the North Sea 
would enhance the flexibility of fishing operations if single species TACs were 
to be dispensed with and the effort measure became multi-species in character. 
In reality, however, it is likely that some degree of directivity would require to 
be maintained to enable broad classes of species to be protected (e.g. separate 
allocations would exist for gadoids, flatfish, nephrops etc.) Moreover, given the 
mixed characteristics of the fishery, DAS would require to be set at the level 
considered appropriate to protect the most heavily exploited species. This fac-
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tor, coupled with the size of the North Sea fleet suggests that the increase in 
individual vessel flexibility might not be all that significant. 
If the effort measure had multi-species characteristics, it is possible that, 
in the shorter term, the improved flexibility associated with effort measures 
might serve to smooth out supply of product and enhance market consistency. 
In the longer term however, most of the measures would involve the setting 
of annual effort levels which might lead to unpredictable and variable supplies 
of roundfish to markets, given that effort rather than catch itself is being con-
trolled. Days-at-sea alone are a very crude measure of activity and are likely to 
prove poor predictors of catches and landings given the heterogeneity of the 
fleet in terms of the catch capabilities of individual vessels and also the longer 
term scope for substituting inputs which are not directly controlled (i.e. more 
advanced equipment, double crewing etc.). In the longer run therefore, there 
is likely to be a decoupling of the link between effort (measured in days) and 
eventual output. 
Effort restrictions are clearly very imprecise conservation instruments. 
Moreover, given the size of the existing fleet, setting effort in line wi th the 
ACFM advice for the conservation of North Sea roundfish (i.e. 30% cut in fish-
ing mortality) would result in individual vessel effort allocations being insuffi-
cient to guarantee economic survival for many vessels, which could have detri-
mental implications for economic performance. 
These problems are likely to accelerate the race for North Sea gadoids 
with the consequent destabilizing impacts on markets for cod and haddock (i.e. 
supply gluts of smaller fish early in the year). 
Constant-year effort measures might enhance the ability of vessels to plan 
their operations. However, to the extent that many of the proposed measures 
would involve the annual setting of days-at-sea, it is unlikely that the introduc-
t ion of effort restrictions would facilitate planning for vessels fishing in the 
North Sea. 
2.7.2 Policy and institutions 
Superficially the theoretical ease of enforcing days-at-sea restrictions in 
the North Sea might make it appear a politically attractive option. However, 
recent experience in the UK with the industry going to the European Court in 
its opposition to the government's Seafish Conservation Bill (which proposed 
days-at-sea restrictions for the UK fleet) shows that there is vociferous opposi-
t ion to these measures in the UK industry. However, the nature of the opposi-
t ion does vary between the different fishermen's organizations. 
It is fair to say that there are problems associated with the sectoral 
acceptability of DAS regimes in the UK which would probably have some un-
dermining effect on their political acceptability also. 
Most sectoral arguments associated with tie-up measures focus on the 
unfairness of the measures and the fact that they may force fishermen to take 
risks and put to sea in poor conditions in order to make sufficient revenue to 
survive. 
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Whatever the case, the complexity of the roundf ish fishery in terms of the 
diversity of countries involved, suggests that there could be lengthy conflicts 
associated with allocating effort between countries. It is quite possible that the 
subsequent negotiations would undermine relative stability. One of the funda-
mental problems associated with the practical application of effort measures 
is in fact in the initial definition of what constitutes fishing effort. 
Hanneson (1994) discusses the impossibility of deriving a stable and valid 
relationship between effort and fishing mortality and also between effort and 
the diverse input mix that comprises it. In reality, the fishing fleets which prose-
cute the North Sea gadoids are not homogeneous in character and their techni-
cal specifications and thus catch capabilities may vary to a very large extent. 
Because of this it becomes very difficult indeed to measure fishing effort in a 
way that facilitates comparison of effort across fleets. While days-at-sea are 
likely to be fairly poor predictors of output given the above observations, in 
practice, implementing progressively more complex measures which incorpo-
rate additional vessel-specific details, is likely to become increasingly difficult 
as the task of enforcement becomes more onerous. 
Despite the comments made earlier on the issue of directivity, a DAS 
scheme which is multi-species in character would tend to involve days alloca-
tions being set with the aim of protecting the more heavily exploited cod and 
haddock species in the North Sea. It is conceivable that this would curtail some 
countries from exploiting the fishing opportunities available for less pressured 
species eg.whiting and saithe. This problem might be attenuated somewhat by 
applying the days-at-sea restriction to fixed fisheries, for instance where the 
fishery is more geographically distinct, it might be possible to have differential 
permitted effort levels for the saithe and cod/haddock fishery. This would 
again become decidedly more complex to enforce. 
Where a fishery is truly mixed, however, and the constituent species vary 
in abundance, conflicts of interest are always likely to arise when applying a 
single non-discriminating regulatory measure. 
Effective enforcement of days-at-sea measures would probably require 
that enforcement effort was harmonised between countries. This might have 
negative implications for subsidiarity. The impacts of a DAS scheme on local 
communities is difficult to predict although there is a possibility that, given 
existing overcapacity in the North Sea fleet, days allocations would be insuffi-
cient to guarantee economic survival for many vessels. The local impacts on 
income and employment might therefore be significant. 
While there may be conservation benefits associated with a DAS scheme, 
it does not offer a long-term economic solution to the problem of overfishing. 
While DAS restrictions most certainly offer managers an alternative regulatory 
approach (being based on input control), problems associated with the decoup-
ling of the link between effort (measured in days) and landings do not suggest 
that it would offer managers a particularly effective management tool beyond 
2002. 
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2.7.3 Biological considerations 
It is difficult to dispute that there would be conservation benefits associ-
ated with a stringently enforced DAS scheme or other form of effort restricting 
measure. Unlike the TAC-based measures, effort restrictions do attempt to ad-
dress the issue of fleet capacity (albeit inefficiently) and therefore to align this 
capacity wi th actual stock abundance. However, the precise impacts on the 
level of fishing mortality would be difficult to assess because of the impossibil-
ity (discussed earlier) of defining a predictable and stable relationship between 
effort (measured in days) and the level of fishing mortality. Any relationship 
between effort and fishing mortality is also likely to decouple completely over 
time. 
If constant annual effort allocations were to be introduced, it would be 
necessary to remove a portion of the fleet annually to account for the in-
creased catching capacity associated with technical progress otherwise there 
could be damaging implications for spawning stocks. As indicated previously, 
it is likely that in the absence of TACs, vessels faced with a set number of fish-
ing days will invest in technology intensive equipment in efforts to increase 
their productivity, a strategy also referred to as 'capital stuffing'. As a result, 
allocated days would have to be continually 'wound-down' to compensate for 
this. This would then effectively be a measure involving annual adjustment of 
fishing effort. 
An example of the problems discussed above emerges in the case of the 
Pacific halibut fishery. In 1923, a closed season of three months was introduced 
to protect Pacific halibut. By 1928, it was clear that the closed season by itself 
was not going to be sufficient to protect the species. In 1972, the area 2 (off 
British Columbia) fisheries had become restricted to an open season of 101 
days. (International Pacific Halibut Commission 1974.) By 1989 area 2A was 
open for just three 24 hour periods. The remainder of area 2 showed a similar 
decline. 
In the above example, the entry of new vessels to the fishery was 
undoubtedly part of the reason behind the rapid rise in fishing mortality. The 
rules governing the entry of vessels into the fleet in the UK (e.g. licence aggre-
gation) suggest that the problem in the North Sea is unlikely to be as severe 
although stocks are already heavily exploited and as such the impact of input 
substitution and capital stuffing cannot be dismissed. 
When considering effort measures, the overexploited nature of North Sea 
cod and haddock stocks make it imperative that estimated catch/effort relation-
ships are well described. This is not really the case in the North Sea roundfish 
fishery at present. DAS measures which can potentially be multi-species in char-
acter also make it increasingly difficult to protect spawning stocks for indivi-
dual species. 
One possible environmental benefit associated with effort measures is the 
associated benefit that they might have on the levels of discarding. Assuming 
that individual species TACs are dispensed with, fishermen could be permitted 
to land all that they catch. 
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2.7.4 Other considerations 
As indicated earlier, an effort restricting regime (e.g. days-at-sea) in the 
North Sea would potentially be relatively transparent and easy to enforce. The 
new problems are likely to manifest themselves in the process of allocating 
effort between Member States and also in the failure to predict the impact of 
those measures on the level of fishing mortality. 
Conflicts are likely to be greatest if the days-at-sea restriction was non-dis-
criminating and applied to all vessels irrespective of species fished - days would 
be set wi th the objective of safeguarding the most heavily exploited stocks. 
However, the more the authority attempted to set differential effort restric-
tions, the more difficult the measures become to enforce. 
The measures are not particularly consistent wi th existing policies as men-
tioned previously and are likely to be resisted by some sectors of the industry. 
2.7.5 Applicability of effort measures to the North Sea roundfish fishery 
Effort restrictions which are largely temporary by nature (e.g. days-at-sea 
restrictions) do not effectively tackle the major problems endemic in the North 
Sea roundfish fishery. They are also highly contentious from the point of view 
of the UK fishing industry. 
The principal problems associated with effort restraints are in effectively 
defining a measure of effort which allows a sensible comparison to be made 
across fleets where technical specifications and thus catch capabilities may vary 
between vessels to a large extent. Expressing fishing effort as a simplistic multi-
ple of vessel power or fishing time is fundamentally flawed in that it ignores 
the likelihood of input substitution in the complex mix of inputs which deter-
mine the output of a vessel. In addition the link between this basic form of 
effort measurement and fishing mortality is difficult to predict and likely to 
prove highly unstable. 
In the short term, there are likely to be conservation benefits associated 
with a tightly enforced DAS regime but these are temporary measures and are 
not long term solutions to the problem of overfishing. 
Overfishing in the North Sea roundfish fishery is evidence of excessive 
capacity relative to stock abundance and the failure of fisheries managers to 
charge vessels for the right to fish such that the cost function faced by the fish-
ing enterprise is altered. 
Relative to the TAC-based MAMs/MSMs, effort restrictions are more rele-
vant management measures to the extent that they partially address the issue 
of fishing capacity in seeking to reduce the extent of overfishing. However, 
activity restrictions are an extremely blunt and rather short-term mechanism for 
tackling the problem of overfishing. 
It is necessary to institute a more permanent system of management 
which constrains the growth of fishing capacity. The argument that the MAGP 
is the tool being used to effect permanent reductions in fishing capacity is not 
credible. Capacity and fishing mortality can, in the longer term, only be eff i-
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ciently constrained by imposing realistically high fishing costs on the fishing 
fleet, not by rules alone. 
2.8 Conclusions 
The case has stressed that North Sea haddock and cod stocks are very 
heavily exploited at present and that the fishery has, as a result, become 
heavily dependent upon juvenile fish. In recognition of this fact, the ACFM has 
recommended that fishing mortality for North Sea roundfish be reduced by 
some 30%. 
The current system of fisheries management based on TACs and technical 
measures has failed to limit fishing capacity and effectively constrain the fish-
ery. More recent attempts to reduce TACs to effect reductions in the level of 
fishing mortality, have exacerbated the problems of illegal landings and dis-
carding. Unless fundamental changes to management policy are effected, there 
is a possibility that the North Sea cod stock might collapse. 
MAMs and MSMs which are TAC-based are really variants of the existing 
ineffective management regime and cannot be expected to solve the problems 
of the fishery. 
Effort constraints can take a number of forms although for the purposes 
of the case study, a days-at-sea scheme was explicitly considered on account of 
its potential administrative simplicity and ease of enforcement. 
If the DAS regime was effectively enforced it would undoubtedly have 
some constraining effect on the level of fishing mortality. However, DAS are 
likely to prove poor predictors of catches and landings given the scope that 
they offer for input substitution by individual vessels and do not appear to 
provide a long term solution to the problem of overfishing. Fishing vessels dif-
fer markedly with respect to their technical specifications and catch capabilities 
and this underlines the difficulties associated with defining effort in a way that 
allows a sensible comparison to be made across fleets. 
Given the extent of overcapacity in the North Sea fleet and the degree of 
capital stuffing that could accompany a days-at-sea measure, it is predictable 
that the days allocation for each vessel would have to be progressively reduced 
in order to compensate for increased catch capabilities. This would undoubt-
edly cause increasing hardship for certain vessels and underlines the fact that 
a DAS scheme does not provide a long term economic solution to the problems 
of overfishing in the North Sea. It should be emphasized that the objectives of 
the CFP are not entirely conservationally orientated, indeed, the promotion of 
an economically viable fishing industry is also a goal. Thus it is quite legitimate 
to consider the longer run responses of the industry to days-at-sea measures. 
The measures under review in the study have been formulated solely 
from a biological perspective and fail to address the fundamental economic 
problems in the North Sea roundfish fishery. It seems improper to partially eval-
uate the measures on economic criteria when economic solutions to the prob-
lems of overfishing are not addressed by any of them. 
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Economists have long contended that to eradicate the overfishing seen 
in the North Sea and manage the fishery efficiently, it is necessary to alter the 
cost function faced by the fishing enterprise. This involves the institution of 
some form of charging mechanism which dictates that fishermen pay for their 
fishing rights. The correct economic signals and realistically high fishing costs 
would serve to constrain effort, capacity and subsequent overfishing. 
A possible line of future research might conceivably examine the impacts 
on a specified fishery of introducing a management regime based on charging 
fishermen for their fishing rights. 
It may emerge that there are elements of the MAMs, MSMs or effort mea-
sures discussed which could be incorporated into such a management regime. 
However, such questions are beyond the scope of the current study. 
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As
 
w
ith
 
m
in
im
um
 
sp
aw
-
n
in
g 
st
oc
k,
 
th
is
 
m
ea
su
re
 
te
nd
s 
to
 
gi
ve
 
pr
io
rit
y 
to
 
bi
ol
og
ica
l 
co
n
si
de
ra
tio
ns
.
 
Is 
n
ot
 
pa
rti
cu
la
rly
 
w
e
ll 
a
lig
ne
d 
w
ith
 
th
e
 
re
a
lit
ie
s 
o
f 
th
e
 
fis
hi
ng
 
o
pe
ra
tio
n,
 
gi
ve
n
 
th
at
 
it 
gi
ve
s 
to
ta
l p
rio
rit
y 
to
 
st
oc
k 
co
n
se
rv
a
tio
n.
 
Li
m
it 
is
 
pl
ac
ed
 
o
n
 
a
dju
st-
m
e
n
t o
f T
AC
 
fo
r 
a
dm
in
is
tra
-
tiv
e
 
co
n
ve
n
ie
nc
e.
 
M
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be
 
u
n
re
a
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tic
 
w
he
n
 
u
pw
ar
d 
re
vi
si
on
 
o
f T
AC
 
is
 
re
st
ric
te
d.
 
Te
ch
ni
ca
lly
 
m
o
re
 
re
a
lis
tic
 
gi
ve
n
 
th
at
 
qu
ot
a
 
fro
m
 
pr
ev
i-
ou
s 
ye
ar
 
ca
n
 
be
 
ca
rr
ie
d 
o
ve
r 
if 
ba
d 
w
e
a
th
er
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en
ts
 
fis
hi
ng
.
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t 
sa
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u
n
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el
y 
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a
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su
lt 
o
f o
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rc
a
pa
ci
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in
 
th
e
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.
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ea
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.
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w
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m
e
 
m
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ne
d 
w
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a
ila
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y 
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ve
n
 
o
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d 
v
a
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lit
y 
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ro
u
n
df
 
ish
 
st
oc
ks
.
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Gi
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liz
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n
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th
e
 
fis
hi
ng
 
fle
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a
n
d 
th
e
 
re
qu
ire
d 
re
du
ct
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n
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Cs
 
to
 
e
n
la
rg
e
 
sp
aw
ni
ng
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oc
ks
,
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el
y 
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at
 
th
e
 
ra
ce
 
fo
r 
fis
h 
w
o
u
ld
 
w
o
rs
e
n
.
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nt
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e
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ge
sts
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ni
ng
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r 
N.
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a 
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d 
a
n
d 
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dd
oc
k 
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re
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o
 
lo
w
.
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es
ts 
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e
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o
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re
du
ce
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n
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.
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C
 
m
a
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h.
 
So
m
e 
a
lle
vi
at
io
n
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a
 
(e.
g. 
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e
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A
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a
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o
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ld
 
a
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is
 
al
so
 
ca
us
ed
 
by
 
la
rg
e
 
n
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m
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n
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o
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n
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n
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,
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ev
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,
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o
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g 
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.
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th
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Sh
or
t 
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w
ith
 
a
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g 
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ci
l-
ity
.
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ow
ev
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,
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ive
 
ca
-
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ci
ty
 
su
gg
es
ts 
th
at
 
th
is
 
fa
-
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y 
w
o
u
ld
 
be
 
he
av
ily
 
u
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i-
se
d 
to
 
th
e
 
de
tri
m
en
t 
o
f 
lo
ng
 
te
rm
 
pr
of
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bi
lit
y.
 
Va
ria
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lit
y 
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st
oc
k 
a
bu
n-
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e
 
su
gg
es
ts
 
th
at
 
M
AM
s 
m
ay
 
fa
il 
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tra
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ch
an
ge
s 
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st
oc
k 
a
bu
nd
an
ce
 
fr
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ye
ar
 
to
 
ye
ar
.
 
G
ive
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o
ve
rc
a
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,
 
m
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w
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ha
ve
 
n
e
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tiv
e
 
im
-
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o
n
 
pr
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ita
bi
lit
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3. NORTH SEA FISHERY FOR FLATFISH 
J.W. de Wilde and F. van Beek 
Summary 
The major North Sea flatfish species plaice and sole are mainly exploited 
with beam trawl by the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Belgium. In this 
fishery sole and plaice are generally caught together, but catching sole can be 
avoided by using a large mesh size. Denmark is another major operator having 
more directed fisheries for plaice and sole. 
The plaice stock, which for a long period was strong and stable, has dete-
riorated since 1990 and was below the minimum biologically acceptable level 
(MBAL) in 1994. The sole stock is in good shape, due to a couple of strong year 
classes. Both stocks are growth overfished, meaning that in the long run they 
tend to fall below MBAL. For plaice, a reduction of fishing effort has been re-
commended, and for sole this is desirable as well. 
The fishery is mainly regulated by annual TACs, accompanied by various 
other measures, like minimum mesh sizes and area restrictions (Plaice box). The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom have rather complex sets of national 
regulations for the implementation of the quota system. 
The stocks, particularly that of sole, have allowed reasonable economic 
results since 1990. The technical overcapacity of the fleet which, in spite of de-
commissioning, is still there, has not yet become economically visible, so fisher-
men want to maintain or even expand their capacity. But the beam trawling 
fleet is very vulnerable to reductions of the sole catches and fuel price rises, and 
these may cause serious economic problems. Combined with the rather high 
level of fishing mortality this is the main management problem. 
Multi-annual and multi-species measures are only considered realistic and 
feasible under well specified conditions and restrictions. Setting a constant TAC 
over a range of years could only be feasible with plaice, after recovery of the 
stock, but it would provide no improvement of management. Borrowing lim-
ited amounts of next years quota is a feasible and attractive proposition, al-
though it does not attack the major management problem. Limited adjustment 
of the quota could, with sufficiently strict enforcement, eventually have a posi-
tive effect on the sole stock and on stability of supply, but again it would have 
no effect on the management problem. A policy of keeping the stocks above 
a certain minimum size is not considered to be feasible (yet). Application of a 
fixed formula to reduce the fishing mortality would require very strict enforce-
ment and accompanying decommissioning of boats. If these conditions can be 
fulfi l led, this is an effective policy. 
Unlimited transfer between plaice and sole quota, using a common de-
nominator would be detrimental for the state of the stocks, even if the right 
denominator can be found. Like limited compensation of quota between years, 
limited transfer between species can be a feasible and attractive management 
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measure, even if it does not address the major management problem. Allowing 
limited bycatches of plaice in the sole fishery after an early closure of the plaice 
fishery would be feasible, but would not contribute to solving the manage-
ment problem. Application of a two tier system, devised to encourage fishing 
for the less vulnerable species, appears to be too complex and intransparent to 
be useful. 
Management by effort is already applied in the North Sea flatfish fishery, 
as the Netherlands operate a days-at-sea system as an accompanying measure 
to the individual transferable quota system. Nevertheless a complete change 
over from quota management to effort management would meet political 
opposition in the Netherlands, as the ITQs represent considerable financial 
value and most fishing firms have invested heavily in bringing their ITQs into 
line wi th their fishing capacity. To meet this opposition, an acceptable and 
transparent method must be found to translate quota and ITQs into (individ-
ual) effort allocations. The effectiveness of effort management will highly de-
pend on solid monitoring of the efficiency of fleets and fishing methods, to 
take into account technological progress. 
3.0 Introduction 
The major fishery for flatfish in the North Sea (ICES areas lla(EC) and IV) 
is a mixed fishery for plaice (Pleuronectes platessa L) and sole {Solea solea L) 
with beam trawl. Other single species directed fisheries occur applying seine 
nets and gill nets. Since the inception of the Common Fisheries Policy in 1983 
it has developed into the most important North Sea fishery in terms of aggre-
gate value. The 1994 TACs - plaice: 165,000 tonnes and sole: 32,000 tonnes -
represent a total value of around 470 mln. ECU (at mid '94 Dutch auction 
prices). 
Management of the sole and plaice fishery by TACs and quota started in 
1975 in the framework of the North East Atlantic Fisheries Convention. Country 
quota were allocated according to catch performance in the previous years 
1972, '73 and '74. The initial regulations had the character of gentlemen's 
agreements, as enforcement was generally lacking. Consequently the system 
had a rather false start, wi th quota being more or less ignored. 
After the general extension of the fishery zones by the Member States, 
the EC in fact took over the regulation of the North Sea (and other) fisheries 
in 1978. But it became only effective after agreement on the Common Fisheries 
Policy was reached. In the CFP the original key for allocating quota to member 
countries was greatly maintained, for the sake of 'relative stability'. This has 
been a source of contention, as the considerable shifts in the relative shares 
that had occurred since the early seventies, particularly in the plaice fishery, 
were not taken into account. 
Other North Sea flatfish species, like dab (Limanda limanda L), turbot 
(Scophtalmus maximus L), brill (Scophtalmus rhombus L), flounder (Platichthys 
flesus L), lemon sole (Microstomus kitt L), are not regulated by the EU. They 
are mostly caught as bycatch in the sole and plaice fisheries. 
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Part A Description o f the f ishery 
3.1 Countries and fleets involved 
All EU Member States surrounding the North Sea are participating in its 
flatfish fishery. Table 3.1 gives a survey of catches by country in 1993 as re-
ported to ICES 1) and the allocated quota for 1994 2). 
Table 3.1 North Sea catches and quota of plaice and sole by country (1,000 tonnes) 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Total EU 
Non EU countries a) 
Total reported 
Unreported 
Grand total 
Plaice 
catch 
1993 
10,814 
16,452 
593 
6,896 
48,552 
31,163 
114,470 
760 
115,230 
-5,279 
109,951 
quota 
1994 
9,440 
30,680 
1,770 
8,850 
59,000 
43,660 
153,400 
11,600 
-
-
165,000 
Sole 
catch 
1993 
2,783 
1,661 
484 
1,378 
22,015 
688 
29,009 
60 
29,069 
2,101 
31,170 
quota 
1994 
2,665 
1,220 
535 
2,135 
24,075 
1,370 
32,000 
-
-
-
32,000 
a) Mainly Norway. 
The table gives the basic quota before transfers and exchanges. Annually 
around 15,000 tonnes of plaice are transferred from the UK to the Netherlands 
in exchange for its small quota of flatfish and roundfish outside the North Sea, 
which are abandoned for control reasons. In this arrangement also a transfer 
of about 500 tonnes of North Sea sole from the Netherlands to the UK is in-
cluded. 
1 ) Extract of the Report of the Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management; De-
mersal Stocks in Division Ilia and the North Sea. ICES, Copenhagen, Oct/Nov 
1994. 
2) Council Regulation (EC) No 3676/93 of 21 December 1993 fixing, for certain fish 
stock and groups of fish stocks, the total allowable catches for 1994 and certain 
conditions under which they may be fished. Official Journal of the European 
Union No L 341, 31. 12.93. 
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Figure 3.1 a Total international landings of North Sea plaice and TACs set at start of year, 1983-
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Figure 3.1b Total international landings of North Sea sole and TACs set at start of year, 1983-
1994 
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A picture of the North Sea plaice and sole TACs and landings since the 
inception of the CFP in 1983 is given in figure 3.1. 
The Netherlands is the main operator in the North Sea flatfish fishery, 
having a share of about 45% of the plaice TAC (after the swap) and 75% of the 
sole TAC. Denmark and the UK follow at some distance with shares of 18% and 
17% (after the swap) respectively of the plaice and just under 4% and 6% (af-
ter the swap) respectively of the sole. Belgium and Germany have slightly larger 
shares of the sole TAC, with 8% and 7% respectively, but their plaice quota are 
rather small: 6% and 5% respectively. France has only a small share in the 
North Sea flatfish fishery. Figure 3.2 shows the country shares in the landings 
of plaice and sole from 1983 onwards. 
North Sea sole is exclusively caught by EU Member States. Norway is the 
only third country participating in the North Sea plaice fishery, but its landings 
are much smaller than the available quota. 
The main fishing gear used for exploiting plaice and sole in the North Sea 
is the twin beam trawl. This gear is used by virtually all Dutch and Belgian flat-
fish vessels and a large part of the British flatfish fleet. It contributes approxi-
mately 80% to the total fishing mortality of flatfish (70% of plaice and 90% of 
sole). 
Since the abundance of sole increased again as a result of the 1987 and 
fol lowing good year classes, the effort of most beam trawlers appears to be 
primarily directed at catching sole. But in beam trawling for sole, plaice is an 
inevitable bycatch. A directed fishery for plaice with beam trawls is always pos-
sible by using sufficiently large meshes in the codend. 
Apart from beam trawls, plaice and sole are caught by otter trawls, Dan-
ish and Scottish seines and set nets. Denmark still has a small otter trawl fishery 
directed at plaice, but generally plaice is just a bycatch of otter trawling. Very 
little sole is caught by otter trawls. 
With Danish and Scottish seining, a directed fishery for plaice is practised, 
mainly by Danish and British vessels. Bycatch of sole are practically nil in this 
fishery. On the other hand the fishery with set nets is primarily directed at sole, 
with little bycatch of plaice. This is a seasonal fishery, mainly practised by Dan-
ish fishermen. Apart from that, Danish netters have a directed fishery for 
plaice. The North Sea beam trawl fleet is composed of the following segments 
by nationality. 
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Figure 3.2a National shares of North Sea plaice landings, 1983-1993 
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Belgium 1) 
In 1993 a fleet of 149 beam trawlers, with an aggregate engine power of 
66,000 kW operated under the Belgian flag. The total beam trawling effort 
was 14.1 mln kW-days. Approximately 70% of the effort was exerted in the 
North Sea. 
The total crew of the beam trawler fleet is estimated at 680, so the labour 
involved in North Sea beam trawling is equivalent to 475 man-years. 
Some of the Belgian beam trawlers are owned by combined Belgian and 
Dutch interests. 
Denmark 2) 
Has no beam trawling of any significance. 
France 3) 
France has a small fleet of relatively small beam trawlers: 25 to 30 boats 
of 10 to 29 m length over all. Less than a quarter of their effort is directed at 
the North Sea. 
Germany 4) 
At the end of 1993, Niedersachsen and Bremen had 9 beam trawlers fish-
ing outside the coastal zone and 28 coastal fishing vessels partly engaged in 
beam trawling for flatfish. Schleswig-Holstein had 17 vessels fishing for white 
fish in the North Sea; part of this activity was beam trawling for flatfish. 
Part of the German beam trawlers is owned by combined German and 
Dutch interests. Those boats are generally manned by Dutch crews and operat-
ing from Dutch ports. 
The Netherlands 5) 
The Dutch fleet of beam trawlers consists of 294 vessels, having a com-
bined engine power of 327,700 kW and an aggregate gross tonnage of 82,200 
G(R)T. Out of this fleet, 100 boats with a total engine power of 38,400 kW par-
ticipate also in other fisheries, like those for roundfish, herring or shrimp. The 
1) Ir. M. Welvaert; De Belgische zeevisserij, aanvoeren besomming, 1993; Dienst 
voor de Zeevisserij, Oostende, 1994. 
2) Fiskeristatistisk ârbog 1992; Fiskeriministeriet, Copenhagen, 1993. 
3) Report of the Working Group on the Assessments of Demersal Stocks in the 
North Sea and Skagerrak, 6-13 October 1992; Ch.6: Matters relating to technical 
interactions; ICES CM. 1993/Assess: 5, Copenhagen, 1993. 
4) Die Kleine Hochsee- und Küstenfischerei Niedersachsens und Bremens im Jahre 
1993; Jahresbericht des Staatlichen Fischereiamtes Bremerhaven; Die Kleine 
Hochsee- und Küstenfischerei Schleswig-Holsteins im Jahre 1993; Jahresbericht 
des Fischereiamtes Kiel; Das Fischerblatt, Jahrgang 42, Nr. 2, 3, 4, 5, Kiel, Febr. -
May 1994. 
5) Drs. W. Smit et al.; Visserij in cijfers 1993; LEI-DLO, Periodieke Rapportage 31-93, 
Den Haag, 1994. 
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total beam trawling effort amounted to 56.5 mln kW-days in 1993. Just over 
1,600 man-years of labour were involved in the fishery. 
United Kingdom 1) 
The British beam trawler fleet fishing in the North Sea numbered 187 
vessels in 1993, spending about 0.25 mln fishing hours. Part of those are rela-
tively small coastal fishing vessels, and part of the fleet is based in ports at the 
south and west coasts, only fishing in the North Sea occasionally. It is estimated 
that around 70 vessels ranging between 24 and 40 m loa have their main fish-
ery in the North Sea. 
About 60% of these boats are owned by combined British and Dutch 
interests. They are generally manned by Dutch crews and operate from Dutch 
ports. Amongst those are 20 vessels based in Scotland, having a combined en-
gine power of 24,000 kW and an aggregate gross tonnage of 5,200 GRT. 
The total North Sea beam trawler fleet is estimated to comprise nearly 
600 vessels, having an aggregate gross tonnage of around 120,000 G(R)T and 
a combined engine power of about 470,000 kW. The total beam trawling ef-
fort of this fleet in the North Sea was around 75 mln kW-days in 1993. The fish-
ery has a labour input of around 2,500 man-years. 
The non-beam trawl fisheries cannot be described with a similar precision. 
Those fisheries are generally only seasonally directed at flatfish. The main di-
rected fisheries are: 
otter trawling for plaice in Denmark; 
seining for plaice in Denmark and the United Kingdom; 
netting for sole, plaice or turbot in Denmark and Germany. 
Only very general data on the fleets involved are available. 
Denmark 
Nearly 40% of Danish plaice landings from the North Sea in 1992 were 
the result of seining. The seiner fleet of the North Sea fishing districts num-
bered 148 vessels, having a total gross tonnage of 5,500 G(R)T, a total engine 
power of 21,600 kW and a total crew of 455 men. The effort is more or less 
concentrated in the period from March to September, when nearly 80% of the 
North Sea plaice landings are made. 
The Danish fleet of netters in the North Sea districts counted 408 boats 
in 1992, having an aggregate gross tonnage of 5,600 G(R)T, a combined engine 
power of 34,800 kW and a total crew of 920 men. According to the landing 
value, over 40% of the effort of these vessels concerned fishing for flatfish. 
Netters account for 80% of the Danish North Sea sole catch (75% of that of 
turbot) and 30% of that of plaice. The sole fishery is highly seasonal, the season 
running from March until August. It peaks in April, when nearly half the total 
catch is made. 
1) a) United Kingdom Sea Fisheries Statistics 1993, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food, London, 1995; b) C. Egner, (SFIA) personal communication. 
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In 1992 about 15% of North Sea plaice landings in Denmark was made by 
(otter) trawlers under 100 GRT. Most of this probably was the result of directed 
fishing. Another 15% was landed by trawlers over 100 tonnes, mostly as a 
bycatch probably, or as the result of a mixed fishery. Data from 1988 show that 
about 40 trawlers of 10-70 G(R)T were fishing specially for plaice in that year, 
making about 1,000 trips in total. The size of this fleet has probably decreased 
since. 
Germany 
A small fleet of about a dozen German Baltic netters also profit from the 
sole season in the North Sea. 
United Kingdom 
The UK North Sea seiner fleet counts only about 40 boats. They are gener-
ally of a similar size and operate in a similar way as the Danish seiners. 
The total non-beam trawling North Sea flatfish fleet is estimated to con-
sist of nearly 650 boats, having an aggregate gross tonnage of around 14,000 
G(R)T, a combined engine power of around 70,000 kW and a total crew of 
some 1,700 men. At a 60% dependence on fishing for flatfish, this would mean 
a total employment of around 1,000 man-years. 
The total fleet of vessels engaged in directed fishing for flatfish in the 
North Sea, both beam trawl and non-beam trawl together, so is estimated at 
1,250 boats, with an aggregate gross tonnage of around 134,000 G(R)T and a 
combined horse power of around 540,000 kW. The North Sea flatfish fishery 
provides an employment equivalent to around 3,500 man years, but the num-
ber of crew members engaged in it for at least part of the year is probably over 
4,500. 
3.2 Biological basis 
Plaice and sole occur in a large area in the northeast Atlantic. They are 
managed in separate management areas as separate stocks. 
The distribution of sole extends from the north African Atlantic coast, the 
Mediterranean to the southern part of the North Sea (IVc and IVb south). In the 
North Sea the species is on the northern limit of its distribution area. The North 
Sea stock is the largest of the exploited sole stocks. Nurseries are situated in 
shallow waters along the continental and English coast at 5 to 10 m depth. 
The distribution of European plaice extends from the Barents Sea, Ice-
land, west of Ireland and Baltic Sea to the Bay of Biscay, the latter also being 
the southern limit of its distribution area. The North Sea stock is the largest 
plaice stock. Nursery areas are situated in coastal and inshore stretches along 
the North Sea coast of Britain and the continent. The most important nursery 
areas are the Wadden Sea and the German Bight. 
In many cases both plaice and sole are exploited by the same fleets in the 
North Sea. Both species show a considerable overlap in distribution area of the 
adults on the fishing grounds and juveniles in the nurseries. Peak spawning of 
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plaice occurs in the 1st quarter and for sole in the 2nd quarter in coastal areas. 
High densities during spawning time attract a more directed fishery for these 
species. Juveniles of both species start recruiting into the fishery as 2-year-olds 
in the second half of the year in coastal areas. Most of the catch of both species 
is taken by beam trawlers. The minimum mesh size, used in this fishery, is 80 
mm and is, by derogation of the general minimum mesh size of 100 mm, set in 
accordance with the selection characteristics of sole. Due to this minimum mesh 
size, large numbers of plaice are discarded. Discards in the beam trawl fishery 
are estimated to be around 50% (plaice in numbers) and sole 15%. These per-
centages may vary between years, pending on the strength of recruiting year 
classes. There are no predatory interactions between the two species. 
The overview of the historical development of both stocks is given below 
and is drawn predominantly from assessments made by the ICES Working 
Group on the Assessment of Demersal stocks in the North Sea and Skagerrak 
(Anon, 1995) 1). 
3.2.1 Plaice 
Trends in landings, recruitment, fishing mortality and spawning stock 
biomass are shown in figure 3.3. 
With the exception of three exceptionally strong year classes, all born 
after a strong winter, recruitment of North Sea plaice shows less variation, com-
pared to many other exploited species for which information on recruitment 
is available. In the period 1957-1994 annual recruitment varied between 235 
and 1,270 mln 1-year-olds. Average recruitment in this period is 465 mln. The 
level of recruitment increased significantly in the seventies but appears to de-
cline again since the end of the eighties. All year classes born after 1988 are at 
or below average strength. 
In the first half of this century landings of plaice in the North Sea have 
fluctuated between 30 and 70,000 tonnes. Since the end of the 2nd World War 
landings have started to increase continuously. After a period wi th historically 
high landings at a level of around 150,000 tonnes in 1979-1991, landings in 
1993 declined to 110,000 tonnes the lowest since 1975. 
The fishery is dependent on the success of incoming year classes. In the 
period 1984-1993 on average 45% (32-51) of the landings in numbers were 3 
years old or younger and 70% (53-84) were 4 years old or younger. 
Fishing mortality has increased steadily between 1960 and 1980. Since 
1990 it has increased further and is currently believed to be at a record high 
level. The trends in fishing mortality are very similar to sole. 
Historically the spawning stock biomass has varied between 300 and 
500,000 tonnes since 1957. Despite a steady increase in fishing mortality, 
spawning stock had remained rather stable and even increased to a level of 
415,000 tonnes in 1989, mainly due to the increase in the average level of re-
1) Anon; Report of the working Group on the Assessments of Demersal Stocks in 
the North Sea and Skagerrak; ICES CM. 1995/Assess: Copenhagen, 1995. 
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cruitment in the 1970s and 1980s and to an increase in growth in the 1960s. 
Recently SSB has fallen to 250,000 tonnes in 1994, the lowest recorded in the 
assessment period. The 1994 level of biomass is well below the minimum bio-
logically acceptable limit (MBAL) of 300,000 tonnes. The recent fall in spawning 
stock biomass is due partly to a decrease in the growth rate of plaice, partly to 
a decrease in the level of recruitment and to an increase in fishing mortality. 
The reduced growth results in a direct reduction of the total production 
capacity of the stock. The reduction in growth also extends the pre-recruit pe-
riod of the juveniles, therefore recruitment in the fishery is delayed and 
pre-recruits are exposed to discard mortality for a longer period. Consequently 
apparent recruitment in the fishery is reduced. 
In 1989 a closed area, the Plaice box, was introduced in the coastal waters 
of the continental coast in the German Bight and along the Dutch and Danish 
coast, wi th the intention of reducing discarding of juvenile plaice, which is 
most abundant in the area. In the box, the fishing conditions for the 12 coastal 
miles zones are applicable. 
Since 1975, plaice in the North Sea are managed by annual TACs and 
quota. Problems with the quota management occur because the allocation key 
of the TAC into national quota does not correspond with the distribution of 
fishing capacity. This situation resulted in structural underexploitation of the 
quota by some nations, while other nations structurally overshot their quota. 
The resulting enforcement problem has tempted managers to set TACs above 
the status quo catch predictions indicated by scientists. These predictions, how-
ever, in recent years (1990-1993) also appeared to be overestimates of the real-
ised status quo catch. In those years scientists had overestimated the stock and 
recruitment as a result of unreliable estimates of unreported landings. There-
fore TACs for plaice in recent years have not been restrictive in the North Sea. 
3.2.2 Sole 
Trends in landings, recruitment, fishing mortality and spawning stock 
biomass are shown in figure 3.4. 
In the period 1957-1994 recruitment varied between 12 and 550 mln 
1-year-olds. Average recruitment is 134 million. Although there is considerable 
variation in the level of recruitment from year to year, recruitment of year 
classes born in the periods 1956-1964 and in the period after 1975 has been 
higher than the period in between. The pattern of recruitment is characterized 
by the incidental occurrence of exceptional strong year classes which have had 
a great impact on the development of landings, stock and fisheries. These 
strong year classes were all born after severe winters or cold springs. Severe 
winters can also cause severe mortality. Recruitment of year classes 1961, 1962 
and 1978 were reduced by the winters of 1963 and 1979. In recent years two 
outstanding year classes were born (1987 and 1991), which presently dominate 
the stock and the fishery. 
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Figure 3.3a North Sea plaice landings, 1957-1994 
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Figure 3.3b North Sea plaice fishing mortality, 1957-1994 
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Figure 3.3c North Sea plaice recruitment (year class), 1957-1994 
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Figure 3.3d North Sea plaice Spawning Stock Biomass, 1957-1994 
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Figure 3.4a North Sea sole landings, 1957-1994 
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Figure 3.4b North Sea sole fishing mortality, 1957-1994 
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Figure 3.4c North Sea sole recruitment (year class), 1957-1994 
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Figure 3.4d North Sea sole Spawning Stock Biomass, 1957-1994 
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Landings in the first half of the century gradually increased from levels 
around 1,500 tonnes in the beginning of the century to about 10,000 tonnes 
around 1950. Trends in landings are related to the recruitment of strong year 
classes in the fishery and a gradual increase in fishing mortality. In the period 
1957-1963 landings increased from 12 to 26,000 tonnes, mainly because of the 
good 1958 year class. They declined sharply in 1964 as a result of a reduction 
of the stock caused by excessive mortality of adult fish in the severe winter of 
1963. Landings increased thereafter in the period 1965-1969 from 17 to 33,000 
tonnes, because of the record 1963 year class and an increase in fishing mortal-
ity. In the period thereafter they declined to a level around 20,000 tonnes with 
variations reflecting variations in recruitment. In 1991 they increased sharply 
to an historically high levels and remained high in 1992 and 1993 by two strong 
year classes born 1987 and 1991. 
In the period 1984-1993 on average 58% (44-81) of the landings in num-
bers was 3 years old or younger and 81 % (60-90) was 4 years old or younger. 
Even more than for plaice the level of the landings depend on the success of 
incoming year classes. 
Fishing mortality increased gradually in the period 1957-1966. It increased 
sharply in 1967-1969, mainly because of the introduction of the beam trawl 
and continued to increase gradually until the mid eighties. In the last five years 
it has been somewhat reduced and is fluctuating at around a level of 0.42. 
Spawning stock biomass was high in the early period. The historically high 
value of 149,000 tonnes was in 1961. It dropped after the cold 1993 winter and 
increased again to 105,000 tonnes in 1966. Thereafter it decreased gradually 
because of an increase in fishing mortality and low recruitment. In the period 
1973-1989 it has fluctuated between 25 and 45,000 tonnes. It increased sharply 
in 1990 to 97,000 tonnes when the 1987 year class recruited to the fishery and 
remained at a high level thereafter. At observed levels of biomass, the stock 
has not shown signals of recruitment failure. Management is directed to main-
tain the spawning stock biomass above a minimum biologically acceptable limit 
(MBAL) of 35,000 tonnes. 
In the past fisheries managers have attempted to reduce the exploitation 
rate of sole by setting restrictive single species TACs which have corresponded 
to a reduction in fishing mortality. In most years, however, the actual landings 
exceeded the TAC (figure 3.1) and were closer to the status quo catch forecast. 
3.2.3 Conclusions 
The exploitation rate of flatfish is much lower compared with roundfish. 
The level of fishing mortality of plaice and sole is around 0.5 while cod, had-
dock and whit ing are twice as high. 
The main reason for the difference is related to their habitat and their 
behaviour. While roundfish can be exploited with various gears everywhere in 
the North Sea, flatfish is relatively more protected in several (stony and muddy) 
areas, which are difficult to fish wi th beam trawlers. Therefore the flatfish 
stocks are less volatile compared to roundfish stocks in the North Sea. 
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In recent years both sole and plaice yields and stock biomasses in the 
North Sea have been in an 'above average' situation and profited from in-
creased levels of recruitment or a few outstanding year classes. This situation 
is not expected to continue. Outstanding sole year classes occurred about eight 
times in this century with possible intervals of 25 years. The present size of the 
adult sole stock is dominated by 2 outstanding year classes, which contribution 
is expected to decrease rapidly. The spawning tock of plaice has recently de-
clined below the biologically acceptable minimum level by a reduction in re-
cruitment since 1988, it is expected to remain below this level if present level 
of exploitation and average future year class strength will not change. 
Although both stocks have not shown signs of recruitment overfishing at 
historical levels of spawning biomass, they are both overfished in terms of 
growth. Management advice for both stocks has been to reduce fishing mortal-
ity by reducing fishing effort. Such a reduction is required to reduce the proba-
bility that the stocks drop or remain below their minimum thresholds. 
Yields in the fishery for plaice and sole have been dependent on the size 
of recruiting year classes. Therefore predictions of future yields depend on the 
accuracy of estimates of year class strength. In practice most problems with 
predicting year class strength have been with the outstanding year classes, 
which already have a great impact on the predicted yields in the first year 
when they recruit in the fishery. 
3.3 Regulations 
3.3.1 EU Regulations 
The North Sea flatfish fishery is extensively regulated by the European 
Union: rules and regulations are in force in all four fields of the Common Fish-
eries Policy. These concern TACs and quota, technical measures, structural mea-
sures and marketing measures. 
3.3.1.1 TACs and quota 
Since 1975 the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission has regulated the 
fisheries for plaice and sole in the North Sea by a system of TAC and quota. This 
system was adopted by the European Union and integrated into its Common 
Fisheries Policy. EU is now the dominant partner in the fisheries regulation of 
the North Sea. TACs are still agreed upon in the NEAFC but the EU has a deci-
sive vote. The EU distributes its share of the TACs over the Member States ac-
cording to a fixed key. 
Table 3.2 gives TACs of plaice and sole over recent years; table 3.3 shows 
the shares of the Member States. 
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Table 3.2 Total Allowable Catches of plaice and sole in the North Sea (IIa and IV) 1989 - 1995 
(1,000 tonnes) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Plaice total TAC 
EU plaice TAC 
Sole TAC 
185.0 
182.7 
14.0 
180.0 
176.9 
25.0 
175.0 
171.9 
27.0 
175.0 
168.8 
25.0 
175.0 
168.8 
32.0 
165.0 
153.4 
32.0 
115.0 
106.9 
28.0 
Table 3.3 Basic quota shares of Member States in the EU TACs of plaice and sole in the North 
Sea (IIa and IV) (%) 
Belgium Denmark 
Plaice 6.2 20.0 
Sole 8.3 3.8 
France Germany Netherlands Un. Kingdom 
1.2 5.8 38.5 28.5 
1.7 6.7 75.2 4.3 
By exchanging its quota of demersal species in waters outside the North 
Sea (and part of its North Sea sole quota) with Belgium, Denmark and, particu-
larly, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands has annually increased its share in 
North Sea plaice by around 7.5%. This solved two problems: it relieved the 
shortage of plaice that existed during the eighties; and it made controlling the 
fishery a lot easier, as all quota for demersal species were concentrated in one 
management area, the North Sea. The necessity for making these swaps to 
provide for sufficient plaice became less evident when, coinciding wi th the 
increased availability of sole, the Dutch catches dropped gradually to even be-
low the basic quota level. The other reason for the swaps, ease of control, was 
as yet never challenged by the Dutch industry. 
3.3.1.2 Technical measures 
Technical measures have been laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No 
3094/86 and successive amendments. 
Minimum landing size 
The following minimum landing sizes are in force for 'protected' flatfish 
species in the North Sea (in cm): 
Plaice Pleuronectes platessa 27 
Witch Glyptocephalus cynoglossus 28 
Lemon sole Microstomus kitt 25 
Sole Solea vulgaris 24 
Turbot Psetta maxima 30 
Brill Scophtalmus rhombus 30 
Megrim Lepidorhombus spp. 25 
Dab Limanda limanda 23 
Flounder Platichthys flesus 25 
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Minimum mesh size 
The minimum mesh size for fishing for demersal species in the North Sea 
is 100 mm. Of the few derogations to this general rule, one is particularly rele-
vant to the flatfish fishery: fishing for sole south of 55° N is allowed with 80 
mm meshes in the cod end, provided that at least 5% of the catch is sole, and 
no more than 10% of the catch is composed of cod, haddock and saithe. 
The 80 mm mesh used in most of the flatfish fishery results in substantial 
discards of undersized plaice. Dutch fishermen are of the opinion that for sole 
the minimum landing size and the mesh size are not optimally tuned, as they 
tend lose considerable amounts of marketable sole when a new year class re-
cruits to the fishery. 
Maximum beam length 
An additional technical measure concerning the fishing gear is the restric-
t ion of the aggregate beam length of beam trawlers to 24 m. This limits the 
fishing power of beamers over about 1,300 kWto a certain extent, by reducing 
the swept area, but this may be partly compensated by increasing the fishing 
speed. 
12 mile zone 
Beam trawling is not allowed in a 12 nautical mile (22.2 km) wide zone 
along the British coast, except for vessels having an engine power not exceed-
ing 221 kW and an overall length of 24 m maximum. 
In the 12 mile zone extending from the French coast at 51° N to Hirtshals 
in Denmark trawling is not allowed for vessels over 8 m overall length. How-
ever, otter trawling is allowed for vessels of maximum 221 kW and 24 m overall 
length, provided that catches of plaice and sole exceeding 5% of the total 
amount of fish on board are discarded. Beam trawling is only allowed for ves-
sels included in a list that has been drawn up for the purpose. The number of 
vessels on this list is bound to a maximum, but the vessels on it may be replaced 
by other ones, provided their engine power does not exceed 221 kW and their 
overall length is 24 m maximum. Vessels on the list are allowed to fish within 
the twelve mile zone with beam trawls having an aggregate width of 9 m max-
imum. To this rule there is a further derogation for vessels having shrimping as 
their main occupation. Such vessels may be included in an annually revised sec-
ond list and are allowed to use beam trawls exceeding 9 m total width. 
Plaice box 
In addition to the twelve mile zone a 'Plaice box'was established in 1989, 
extending from 53° N to 57° N along the coasts of the Netherlands, Germany 
and Denmark and about 30 nm (55 km) wide, where the same restrictions are 
in force as in the twelve mile zone that is part of it (in effect no beam trawling 
by vessels over 24 m overall length with engines over 221 kW). Initially the re-
striction applied only to the second and third quarter, in 1994 it was extended 
to the fourth quarter. 
The Plaice box was established in order to protect the nurseries and 
ongrowing areas of young plaice, which should result in increased yields of 
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plaice, possibly to an extent of 25%, related to a situation without the box. An 
evaluation by an ad hoc study group in 1994 1) has confirmed the opinion of 
the fishermen that the predicted effects have not been realized. But a maxi-
mum effect of the box can only be reached by excluding all discard producing 
fleets. 
Apart from the fact that the box was closed to the larger beamers only 
during half of the year, an important factor in not achieving the expected ef-
fects has been the expansion of the fishery within the box. The protection of-
fered by the box, and earlier by the twelve mile zone, has led to substantial 
investment in powerful 221 kW, 24 m loa vessels, mostly replacing smaller, ob-
solete boats on 'List I'. In the Netherlands, for instance the number of boats 
with engines from 192 to 221 kW increased from 107 to 124 between the end 
of 1989 and the end of 1993, while the total fleet size decreased by nearly 100, 
from 573 to 474 boats. 
Since the beginning of the eighties, when such 'Eurocutters' measured 
around 85 GT (at that time the maximum allowed vessel size in the 12-mile 
zone still was 70 GRT), the size of the newly built vessels has almost doubled to 
160 GT. It is hardly conceivable that the extra investment involved in the extra 
volume would not be compensated by an increase in fishing power to a similar 
extent. So not only the number of top of the range boats allowed to fish 
within the protected areas has increased, but also their average fishing power. 
In addition to this the activity of the Dutch up to 221 kW beam trawling 
fleet in the box has more than doubled, as is indicated in the ACFM evaluation 
report. The combined effect must have been an increase in fishing effort and 
resulting mortality in the box rather than the expected decrease. 
Compared to this, the expansion of Danish netting, for sole in particular, 
in the lee offered by the box exactly during the season, has been of negligible 
influence. 
3.3.1.3 Structural measures 
According to the framework of the present Multi-Annual Guidance 
Programme, covering the period 1-1-'93 to 31-12-'96, benthic fishing fleets, i.e. 
beam trawling fleets, should be reduced in engine power and gross tonnage 
by 15%. Demersal fleets should be reduced by 20%. For other fisheries no re-
ductions are required. Of the required reductions, 45% may be realized by a 
(permanent) reduction of effort. 
The Dutch MAGPalreadytakes into account a capacity reduction of 8.2 % 
realized by a limitation of the days-at-sea in the former period. 
1) a) Report of the study group on the North Sea Plaice box, 12-15 April 1994; ICES 
CM. 1994/Assess: 14, Copenhagen, 1994; b) Extract of the report of ACFM to the 
European Commission: North Sea Plaice box; ICES, Copenhagen, May 1994. 
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3.3.1.4 Marketing measures 
A number of flatfish species are included in the common withdrawal price 
system, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 3759/92. These are: plaice, megrim, dab, 
f lounder and sole. The withdrawal price for 1995 is set at 83% of the guide 
price for all of those, except for megrim, where it is 80%. 
Not all species have to be included in the withdrawal systems of the indi-
vidual Producer Organizations. The Dutch POs have no withdrawal price for 
sole, as it would serve no practical purpose. 
The withdrawal prices for plaice are set at two levels: they are lower for 
the first four months of the year in order to discourage landing of lean, low 
quality plaice during the spawning season. This could have some stock conser-
vation effect as well, although in practice the effect is very limited. 
3.3.2 National regulations 
In most participating countries the North Sea flatfish fishery, particularly 
of plaice and sole, is subject to more or less specific national restrictions. These 
may concern access to the fishery or landing restrictions and are quite compli-
cated in some instances. 
3.3.2.1 Belgium 
The fishing capacity of the Belgian fleet is controlled by a vessel licensing 
system, which allows no increase in aggregate engine power and tonnage. A 
decommissioning scheme serves to stimulate capacity reduction as required by 
the MAGP. Vessels can be replaced by boats of the same horse power and gross 
tonnage, or licenses can be joined for new building up to a maximum tonnage 
of 385 GT, an engine power of 883 kW and a length of 38 m. 
The fishery for plaice is not subject to any national restrictions. Individual 
quota of North Sea sole are allocated on the basis of engine power. The alloca-
tions may be adapted during the year, according to the recorded catches. For 
instance in 1993 after successive increases, vessels of 221 kW or less were even-
tually allowed to land 93 kg/kW and more powerful vessels half of that. 
3.3.2.2 Denmark 
The fishing capacity in Denmark is in general limited by a licensing sys-
tem. New capacity can only be commissioned after withdrawal of a similar old 
capacity. The capacity of individual vessels is expressed in six parameters: gross 
tonnage, length, width, depth, hold volume and engine power. Increases in 
any of these parameters require the consent of the Ministry of Fisheries. Con-
version of vessels having an engine power over 368 kW to beam trawling is not 
allowed. 
There is no direct regulation on the catch of plaice, as the quota remains 
underutilized. In fact the plaice fishery is stimulated through a kind of multi-
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species regulation: fishermen get extra cod quota if their plaice landings ex-
ceed 40% of the landed weight of cod. 
Catches of sole are regulated by boat quota per unit of time, varying dur-
ing the year with the season. In 1994 for instance, sole catches were restricted 
to 300 kg per week, only as a bycatch of the plaice fishery, during the first 
quarter. In the second quarter the boat quota varied between 600 and 1,800 
kg per two weeks, depending on boat length. The sole fishery was free during 
the third quarter, but quota were reintroduced in October to a level of 100 kg 
per boat per week. 
3.3.2.3 France 
France has no national regulations on the North Sea flatfish fishery. 
3.3.2.4 Germany 
The fishery for plaice has no national regulation in Germany. Catches of 
sole are restricted by boat quota per calendar month. In 1994 these quota in-
creased quarterly from 3,000 kg/month in the first quarter to 12,000 kg/month 
in the last quarter. 
3.3.2.5 The Netherlands 
A complex system of national regulations has been introduced in the 
Netherlands in order to regulate the fisheries, in particular that for flatfish. 
Since 1985 licenses on engine power have restricted the capacity of the 
fleet. The licenses are transferable, but since 1994 have been reduced in size by 
10% on transfer. At the start of 1995 a total of 553 licenses were 'active', i.e. 
had been issued to vessels, having an aggregate engine power of 374,000 kW. 
The size of the actual flatfish fleet has been given in section 3.1: 294 licensed 
vessels having an aggregate engine power of 327,700 kW. 
The catches of plaice and sole are regulated basically wi th a system of 
individual transferable quota. These were introduced in 1976, shortly after the 
inception of the NEAFC quota management. Originally the ITQs were allocated 
on the basis of track records in the same reference years as the national quota 
allocation had been based upon: 1972-1974. The ITQs are expressed in kg per 
year and annually adapted in proportion to the changes in the national quota, 
so in effect the ITQs are shares in the national quota. Transfer of quota is re-
stricted in time and in relation to the extent of exhaustion of the relevant 
quota of both letter/seller and hirer/buyer. 
From the start, the ITQs proved very difficult to control and enforce. On 
one hand the obligation of first sale of landed fish through auctions had been 
dropped due to EU market regulations, so fishermen were free to land their 
fish wherever and whenever they wanted, and sell it to whoever they wanted. 
On the other hand it appeared to be legally virtually impossible to end the 
fishing activity of vessels that had exhausted their quota (as they could still go 
fishing for non-quota/other species). Another aspect of the problem is, that the 
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Dutch government is primarily responsible to enforce the national quota and 
the ITQs, as a tool of equitable allocation, are only of secondary concern. 
Very strict rules on and control of landings were introduced during the 
eighties in order to curb illegal fishing and landing practices. Landing of fish 
is only allowed in fifteen ports, at designated quays, between certain hours. 
The inspection service has to be notified of the intention to land 8 hours be-
forehand (on trips lasting more than one day), and unloading of the catch is 
not allowed without the consent of the inspection service. All fish on board has 
to be unloaded in one uninterrupted action. 
In order to support the enforcement of national quotas, restrictions on 
effort were introduced. From 1987 onwards, vessels having ITQs of plaice and 
sole were allowed to spend a certain number of days-at-sea. Vessels having 
more quota than could be caught in the standard number of days were given 
a derogation. Since 1992 these derogations are based on a combination of ITQs 
and fishing (=engine) power 1). 
The basic number of days-at-sea is now reduced to 100 days, and virtually 
all flatfish cutters have a derogation, so in fact this is equivalent to an individ-
ual days-at-sea regulation. (Some vessels wi th very ample quota in relation to 
their engine power could stay at sea all the year round.) 
It should be noted that the days-at-sea allocation system is implicitly 
based on the assumption that TACs are set at status quo level. As a result al-
lowed sea time does not vary with variations in TACs, but in fact has gradually 
increased as a consequence of the reduced catchability of plaice. 
In 1993 the management and control of ITQs and days-at-sea was to a 
certain extent transferred to PO-groups. In the groups ITQs and days-at-sea are 
pooled and can be transferred more freely than outside the groups, subject to 
the rules of the group. Group members are obliged to sell all fish landed 
through an auction. All flatfish fishermen have joined one of the eight groups 
that have been formed and signed a contract to abide by the rules set by the 
group. 
3.3.2.6 United Kingdom 
The UK operates a fairly complex system of licences for the regulation of 
its so called 'pressure stock' fisheries. Both plaice and sole in the North Sea are 
considered to be 'pressure stocks' and for each a licence is required. These licen-
ces are not only connected to the stock, but also connected to the capacity of 
the vessel expressed in a figure compounded from tonnage and engine power. 
All fishing vessels require to hold a licence of one form or another and al-
though licence aggregation is permitted, any vessel owner wishing to replace 
a vessel wi th one of greater capacity must purchase licences equivalent to 
120% of the capacity of the replacement vessel. The 20% capacity penalty is 
1) Jan Willem de Wilde; Capacity and effort limitations in the Netherlands; EAFE 
Conference, Brussels, March 1993. 
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reduced to 10% if the replacement vessel is the same size as the one leaving 
the fleet. 
A decommissioning scheme, involving funds to a total of £ 53 mln over 
a period of five years, has been set up, in order to reach the MAGP targets. For 
the beam trawler fleet this involves a reduction by 15% to 17,600 G(R)T and 
81,500 kW. 
Management of quota has been partly devolved to Producer Organiza-
tions. Shares of the national quota are allocated to POs based on the aggre-
gate track records on the species concerned of their members. In 1994 27 % of 
the North Sea plaice quota was allocated to POs and 74% of the North Sea sole 
quota. The POs can manage their quota as they wish, for instance by setting 
monthly quota related to boat size, or by allocating annual quota to individual 
boats. The activities of vessel who are not members of a PO are managed by 
the government by fixing 'non-sector' quota. 
3.4 Definition of the management problem 
The management problem in the flatfish fishery will be defined on the 
basis of an evaluation of the present situation according to the criteria devel-
oped in chapter 1. As the flatfish sector of the Netherlands is the dominant 
participant and is best known, this evaluation is restricted to the Dutch situa-
t ion. 
3.4.1 Economics 
Flexibility 
The present national management system, wi th PO-group management 
of ITQs and days-at-sea, has exerted very little restrictions on the freedom of 
operation of Dutch fishermen. On one hand the quota of sole and particularly 
of plaice were ample until 1993-94. On the other hand, a surplus of more or 
less freely transferable days-at-sea was available. This resulted from the gener-
ous allocation of sea time to small boats with small ITQs, left unused. Only the 
different rates of exhaustion of the quota interfered with operational free-
dom, regularly obliging fishermen to shift their effort from sole to plaice. Gen-
erally, it can be stated that fishermen rather prefer to cope with the whims of 
nature than wi th those of managers. 
Planning 
Planning the future development of a fishing firm no longer mainly con-
cerns investments in vessels and their equipment but as much or even more so 
the availability of fishing rights: ITQs and HP-licences. Possibilities for expansion 
of individual firms are curbed by the scarcity of free HP-licenses on the market, 
as a result of the decommissioning programme and the policy of licence reduc-
tion on transfer. The 2,000 HP limit stimulates the development towards more 
efficient propulsion systems, giving the new big beamers probably as much 
fishing power as their 3,000 + HP predecessors, or even more. As long as the 
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economic results remain attractive, the fishermen will tend to expand their 
operation. This makes a further reduction of the size of the fleet very difficult; 
in fact to the industry it is out of the question. 
By introducing ITQs and HP-licences the 'unpriced access' to fish has be-
come a market good, and access is 'governed' by supply and demand. However, 
the level of prices for ITQs and licences appears to be too high. Generally only 
relatively small quantities are traded, supplementing already availale quota or 
licence HPs. As a result from the fact that a large share of licences and quota 
originally has been handed out free of charge the marginal prices are higher 
than the average prices. Consequently the 'average price' of fishing rights in 
possession of an enterprise is still lower than a price which would be realized 
if large quantities of the rights would be on the market. 
Even so the fishing rights owned by a company represent very substantial 
financial interests, becoming a hampering factor on transfer to successors, 
when fiscal considerations play an important role. Also because of this, changes 
in the system are not welcome to the industry. As quota are (curiously enough) 
generally traded on a kg basis and not as shares in the total quotas, fluctua-
tions of quota from year to year are perceived as an 'investment risk'. Uncer-
tainty about the future continuity of the quota system makes that ITQs as as-
sets are not fully accepted as security by banks. 
Market consistency 
PO-group management has brought little change with respect to regulat-
ing landings and spreading them over the year. As a consequence prices of fish 
have not been affected, neither positively nor negatively. 
Daily practice 
The discrepancy between the catch rates of plaice and sole in relation to 
their quota makes the fishermen both wish they were allowed to exceed the 
sole quota, and ask for an increase in sea time to be able to exhaust their plaice 
quota. 
When good year classes of sole recruit to the fishery, the fishermen are 
complaining that the allowed mesh size for sole fishing is not consistent wi th 
the legal minimum size, resulting in a loss of marketable sole. Pleas from indus-
try leaders as well as researchers that it would be better to leave these small 
fish in the sea have had little effect. 
Race for fish 
This has not been a serious problem in the first half of the nineties, be-
cause the quota have not been very restrictive. The system of PO-group mana-
gement has yet to prove itself in this respect in a situation where a catch rate 
is high in relation to the quota. The situation with excessive landings of small 
sole shows that there is still a tendency to race for fish and sub-optimal use of 
quota, in spite of the strict enforcement of ITQs. 
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Economic performance 
The economic results of beam trawling have varied between very good 
('91) and moderate ('93 and '94) during the first half of the nineties, moderate 
meaning: operating around the economic break even point. These good results 
were mainly due to two factors: good fishing opportunities for sole and low oil 
prices. Both are rather uncertain factors and may change unfavourably in the 
future. For the sole fishing this danger is already imminent (see 3.3), but here 
rising landing prices may partly compensate reduced landings. With its highly 
energy intensive character, oil costs even at the low price level of '93-'94 repre-
senting nearly 20% of total operating costs, the beam trawl fishery is very vul-
nerable to oil price rises. 
The historically generally good financial results of the fishery has enabled 
the industry to finance investments with substantial commercial bank loans at 
normal interest rates. 
3.4.2 Biology 
Spawning stock 
The spawning stock of plaice had dropped below MBAL (300,000 tonnes) 
in 1994 to 250,000 tonnes, so it requires special protection. The industry dis-
putes the set level of MBAL, but it also had complained for a succession of years 
that the plaice promised by the quota just was not there. 
The sole spawning stock was at the sound level of 90,000 tonnes in 1994, 
considerably above MBAL (35,000 tonnes). However, it is composed mainly of 
a few strong year classes and tends to go down rather rapidly as long as no 
new good year class recruits to the fishery. As recruitment of sole is rather vola-
tile, the success of the fishery is somewhat precarious. A more even year class 
composition of the stock would be preferable from an economic point of view, 
but this would require a considerable lowering of the fishing pressure, particu-
larly on the smaller sole. 
Generally maintenance of the minimum spawning stock MBAL and a solid 
age composition are not assured because the decision making process (Council 
of Ministers) gives a certain priority to the short term interests of the fleets. 
Fishing mortality 
The fishing mortality rate of both species is high at about 0.4. This results 
in a high probability of the stocks decreasing to below MBAL. Only a number 
of good year classes have kept the stocks at a sound level; the plaice stock dur-
ing the eighties and the sole stock from the beginning of the nineties. In the 
longer run a reduction of fishing pressure is required to assure sound stock 
levels. 
High-grading 
High-grading of sole is virtually out of the question for Dutch fishermen. 
As for plaice it probably does not occur intentionally. 
Until the early nineties excessive bycatches of cod and whit ing had to be 
discarded in order to meet bycatch regulations. 
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Discarding 
The small mesh size used in beam trawling for sole results in continuous 
discarding of small plaice and of undersized sole when a large year class is en-
tering the fishery. In spite of its negative effects on the stocks, fishermen accept 
this as normal practice, for which there is no economically feasible alternative. 
Non-commercial species are also discarded continuously. 
Ecosystem management 
Little is known yet on the interactions of flatfish with other marine life 
and the position of the various species in the ecosystem. 
There is still insufficient scientific evidence to support allegations on the 
destructive effects of beam trawling on the ecosystem. Still some protective 
actions have been and will be taken, like the establishment of the Plaice box; 
restrictions on fishing in the Wadden Sea, which is an important nursery area 
for plaice; the intentions to close selected areas in the North Sea for fishing. 
Also some technical measures have positive effects (shorter beam trawl, restric-
tions on effort). 
Pressure from environmental (special interest) groups obliges the govern-
ment to take precautionary actions. The industry is as yet little interested in 
these issues and tends to react to such pressures and actions in a strongly de-
fensive manner. 
3.4.3 Institutions 
Political acceptance 
The responsibility to implement quota management has been fully ac-
cepted by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1986/87. A new set of very strict rules 
and regulations was issued and a large number of controllers (120) were put 
into action in fisheries. However, the prosecution is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Justice, which has shown different priorities, mainly in terms of the 
rate at which the severeness of the prosecution was increased. Pressure from 
the Parliament has been mainly directed at the Ministry of Agriculture, which 
was supposed to coordinate with the Ministry of Justice. 
In this the Dutch legal tradition plays an important role: application of 
administrative sanctions (fines) is not a custom in the Netherlands (apart from 
traffic). The Ministry of Agriculture is reluctant to take over this responsibility 
from the Ministry of Justice (and the other way round!). Immediate prosecution 
(or in the short term) was not feasible; court cases regularly lag(ged) several 
years behind the date of offence. Only by 1991/92 had coordination between 
Agriculture and Justice become adequate and prosecution fairly effective; vari-
ous persons have been jailed and heavy fines have been imposed. As a result 
fishermen have realised that the government is serious about the full imple-
mentation of the rules. 
Sectoral acceptance 
In spite of this change in attitude, the credibility of the quota system does 
not seem to have improved. The scientific assessment is still disputed by the 
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sector whenever it results in restrictions. As there were little restrictions be-
tween 1992 and 1994, management through ITQs, HP-licences, days-at-sea and 
group responsibility has been fairly well accepted. However, it is still uncertain 
what would be the point of view of the sector in the case of low quota and the 
prospect of serious economic problems. 
Relative stability 
The original set of keys to allocate quota to Member States in the CFP 
does not well reflect the shares of the participating countries in the plaice fish-
ery as they had developed during (and even before) the lengthy negotiations 
on the CFP. In fact the Netherlands was permanently short of plaice, and Den-
mark and the United Kingdom had a structural surplus. Adjustments to this 
situation have been achieved in two ways: 
1. swaps of quota of plaice in the North Sea in exchange for virtually all 
demersal quota outside the North Sea (mainly wi th the UK); 
2. relatively high plaice quota to accommodate the Dutch fleet as other 
fleets could not exploit their share. 
As the available quota is still insufficient to be exploited by the fleet on 
a legally and economically sound basis, apart from decommissioning, expansion 
of fishing opportunities has been achieved through reflagging, mainly to the 
United Kingdom. 
National enforcement 
Very significant funds have been made available for the controlling 
agency of the Ministry of Agriculture: 120 full-time men on 600 vessels, costing 
10 min NLG per year on a total gross revenue of about 650 min NLG. As a result 
illegal landings have been virtually eliminated. Although PO-groups have as-
sumed a substantial part of the control of landings since February 1993, the 
Ministries of Agriculture and Justice are maintaining their strict control, as the 
system still has to prove its effectiveness. This wil l be evaluated by the end of 
1995. 
PO-group management of ITQs and days-at-sea is partly based on the 
assumption that greater social control may be expected, as those who paid for 
their rights cannot accept that others would be 'cheating on landings'. Only 
adverse (economic) circumstances can really test the validity of this assumption. 
Subsidiarity 
Subsidiarity has gone quite far with delegation of the responsibility of 
most of the national quota management to eight PO-groups. 
Local communities 
In various local communities the fishing sector plays a very important or 
even dominant role. The commercial interests of individual firms within those 
communities regularly prevail above the community interest. 
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Some auctions are operated by the local councils, which try to attract new 
business by modernisation and offering other advantages. The resulting com-
petition has led to economic problems in some cases. 
Beyond 2002 
The fisheries policy beyond 2002 is not yet an issue in the Dutch discussion 
on the CFP. Anyway, the sector would desire greater international flexibility. 
The fleet reduction required for free movement within the EU in order to make 
overexploitation of most fish stocks unlikely is far from being achieved. In fact 
the industry as well as the government are not able to comply with the 1993-96 
MAGP. 
3.4.4 Other considerations 
Consistency 
A good level of consistency is achieved thanks to a clear division of re-
sponsibilities. The Ministry of Agriculture feels only responsible for the mainte-
nance of a certain level of stocks (adherence to quota). Economic results are the 
sole responsibility of the sector itself. 
The allocation of ITQs and days-at-sea to individual vessels gives a clear 
indication as to their production capacity in a given year. This is fully consistent 
with the national quota. Inconsistencies may arise in a situation of low quota. 
It then remains to be seen whether the groups will be able to face up to their 
responsibility for social and legal reasons. 
The consistency with the MAGP is less straightforward. 
Transparency 
Disregarding the various technical measures, the management system is 
quite transparent: each vessel gets in fact only three figures: ITQ of sole and 
plaice (for some also cod and whiting) and a number of allowed days-at-sea. 
However, the background of the quota and number of sea-days may still be 
obscure to many fishermen. 
3.4.5 Conclusions 
From the economic point of view there appears to be little problem. On 
closer examination, however, the industry feels restricted in its possibilities for 
investment. It has not found ways to optimise the use of the quota, and it is 
very vulnerable to decreases of the sole stock and oil price increases. 
The fishing mortalities of plaice and sole are both too high to assure 
sound stock levels in the longer run. In fact the plaice stock has already fallen 
below MBAL and can only recover with a reduction of mortality. At the present 
level of fishing pressure good year classes of sole are exhausted in a few years. 
Also from the political and institutional point of view there appears to be 
little problem since the revision of the national management system and the 
transfer of part of the responsibilities for implementation and control to the 
industry. But the latter system has not yet operated under the adverse condi-
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tions that can really put it to the test. Government as well as industry leaders 
are still unsure about its robustness. 
Summarising, the management problem in the North Sea flatfish fishery 
is excessive fishing pressure, apparent in the high levels of fishing mortality of 
plaice and sole, caused by the continued urge from the industry to expand, or 
at least not further reduce its activities. 
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Part B Evaluation o f management measures 
In the following sections five multi-annual, four multi-species and two 
effort measures are more closely defined with regard to their application to the 
North Sea flatfish fishery. Where necessary the special conditions required to 
make the measures effective are specified. The results of the evaluations are 
broadly discussed and conclusions are drawn for each measure. Comprehensive 
surveys of the evaluations are given in the appendices 3.1-3.3. 
3.5 Multi-annual quantity measures 
3.5.1 Equal quantity for several years 
Until the early nineties, plaice was considered to be a species with a suffi-
ciently stable stock and recruitment, where a constant TAC for several years 
might work. But the experience since 1990 of dwindling plaice catches makes 
this less certain. Sole is notorious for its variable recruitment, wi th occasional 
strong year classes. It must be very difficult to arrive at a 'right' level of 'con-
stant MATAC'. This difficulty is enhanced by the high value of the species. 
Some experience exists with practically constant TACs with both species. 
The plaice TAC was kept nearly constant from 1989 to 1993. As catches gradu-
ally decreased, the Dutch fishermen were no longer able to catch their quota 
in the sea time they had been allocated. This gave rise to heavy pressure from 
the industry for extra sea time, which for a succession of years was eventually 
given. Also the days-at-sea allocation system was so devised, that decreasing 
catch rates experienced in former years automatically resulted in an increase 
in allocated days-at-sea; 
The sole TAC was constant for a period of three years from 1987 to '89. 
In the second half of '89 the strong 1987 year class recruited to the fishery. This 
gave rise to serious control and enforcement problems in combination with 
considerable illegal landings pressure (eventually resulting in the fall of the 
Dutch Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries). 
Both examples illustrate the problems that may arise wi th constant TACs 
over several years. A high MATAC in relation to the catching opportunities will 
result in pressure to increase fishing effort. A relatively low MATAC wil l result 
in overfishing pressure, even with a very strict control system as exists in the 
Netherlands. It is not certain that the present system of devolution of control 
and enforcement to PO-groups will be able to cope with such pressure. 
From an economic point of view this measure only seems to stabilize sup-
ply. With the present national management system, in practice landings wil l 
continue to vary, particularly those of sole. As for both species the best fishing 
season is early in the year, in years of relatively low MATAC, the quota will tend 
to be exhausted before the attractive end of year period, in spite of regulatory 
efforts of POs (race for fish). In order to effectively stabilise supply, the effort 
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has to be adapted rigorously to the fluctuating fishing opportunities. This is not 
an attractive prospect neither for industry nor for administrators. 
A constant TAC for several years does not offer any benefit wi th respect 
to management of the stocks, as direct control is lost. If the allowed effort is 
in effect adapted to the fishing opportunities, particularly wi th a sole MAT AC 
the fishing mortality and discarding in certain conditions could rise to an unac-
ceptable level. 
Constant TACs for several years may seem attractive at first sight to fisher-
ies managers, but they create a false sense of stability. Particularly if applied to 
sole, the management and enforcement of the quota by the PO-groups can 
meet severe difficulties. Negotiations on this kind of multi-annual TACs wil l 
most probably be much tougher than the present ones on single year TACs. 
Conclusions 
Regulating the flatfish fishery by equal quantities for several years at ap-
propriate levels could be feasible for plaice only after a recovery of the stock, 
when recruitment has stabilized again, and provided the fishing effort is well 
controlled and not allowed to rise irresponsibly. For the management of sole, 
this type of measure is not recommended because of its variable recruitment. 
Even if the measure is feasible for plaice under certain conditions, it is 
neither desirable, nor effective, as it leads to no apparent improvement over 
the present management system. 
3.5.2 Limited compensation 
In this case limited compensation will mean: the possibility to borrow fish 
from next years quota to a limited extent and possibly with a penalty. Only 
borrowing is included, as saving for next year almost certainly would amount 
to saving 'paper fish' (quota that could not be caught, because the fish just was 
not there, for instance the plaice quota in recent years). 
The extent to which quota can be borrowed could for instance be limited 
to the level of uncertainty of the assessment of the stock involved. For plaice 
and sole this is in the order of magnitude of 10-15%. But if the situation of the 
stock(s) allows it, higher limits may be justified. 
A penalty, meaning that the deduction from next year's quota is greater 
than the overshoot of this year's, can be considered in order to discourage bor-
rowing. The size of this penalty could be related to the vulnerability of the 
stock. In view of the probably high personal discount rate of fishermen, such 
penalties should be substantial in order to have the intended effect. 
In the flatfish fishery, generally the quota of one species tends to be ex-
hausted before that of the other. Limited compensation would primarily help 
to overcome this problem. In this case it is in fact a solution to a multi-species 
problem. 
The measure appears to be economically attractive, as it ensures fisher-
men, more than in the present situation, that they can fish on til l the end of 
the year, even if one, or both of their ITQs are slightly overshot. Also over-
shooting by others need not bother him, as long as the total of what remains 
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within the allowed limit by species. In effect this measure more or less compen-
sates for the inadequate legal protection of the ITQs. 
A certain tendency to permanently borrow from next year up to the al-
lowed limit should be counteracted by the level of the connected penalty. 
From a biological point of view this measure is more or less indifferent, 
as long as the level of borrowing remains within the margins of uncertainty of 
the biological assessments. The time schedule of biological advice - assessment 
of stock, recruitment and fishing mortality in year t - 1 , estimates including 
catches for year tonnes at status quo fishing mortality, predictions and advice 
for year t+1 - makes it impossible to take borrowings into account in the ad-
vice. So pressure to raise the TAC from countries already aware of substantial 
borrowings has to be dealt with at a political level. 
Political and sectoral acceptance will be good, as this measure could solve 
the problem of a now and again looming threat of early closure of the fishery, 
giving rise to a race for fish in spite of the ITQs. However, it may prove difficult 
to arrive at generally acceptable levels of compensation and even more so of 
penalties. It will be possible to relieve the enforcement pressure, as the quota 
need not be strictly enforced, so there is less reason to 'hide' fish. 
Limited compensation as it is defined here appears to improve consistency 
of the management system, as it can relieve some problems of the fishing en-
terprises, by taking into account biological uncertainties. 
Conclusions 
Limited compensation, meaning borrowing limited amounts off ish from 
next year's quota at a penalty, appears to be well feasible, as it meets no seri-
ous objections from any of the considered points of view. 
The measure can be considered to be desirable as well, as it meets one of 
the annoying points of the present management policy: the very strict enforce-
ment of the quota. 
But only in that respect can limited compensation be considered to be 
effective. With regard to tackling the major management problem of high 
fishing pressure in the flatfish fishery, the measure can hardly be called effec-
tive. On one hand it may somewhat reduce the pressure in the short run, by 
reducing the race for fish, on the other hand its positive effects will encourage 
fishermen to stay in the fishery, who otherwise might have given up. So the 
measure does not really address the management problem. 
3.5.3 Limited adjustment 
Limiting the extent to which TACs can be adjusted from year to year is a 
multi-annual management option that lies somewhere between constant TACs 
for several years and the present system, which basically allows unlimited ad-
justment. In practice, as recent history of the North Sea flatfish fishery shows, 
unlimited upward adjustment (sole 1989-'90) appears to be happily accepted 
by industry as well as decision makers, but substantial downward adjustment 
meets strong opposition (plaice 1994-'95). 
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The limitation can have the character of an absolute amount, or of a rela-
tive amount, that is a percentage of the present TAC. For this case the latter is 
chosen, which implies a slightly more conservative approach, as generally 
speaking downward adjustments from a high TAC level wil l be larger than 
upward adjustments from a low TAC level. A more conservative approach, al-
lowing larger downward adjustment percentages than upward does not ap-
pear necessary for the present. The limit should bear some relation to the vari-
ability and the vulnerability of the species. So for sole the relative level of maxi-
mum adjustment should be higher than for plaice. 
This measure can and will give rise to fluctuating discrepancies between 
catching opportunities and allowed catches. Particularly when an upward ad-
justment has been limited, the effort has to be curbed by adjusting the alloca-
t ion of days-at-sea according to the reduction of fishing mortality involved. An 
extra complicating factor is the multi-species character of the beam trawl fish-
ery, where effort on sole unavoidably implies effort on plaice. 
Reductions of days-at-sea will have to be well tuned in order to avoid 
serious enforcement problems (overfishing of quota) or angry fishermen 
(underfishing of quota of more abundant fish). Enforcement will have to be 
very strict in order to make the measure work and let its possible benefits ma-
terialize. 
From an economic point of view, limiting TAC adjustment does not have 
a decisively positive or negative effect. On one hand, it wil l have a stabilising 
effect on supply of plaice and sole, which can positively affect prices. On the 
other hand, it will bring about discrepancies between the availability of fish in 
the sea and allocated quota that have to be controlled with unattractive adap-
tations of allocated days-at-sea. 
If strictly enforced, the measure can have some beneficial effect in saving 
strong year classes of sole from instant exhaustion, thereby contributing to 
stabilization of the sole stock. This supposes that reductions in stock size are 
eventually followed by reductions in TACs, in order to avoid negative surprises. 
From a biological point of view it would be preferable not to raise effort when 
a downward adjustment is limited (and in fact more effort would be required 
to exhaust the TAC). In this, the complications of the multi-species character of 
the fishery are left out of consideration. 
At first sight the measure may seem attractive from the institutional and 
biological point of view, but on looking closer some negative aspects appear. 
Decision makers may like to have well defined rules to arrive at decisions, but 
they may like to have a free hand better. Also limited adjustment of TACs has 
a lot of unpleasant regulatory consequences, like adjustment of effort and 
more difficult enforcement. 
Conclusions 
With sufficient enforcement, limited adjustment of TACs is a feasible pol-
icy in the North Sea flatfish fishery. 
Although neither the industry nor the administrators are actually waiting 
for this kind of measure, it can be considered to be desirable for its potential 
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positive effects, being stabilization of particularly the sole stock and of market 
supply. 
Limiting adjustment is not effective in the sense of addressing the major 
management problem of high fishing pressure in the North Sea flatfish fishery. 
3.5.4 Minimum size of spawning stock 
The concept of 'minimum size of spawning stock' was developed at the 
Dutch Directorate of Fisheries as an ultimate consequence of the Dutch fisher-
ies law, that leaves only room for regulation of fisheries on biological grounds 
and not for economic reasons. Any regulation of fishing, doing more than pre-
venting stocks to drop below the minimum biologically acceptable level 
(MBAL), must be considered as an interference in the economic process and 
should be left to the industry. 
This approach is not in line with the objectives of the CFP, mentioning 
explicitly the economic and social conditions of the fisheries. However, it should 
not be rejected right away, without evaluating it more extensively. 
The concept has met strong opposition from Dutch fisheries biologists, as 
it leaves no buffer zone at all, if applied literally. But 'minimum stock size' 
needs not to be taken equal to MBAL. Some reserve can be built into it, for 
instance by adding an amount corresponding to the margin of uncertainty of 
assessment of the stock concerned. Another matter of concern from the biolog-
ical point of view is the high pressure on the marine ecosystem. 
Under this rule, without further regulation (by the industry) the fishery 
would have more of a stop and go character than presently. Whereas the mea-
sures discussed before had a tendency to stabilize the fishery, this measure in 
itself appears to be destabilizing. In order to redress this to an acceptable, or 
- even better - an improved situation, the industry will have to accept its in-
tended responsibility and take up further management of the fishery. 
Little can be said on the economic and biological consequences of this 
devolution of fisheries management, as they depend on the type of measures 
chosen. A full evaluation according to the methodology developed in chapter 
1 is therefore considered useless, so the measure is omitted from the tables in 
appendix 3.1. But it is very worthwhile to expand a bit on the institutional and 
other aspects of this type of measure. 
Of the participants in the North Sea flatfish fishery, the Dutch industry 
presently seems to be the best geared to take up the required level of self man-
agement. But it is not (yet) able to take full responsibility for a variety of rea-
sons. 
In the first place an international framework would have to be devel-
oped, where POs would arrive at agreements on management strategies and 
measures. If only the Dutch PO-groups were to reach mutual agreement, wi th-
out the POs from other countries joining in, they could not reap the full bene-
fits of any conservatory action, and unacceptable shifts in relative stability 
could occur. This would be particularly so with plaice, as here the share of the 
other countries is larger than the Dutch. 
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Even reaching agreement within the Dutch industry would be a problem 
now, as here again the required (legal) framework is lacking. One aspect of this 
for example is the limited control and enforcement power of the PO-groups. 
At the moment it is questionable whether the EU and subsequently the Dutch 
government would be prepared to consider transfer of these kinds of responsi-
bilities and powers to the industry. 
Conclusions 
The policy of just maintaining the spawning stocks above a certain mini-
mum level and letting the industry decide on the actual level of fishing is nei-
ther feasible, nor desirable or effective at present. But provided the fleets are 
really brought into line with the fishing opportunities and the industry can be 
left to regulate its activities without fear of endangering the stocks, this man-
agement system might be reconsidered after 2002. 
3.5.5 Fixed formula 
Management of the North Sea flatfish fishery according to a fixed for-
mula could for example be applied to reduce the fishing mortality gradually, 
in order to make the sole fishery less volatile and/or to reduce the pressure on 
the plaice stock. The desired mortality reduction could be effected over a num-
ber of years, for instance 4 or 5, by small steps of for instance 4 or 5% of the 
original mortality level. TACs would result 'automatically' from the annual as-
sessments, once the strategy had been agreed upon. 
Reduction of mortality does not have to go on endlessly: once the level 
of mortality aimed at has been reached, the strategy and formula could change 
to 'status quo' mortality. The pro's and con's of this realistic example are dis-
cussed, as it appears more useful than considering the measure in more general 
terms. This means that the conclusions may not apply to other conceivable 
strategies like for instance keeping fishing mortality at a constant level. 
It has to be noted that a measure like this will in practice have to assume 
a multi-species character: 
a reduction of the fishing mortality of sole will automatically result in a 
reduction of the fishing mortality of plaice, unless the directed fishery for 
plaice is expanded to compensate for this; 
a reduction of the fishing mortality of plaice is hardly possible without 
reducing the fishing mortality of sole at the same time. 
So it is assumed that the fixed formula will apply to both species simulta-
neously. The strategy has to be reflected by the national management mea-
sures. In the Dutch case this means an adjustment of the days-at-sea regulation 
is required, to bring the allotted sea time at least in line wi th the proposed 
reduction of fishing mortality. Even then the available ITQs will be low in rela-
t ion to the available sea time, due to the 'slack' in the system (see 3.4). Com-
bined with a catch rate that will basically not fall, but rather tend to rise, this 
will give rise to enforcement problems, as fishermen will try to seize opportuni-
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ties to overfish their (reduced) quota. This would put the PO-management sys-
tem to a severe test. 
These problems can only be alleviated by a reduction of the fishing capa-
city, in line with, or even in excess of the MAGP. This would allow a reallocation 
of ITQs to the remaining vessels, allowing them to make a better use of the 
catching opportunities. A decommissioning programme to achieve this would 
probably require some strong incentive, or even coercion, as generally the in-
dustry is not happy about a further reduction of the fleet. Dwindling earnings 
as a result of the policy may well provide part of the required pressure. 
Eventually, if the policy, including decommissioning, is effective, the gov-
ernment may find itself in the embarrassing position of having created a group 
of 'happy few'. It is a little outside the scope of this study to indicate how to 
deal with that, but the introduction of royalties or levies on the ITQs could be 
considered. By that at least part of the rent could be retrieved for redirection 
to aims decided by society. 
In the short run the policy will have negative economic effects for the 
fishing sector. Its flexibility will be curbed (again) by the reduction of available 
days-at-sea and ITQs. The discrepancy between catch rate and allowed catches 
will renew the race for fish. Planning should improve, as the strategy is clear, 
but the actual possibilities depend heavily on the success of decommissioning. 
Supposing effective enforcement, initially the economic performance 
probably will go down, but in the end an improvement can be expected, as 
catches per unit of effort will increase. The positive effect wil l be enhanced by 
decommissioning. 
From a biological perspective, the measure would have positive effects on 
all scores, with the exception of possible high grading of plaice. This might be 
removed provided the reductions of ITQs and days-at-sea can be successfully 
enforced. 
The real problems of this kind of measure lie in the political and institu-
tional f ield. Political and sectoral acceptance will very much depend on how 
the short term 'costs' and the later benefits are weighed up by the various par-
ties concerned. Politicians may be more inclined to consider the longer term 
effects, although the considerable enforcement effort required will weigh 
heavily. The industry is known to have a rather short term time preference and 
it wil l be difficult to convince the fishermen, that in the long run they will be 
better off, the more so as this will only come true for those who can stay in the 
industry. 
The problems of enforcement to be expected were amply discussed 
above, and implementation of the strategy may mean putting a bomb under 
the group system of devolved management. Local communities would not ben-
efit from reduced fishing activity, certainly not when this is accompanied by 
decommissioning of vessels. 
In the perspective of management beyond 2002, this measure, combined 
with implementation of the MAGP, could be a useful start. 
Summing up, the balance on this aspect tends to be quite negative, in 
spite of the positive prospects of the results of the measure. In that respect the 
measure considered seems to be inconsistent, or at least to be not sufficiently 
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transparent to the people involved. On the other hand, it is fairly consistent as 
regards being in line with the objectives of the CFP, apart from the 'socio' as-
pect. 
Conclusions 
Application of a fixed formula to implement a gradual reduction of fish-
ing mortality does not appear to be feasible, given the resistance that can be 
expected from the industry and the ensuing difficulties of enforcement. 
From a fisheries management point of view the implementation of the 
proposed strategy is a desirable one, as it improves the state of the stocks and 
provides a more solid basis for the fishery, assuming the reduction of effort is 
accompanied by a sufficient level of decommissioning. 
A fixed formula applied in the described way can (only) be effective if it 
is strictly enforced and is accompanied by adequate decommissioning of vessels. 
Under those conditions it is actually attacking the major problem of the fishery. 
3.6 Multi-species measures 
In the previous paragraphs regular reference was made to the fact that 
sole and plaice have to be managed together. This section will look into four 
management measures explicitly directed at this combined management. They 
are basically meant to more or less even out the differences in catch rates of 
plaice and sole, as far as they are not expressed in the single-species TACs. 
3.6.1 One common denominator 
Instead of separate quota for plaice and sole, multi-species flatfish quota 
can be allocated to the participating countries. The multi-species quota can be 
expressed in for instance 'flatfish equivalents' as a common denominator. 
These can be arrived at by allocating weighting factors or 'exchange rates' to 
the single species quota. 
Annual decisions on these weighting factors are an extra complication of 
the already complex decision making process. This can be avoided by devising 
a fixed procedure, stating exactly how to arrive at the common denominator. 
But a fixed procedure takes away the possibility to direct the fishery more to-
wards one of the species by carefully tuning the weights). 
The weighting factor(s) can be chosen out of a variety of possibilities, 
such as weight ratios (e.g. between stock sizes, TACs, catches in previous years) 
or price ratios (e.g. between landing prices in previous years). From an eco-
nomic point of view a prices based denominator appears the most rational, as 
it would weigh the quota according to their relative value. From table 3.4, gi-
ven the average auction prices of plaice and sole and their ratios in the Nether-
lands over the period 1989-1994 it appears that these are highly variable, which 
makes using them as a basis for a common denominator rather precarious. To 
make a well-founded choice out of the various possibilities would require a 
special study. 
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Table 3.4 Average auction prices of sole and plaice in the Netherlands and the ratio between 
them; 1989-1994, NLG/kg 
1989 
Sole 18.12 
Plaice 2.57 
Ratio sole/plaice 7.05 
1990 
12.78 
3.16 
4.04 
1991 
14.57 
4.12 
3.54 
1992 
15.93 
3.11 
5.12 
1993 
13.60 
3.20 
4.25 
1994 
12.25 
3.39 
3.61 
Another complicating factor is that the biologists will not be able to make 
a reliable estimate of the level of mortality of the species concerned in the on-
going year, nor of the development of the stocks. This undermines the founda-
t ion for sound biological advice. Although in practice the fishing mortalities 
need not vary much with a well-chosen and tuned common denominator, if 
anything goes wrong in the balance between weightings, actual catch rates 
and (unpredictable) economic conditions, substantial shifts in mortality may 
occur. 
Economically, a multi-species TAC expressed in a common denominator 
for plaice and sole appears to be attractive. It would leave the fishermen free 
in their choice of landing mix, enabling them to optimise their fishery, accord-
ing to their own capacities and preferences. This may result in some improve-
ment of economic performance. An improvement of planning possibilities is 
not expected, as future developments will be as uncertain as they used to be. 
Improved economic conditions might tempt people to make investment deci-
sions. 
The biological consequences of this type of multi-species TAC are at best 
unclear and at worst disastrous. If substantial shifts from one species to the 
other do occur, with consequently large fluctuations in mortality by species, it 
wil l become virtually impossible to arrive at a proper biological advice, stocks 
and mortality will be out of control and will probably only by chance stay 
within acceptable limits. 
From a political point of view the potentially serious biological conse-
quences and the additional complexities of the fixing of the weighting factor(s) 
this measure is unattractive. Upsetting the relative stability may add to that. On 
the other hand the sector would welcome the ensuing freedom of action and 
its expected positive economic consequences. 
Enforcement and devolution will not give serious problems. The measure 
may be more acceptable in a situation with a reduced fleet and without the 
constant threat of overfishing. 
In the situation of 1995 the measure is quite inconsistent, and although 
it may be transparent in general terms, it would pose a lot of extra problems. 
Conclusions 
Setting multi-species TACs with unlimited transfer between plaice and 
sole is only feasible if the right weighting of the species can be found. Even 
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then the desirability of the measure is doubtful, as the biological consequences 
will still be uncertain. 
The measure is not effective at all, as instead of addressing the main 
problem, it tends to slacken control of the fishery and thus increase the disequi-
librium between stocks and fleets. 
3.6.2 Limited transfer 
Limiting the possibilities for transfer of quota between plaice and sole 
may remove some of the negative aspects of unlimited transfer as discussed 
above. As with limited borrowing of quota from next year (see 3.5.2) transfer 
could for instance be limited to the levels of confidence of the biological assess-
ment. This would leave room for a more or less 'natural correction' of assess-
ment errors, without losing control completely. Again the stock situation may 
justify higher transfer limits. 
The setting of the 'exchange rate' would not be as critical as wi th unlim-
ited transfer. Simply, the average over a couple of years of one of the ratios 
mentioned above could be chosen, or even a rough rule of thumb figure, that 
is politically acceptable, could be used. Adaptations can be made if a strong 
bias towards one of the species becomes apparent, but also to create a bias, if 
one of the species needs special protection. In this case it is not considered nec-
essary to create different rates for exchanging plaice for sole and for exchang-
ing sole for plaice. 
Opening the possibility of a limited transfer of quota between plaice and 
sole would positively affect the economic situation of the firms in the fishery. 
Flexibility regarding the size of the quota by species enables fishermen to 
adapt their fishery (to a certain extent) to the circumstances at sea and on the 
market. This could result in a better economic performance. 
As long as the possibilities for transfer between plaice and sole quota stay 
within the limits of the levels of confidence of the biological assessments and 
predictions, an acceptable level of control of stocks and mortality is possible. 
Only minor shifts of fishing pressure are to be expected, so there will be little 
change in high grading and discarding practices and no special effects on the 
ecosystem. 
Political acceptance will be good, as some criticisms on the present system 
can be met at a small cost, and so will sectoral acceptance. Only minor and tem-
porary shifts away from relative stability will occur. National enforcement and 
quota management and PO-groups will have to deal with minor administrative 
complications, resulting from exchanges between quota. 
Limited transfer between plaice and sole quota appears to be a reason-
ably consistent management measure, that can well be explained and does not 
pose significant extra problems. 
Conclusions 
If transfer between plaice and sole quota is limited and a reasonable ex-
change rate is set for the transfers, this is a feasible management measure. 
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It is also a desirable measure, as it meets one of the criticisms of the pres-
ent system, by providing more flexibility and allowing fishermen to operate 
closer to daily practice. 
Again it is only effective in that respect, but not when it comes to ad-
dressing the major management problem of the North Sea flatfish fishery. 
3.6.3 Bycatch arrangement 
In the Dutch fishery for flatfish traditionally two bycatch problems occur: 
continued fishing for one flatfish species, when the quota of the other 
one has been exhausted and its fishery is (formally) closed; 
the roundfish bycatches, particularly of cod, in beam trawling. 
Reduced catch levels and changes in national roundfish management 
have more or less solved the latter problem for the moment. 
The former problem has been latent since 1993, but it is still looming for 
individual fishermen, PO-groups and the sector as a whole. If the individual, 
group or national plaice quota is exhausted before the end of the year, the 
fishery for flatfish has to be ended, as it is virtually impossible to beam trawl for 
sole without catching plaice. On the other hand, if the sole quota is exhausted 
early, it is possible to continue with a directed fishery for plaice, using nets of 
sufficiently large mesh size (12-13 cm). 
Seeing this, a bycatch arrangement allowing to land small amounts of 
plaice after its quota has been exhausted as a bycatch of the (continued) fishery 
for sole, would be useful. An arrangement for bycatches of sole in case of clo-
sure of the sole fishery would not really be necessary. The allowed bycatch of 
plaice should be really small, in order to discourage looking for a mixed fishery. 
The rule that a vessel is considered to be fishing for sole if the content of sole 
is over 5% of the total amount of fish on board may have to be changed in this 
case. 
Introduction of a bycatch arrangement for plaice in case of early exhaus-
t ion of the plaice quota would have minor positive economic effects. Apart 
from the allowed small landings of plaice, this could result in (minor) improve-
ments of sole catches, thus enhancing economic performance slightly more. 
Provided the level of allowed bycatches is sufficiently small, the negative 
effects on the plaice stock and mortality will not be significant. Monitoring may 
even improve slightly, as unavoidable bycatches of plaice will now be landed 
legally. 
A measure like this will meet no objections in the political field, as it wil l 
have little or no negative effects. Enforcement could become slightly easier, as 
it would be less necessary to chase after possible illegal bycatches of plaice af-
ter the closure of its fishery. 
Conclusions 
An arrangement allowing small landings of plaice as a bycatch of a con-
tinued sole fishery after exhaustion of the plaice quota is very feasible, as it has 
no serious negative effects and is simple to implement. 
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A bycatch arrangement for plaice is also desirable, as it can provide mi-
nor, if even psychological, improvements to the individual fishing f irm and by 
that to the sector as well. 
This kind of bycatch arrangement cannot be considered to be very effec-
tive, not simply because it has only minor positive effects, but mainly because 
it does not address the major management problem of the North Sea flatfish 
fishery. 
3.6.4 Two tier system 
Since the strong 1987 sole year class recruited to the fishery there has 
been a tendency to overfish the sole quota. This was enhanced by the gradual 
reduction of the catch rate of plaice. For some years landing of sole had to be 
discontinued by the Dutch fleet, whereas fishing for plaice was allowed to con-
tinue. In spite o f that and the extra days-at-sea allowance for fishing in north-
ern waters, the plaice quota remained unused to an increasing degree. 
In this situation a two tier MSTAC might have helped to promote fishing 
for plaice, in order to reduce the pressure on sole. To that effect, the single 
species TACs should be counted together in a second tier multi-species TAC, 
giving the sole a relatively high weight and plaice a relatively low one. The 
MSTAC has subsequently to be reduced by a certain percentage in order to 
provide the required pressure. Without that, the second tier would remain 
without effect. Catches will be deducted from the MSTAC or quota using the 
same weighting factors, so it will be exhausted faster by fishing primarily for 
sole than by fishing for plaice mainly. 
Finding the right levels for the weighting factors and particularly for the 
percentage of reduction of the MSTAC in order to bring about the desired ef-
fect, will not be easy. This will make for an extra complication of the decision 
making process. 
Since the 1994 assessment of the plaice stock, indicating that it has 
dropped below the minimum biologically acceptable level, a shift of pressure 
towards it is not wanted, and a shift the other way around seems to be not 
preferable either. Evaluation of a two tier system therefore becomes of an 
even more academic nature than those of most of the other measures pre-
sented. 
The economic consequences of a two tier system are negative, as fisher-
men are pushed away from their (personal) optimum fishery, in order to have 
the desired effect of deflecting pressure from one species to the other, the 
system has to work against the signals that come from the market and the fish-
ing opportunities. 
The biological effects are basically ambiguous, as the fishing pressure on 
one species will be relieved, while that on the other will increase. But as this is 
exactly the objective of the measure, this can be considered as positive. It is 
clear that this kind of measure should not be introduced in a situation where 
stock and mortality of both species does not allow an increase of fishing pres-
sure. 
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Politically the system does not appear to be attractive. To the decision 
makers it means an extra complication with rather uncertain results. The re-
quired levels of weighting factors and percentage of reduction of the MSTAC 
for bringing about the desired shift of fishing pressure probably can only be 
found after some experience has been gained and even then may be unpre-
dictable. 
To the sector the working of the measure will not be transparent and the 
negative economic effects will not be liked. Serious difficulties concerning en-
forcement and subsidiarity are not to be expected, but some shift away from 
relative stability may occur. 
The two tier system does not contribute to the consistency of the fisheries 
management policy, is rather untransparent and poses the new problem of 
setting the proper parameters for the MSTAC. 
Conclusions 
The feasibility of the application of a two tier system of management to 
the North Sea flatfish fishery is doubtful. Its complexity and dubious results 
make it unattractive from the political as well as from the sector point of view. 
It is also not desirable as, for neither of the species involved is an increase 
of fishing pressure recommendable. It will have short term negative economic 
effects in return for rather uncertain biological improvements. 
Given that, the measure does not even appear to be effective in its own 
right, as a consequence it does not seriously attack the major problem of exces-
sively high fishing pressure. 
3.7 Effort measures 
In the Dutch fisheries, effort management has been used as an additional 
tool to quota management since the middle of the eighties. From temporary 
laying up periods this gradually developed via general days-at-sea restrictions 
into a system of individual allocation of numbers of days-at-sea, taking into 
account the fishing rights and, as far as flatfish vessels are concerned, the fish-
ing power of the vessels. This section wil l discuss the possibilities of a further 
development of effort management, where quota no longer play a role, but 
effort regulation is the main tool of management. 
In order to be able to manage a certain fishery by effort regulation, some 
preliminary conditions have to be met: 
effort is allocated to the fishery concerned, not in general; 
access to that fishery is restricted by capacity licenses; 
the development of capacity or fishing power is monitored and changes 
are taken into account in the allocation of effort; 
some translation method is available to express effort of one fishing 
method into that of another one. 
Without these conditions being met simultaneously, the effort exerted 
on the stocks involved in the particular fishery may get completely beyond con-
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t rol , and with it the fishing mortality of those stocks. Even so, in the flatfish 
fishery the eventual distribution of effort over the plaice and sole stocks will 
depend on the balance between the forces of nature (catch rates) and the mar-
ket (prices). 
Additional limitations and conditions to the allowed effort, like area, 
period, mesh size etc., are further refinements that could contribute to the 
precision of management of the fishery. On the other hand they would lead 
to a more complicated control and enforcement. 
Fishing effort is generally considered to be the product of fishing capacity 
or power and a factor expressing the duration of the application of the fishing 
power to the stock(s). In a situation where the fishing capacity is well con-
trolled, effort regulation mainly concerns limiting the activity of the fleet(s) 
involved. For the Dutch flatfish fishery this means in practical terms: the capa-
city of beam trawlers has been found to be closely connected to their main 
engine power. Vessels have licenses limiting their engine power. The activity 
of the licensed vessels is restricted by the allocation of days-at-sea. The total 
effort is basically expressed in an aggregate number of kW-days. 
In the Dutch situation two practical problems with some political weight 
occur: 
the actual level of effort in the flatfish fishery is significantly below the 
level allowed by the days-at-sea allocation system combined with the 
PO-group system. A change of the management system from quota as the 
primary instrument to effort will tend to activate the latently available 
effort; 
some multi-purpose vessels switch fisheries during trips, for instance 
beam trawling for flatfish by night and otter trawling for roundfish by 
day. In such cases control of effort in a specific fishery is difficult and 
would require special arrangements. Introduction of a one gear rule 
might solve the problem, but it could seriously affect the economic basis 
of firms that contribute very little to the problems of the flatfish fishery. 
3.7.1 Constant effort over several years 
In the North Sea flatfish fishery, constant effort over several years could 
mean freezing the fishing effort at the status quo level. This is not very much 
different from the actual practice since individual days-at-sea allocation started 
in the Netherlands, as this implicitly supposes that the quota are based on sta-
tus quo fishing effort. 
Allowing a constant (status quo) effort for several years can have gener-
ally positive economic effects. Apart from the restriction on effort, the fisher-
men are completely free in what they catch and land, so they can arrive at an 
optimal solution under their particular conditions. It will depend partly on the 
level of enforcement of individual allocations of effort whether the potential 
benefits can fully materialize, or will be spoilt by a race for effort. 
The biological consequences of managing the flatfish fishery by restrict-
ing effort to, for instance the status quo level are rather uncertain in the sense 
that it is not known to which stock the allowed effort will be (mostly) directed. 
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On the other hand, the possibilities of monitoring the fishery wil l probably 
improve, as there is no longer an incentive to under- or misreport catches. At 
least the total level of effort will be restricted and the possibilities for shifts in 
effort are limited by the character of the fishery. Additional conditions may 
influence the directivity of the fleet. Eventually it may become possible to pre-
dict the distribution of mortality as experience is gained with the system. 
Initially, opposition to a change of the management system from TACs 
and quota to effort limitations has to be expected from the fishing sector as 
well as from the politicians. Both will not like the shifts in relative stability, as 
it has been defined at the outset of the CFP, that may result from managing 
effort only. In the Netherlands the fishing firms have substantial vested inter-
ests in the ITQ-system and they are not prepared to let those be wasted by a 
change of system. In order to get effort management without quota accepted, 
at least a method of transformation from quantity quota to effort quota has 
to be devised, maintaining the value of the individual fishing rights. National 
effort allocations will have to adequately reflect the quota allocation keys that 
represent the relative stability of the CFP. 
With simple and effective parameters for effort, like (standardized) en-
gine power and sea time as used in the Dutch days-at-sea regulation, 
subsidiarity and enforcement pose no particular problems. In fact, initially en-
forcement probably will be easier, as the fact that a boat is in or out is easier 
to establish than the amount of fish caught, or even landed. But it has to be 
expected that gradually fishermen will adapt to the new system by finding new 
ways to dodge restrictions. 
Although constant effort over several years is basically inconsistent wi th 
the prevailing system of management by quota, it does not appear to be very 
inconsistent on its own. Even without overseeing the consequences, its princi-
ples are rather easy to explain. This may be deceptive, as maintaining control 
over effective fishing capacity will become a major problem. 
Conclusions 
The feasibility of management of the North Sea flatfish fishery by keep-
ing the fishing effort constant over a number of years is restricted by the oppo-
sition that initially can be expected from both politicians and industry. 
From an economic point of view the system is desirable, as it is from the 
point of view of enforcement. It even has some merits in the field of biology, 
the more so when the uncertainty on the effects on stocks and mortality is re-
duced by additional restrictions to influence the directivity of the fleet. 
But most of all it is desirable as it appears to be effective: limiting effort 
opens possibilities to tackle the problem of the pressure on the flatfish fishery 
more directly, although this cannot be done by maintaining status quo. 
3.7.2 Limited adjustment of effort 
One of the problems with managing the fishery by effort regulation is the 
uncertain effect of a fixed amount of physical effort on the mortality of the 
stocks because of changes in directivity of the fleet. Opening the possibility to 
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adjust the effort annually to a limited amount, for instance by 5 or 10%, would 
allow some fine tuning of the physical effort to desired levels of fishing mortal-
ity. This could even take the form of a strategy to gradually reduce the level of 
mortality. Also it would allow to correct for developments in the efficiency of 
effort. 
Apart from taking away part of the biological uncertainties, this option 
is not essentially different from the fixed effort measure. The ful l evaluation 
in the tables of appendix 3.3 leads to generally identical remarks. 
Conclusions 
Limited adjustment of effort as a management measure would not make 
effort management more acceptable to politicians and industry. They might 
even object more strongly to it, as negotiations on adjustment would be in-
volved, wi th the ensuing uncertainty on future levels of activity. 
The desirability of limited adjustment of effort is certainly greater than 
that of fixed effort, as it meets part of the biological problems. In addition it 
opens the possibility to correct for changes in efficiency and to set out a strat-
egy to arrive at desired levels of fishing mortality. 
The latter aspects particularly can make limited adjustment of effort an 
effective management measure in the North Sea fishery for flatfish. 
3.8 Conclusions 
Multi-annual measures 
1. Regulating the flatfish fishery by equal quantities for several years at 
appropriate levels could be feasible for plaice only after a recovery of the 
stock, when recruitment has stabilized again, and provided the fishing 
effort is well controlled and not allowed to rise irresponsibly. For the 
management of sole this type of measure is not recommended because 
of its variable recruitment. 
Even if the measure is feasible for plaice under certain conditions, it is 
neither desirable, nor effective, as it leads to no apparent improvement 
over the present management system. 
2. Limited compensation, meaning borrowing limited amounts of fish from 
next year's quota at a penalty, appears to be feasible, as it meets no seri-
ous objections from any of the considered points of view. 
The measure can be considered to be desirable as well, as it meets one of 
the annoying points of the present management policy: the very strict 
enforcement of the quotas. 
Only in that respect can limited compensation also be considered to be 
effective. With regard to tackling the major management problem of 
high fishing pressure in the flatfish fishery the measure can hardly be cal-
led effective. On one hand it may somewhat reduce the pressure in the 
short run, by reducing the race for fish, on the other hand its positive 
effects wil l encourage fishermen to stay in the fishery, who otherwise 
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might have given up. So the measure does not really address the man-
agement problem. 
3. With sufficient enforcement, limited adjustment of TAG is a feasible pol-
icy in the North Sea flatfish fishery. 
Although neither the industry nor the administrators are actually waiting 
for this kind of measure, it can be considered to be desirable for its po-
tential positive effects, being stabilization of (particularly) the sole stock 
and of market supply. 
Limiting adjustment is not effective in the sense of addressing the major 
management problem of high fishing pressure in the North Sea flatfish 
fishery. 
4. The policy of just maintaining the spawning stocks above a certain mini-
mum level and letting the industry decide on the actual level of fishing 
is neither feasible nor desirable nor effective at present. Provided the 
fleets are really brought into line with the fishing opportunities and the 
industry can be left to regulate its activities without fear of endangering 
the stocks, this management system might be reconsidered after 2002. 
5. Application of a fixed formula to implement a gradual reduction of fish-
ing mortality does not appear to be feasible, given the resistance that can 
be expected from the industry and the ensuing difficulties of enforce-
ment. 
From a fisheries management point of view the implementation of the 
proposed strategy is a desirable one, as it improves the state of the stocks 
and provides a more solid basis for the fishery, assuming the reduction of 
effort is accompanied by a sufficient level of decommissioning. 
A fixed formula applied in the described way can (only) be effective if it 
is strictly enforced and is accompanied by adequate decommissioning of 
vessels. Under those conditions it is actually tackling the major problem 
of the fishery. 
Multi-species measures 
6. Setting multi-species TACs with unlimited transfer between plaice and 
sole is only feasible if the right weighting of the species can be found. 
Even then the desirability of the measure is doubtful, as the biological 
consequences will still be uncertain. 
The measure is not effective at all, as instead of addressing the main 
problem of the fishery, it tends to slacken control and thus increase the 
problem. 
7. If transfer between plaice and sole quota is limited and a reasonable ex-
change rate is set for the transfers, this is a feasible management mea-
sure. It is also a desirable measure, as it meets one of the criticisms of the 
present system, by providing more flexibility and allowing fishermen to 
operate closer to daily practice. 
Again it is only effective in that respect, but not when it comes to ad-
dressing the major management problem of the North Sea flatfish fish-
ery. 
211 
8. An arrangement allowing small landings of plaice as a bycatch of a con-
tinued sole fishery after exhaustion of the plaice quota is very feasible, 
as it has no serious negative effects and is simple to implement. 
A bycatch arrangement for plaice is desirable as well, as it can provide 
minor, if even psychological, improvements to the individual fishing f irm 
and to the sector as well. 
This kind of bycatch arrangement cannot be considered to be very effec-
tive, as it has only minor positive effects and (more importantly) does not 
address the major management problem of the North Sea flatfish fishery. 
9. The feasibility of the application of a two tier system of management to 
the North Sea flatfish fishery is doubtful. Its complexity and dubious re-
sults make it unattractive from the political as well as from the sectoral 
point of view. 
It is also undesirable as, for neither of the species involved is an increase 
in fishing pressure recommended. It will have short term negative eco-
nomic effects in return for rather uncertain biological improvements. 
Considering that, the measure does not even appear to be effective in its 
own right, it cannot seriously deal with the major problem of excessive 
fishing pressure. 
Effort measures 
10. The feasibility of management of the North Sea flatfish fishery by keep-
ing the fishing effort constant over a number of years is restricted by the 
opposition that initially can be expected from both politicians and indus-
try, due to the potential threat to relative stability. 
From an economic point of view the system is desirable, as it is from the 
point of view of enforcement. It even has some merits in the field of bio-
logy, the more so when the uncertainty on the effects on stocks and mor-
tality is reduced by additional restrictions to influence the directivity of 
the fleet. 
But most of all, it is desirable as it appears to be effective: limiting effort 
opens possibilities to tackle the problem of the pressure on the flatfish 
fishery more directly, although this is not done by maintaining the status 
quo. 
11. Limited adjustment of effort would not make effort management more 
acceptable to politicians and industry. They might even object more 
strongly to it, as negotiations on adjustment would be involved, with the 
ensuing uncertainty on the level of activity. 
The desirability of limited adjustment of effort is certainly greater than 
that of fixed effort, as it meets part of the biological problems. In addi-
t ion it opens the possibility to correct for changes in efficiency and to set 
out a strategy to arrive at desired levels of fishing mortality. 
The latter aspects particularly can make limited adjustment of effort an 
effective management measure in the North Sea fishery for flatfish. 
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4. BRETON FISHERIES IN THE CELTIC SEA 
M. Andro, R. Debeauvais, H. Dupouy and M. Ould el Kettab 
Summary 
This case study first describes the specific features of high sea fisheries in 
area VII (except Vila and Vlld) of the Celtic Sea, and particularly trawling by 
French vessels. 
Part A surveys fleets and targeted stocks. It highlights the multi-species 
nature of the fishery and the flexibility of fishing strategies, i.e. the ability of 
vessels to make the best, in the short or medium term, of available resources 
and market opportunities. 
Multi-annual quota, which may result in the quota adjustment being in-
adequate to reflect resource fluctuations, can also cause aberrant transfers of 
fishing effort to the most fragile stocks. 
Multi-species quota raise the problems of acceptance of exploitation rate 
differentials, of definition of equivalence rules, of setting enforcement mea-
sures, and more generally political and sectoral acceptance. 
Establishing quota according to the various métiers seems at first a more 
realistic approach to the fisheries as they stand. Management of this scheme 
proves, in actual fact, to be exceedingly difficult on technical and political 
grounds. It also does little to optimize economic gains. 
Management by individual effort quota is not optimal on biological 
grounds. It raises the problems of effort definition and maintaining relative 
stability. 
However, it provides for flexibility of fishing strategies and sets itself logi-
cally in the effort control measures which have recently been established by 
area. It is also consistent wi th MAGP. This scheme can gradually be improved 
upon - to include, for instance, specific management of the area in line wi th 
the principal of subsidiarity - through encouragement or penalization of fish-
ing strategies according to their targeted species and/or according to selectivity 
of fishing gears and techniques. 
4.0 Introduction 
This case study which surveys the 'mixed fisheries' of ICES area VII is made 
of two parts. 
Part A outlines the selected fishery, its present biological condition and man-
agement problems. 
Because of the complexity and variety of the region's fisheries, it was not 
possible to include all of them. A large part, namely the high sea demersal fish-
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Figure 4.1 Major fisheries in the Celtic Sea 
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eries of area VII (except Vila and Vlld) was selected. Particular attention has 
been given to highlight specific features: 
diversity of métiers (combining size of vessels, target species ect.); 
multi-species captures of most métiers; 
multi-strategies for a large part of the fleets. 
This first descriptive section of the study is necessary in order to under-
stand the implications of possible management regulations; particularly to eval-
uate multi-species or effort measures. Chapter 4.2 briefly assesses the biological 
situation of the main targeted stocks. Chapter 4.3 describes the present regula-
tory measures in the fishery: technical measures, TACs and quota, MAGP, etc. 
Chapter 4.4 offers an analysis of current management problems based on the 
different criteria that have been defined in methodology. 
Part B presents an analysis of potential measures multi-annual, multi-species 
and effort measures. 
A global assessment of the implications contained in the various defini-
tions of these new measures is offered. The matrices of appendices 4.1-4.3 pro-
vide a detailed analysis based on the different criteria. Certain hypotheses have 
been adopted to suit the context of the fisheries, in particular to take into ac-
count the notion of 'métier'. 
This case study focuses on French operations. The specific conditions and 
consequences ofMATACs, MSTACs, TAE on other fleets will not be commented 
upon. 
Part A Presentation o f the case study 
4.1 Description of the fishery 
4.1.1 Presentation of the area 
Initially, the French case study was to deal with The mixed bottom fisher-
ies' of ICES area VII and area VIM. It was considered more appropriate to limit 
the scope of the analysis and to retain only those fisheries in area VII where 
Breton vessels operate (figure 4.1). 
Area Vlld, i.e. East Channel, was excluded because few Breton vessels go 
there. Area Vila (Irish Sea) was not included because it makes up a particular 
unit from an ecological and socio-economic point of view. Most French vessels 
operating in area Vila are semi-industrial units from the port of Lorient which 
target gadidae, especially whit ing. That fleet is at present going through a 
marked decline. 
227 
In this approach, all the fleets operating in areas Vllb-k, including non-
trawling fleets (netters, longliners) which may have a significant impact for a 
number of species (hake, anglerfish ect.) have been retained. However, the 
bulk of the catches are made by trawlers. 
The fisheries of area VII seem particularly interesting to illustrate the de-
bates on new management measures because they present at the same time: 
Elements of homogeneity 
a geographical unit = the Celtic Sea, to which some adjacent areas can be 
appended (West Ireland, entrance of the Channel); 
a socio-economic unit = this fishery is markedly dominated by French 
artisanal high sea fleets, particularly those based in southern Brittany. 
Elements of singularity 
multi-métiers fisheries; 
to a very large extent, multi-species métiers; 
significant flexibility of fishing strategies; 
a damaged, but not too deteriorated, biological base. 
Table 4.1 International landing of main species from the area VII (1,000 tonnes) 
White anglerfish 
Black anglerfish 
Megr im 
Nephrops 
Pollack 
Ling 
Whi t ing 
Hake 
Cod 
Sole 
83 
27.2 
11.0 
24.5 
4.2 
6.7 
10.2 
8.5 
57.5 
5.3 
1.4 
84 
26.9 
8.1 
16.7 
3.9 
4.9 
8.4 
7.2 
63.3 
5.6 
1.3 
85 
26.9 
7.5 
17.9 
3.8 
4.3 
7.4 
7.3 
58.9 
6.2 
1.3 
86 
20.4 
9.9 
16.7 
2.8 
6.4 
8.8 
6.8 
57.4 
8.0 
1.6 
87 
19.1 
7.9 
16.9 
3.1 
6.3 
11.4 
8.7 
63.4 
7.9 
1.2 
88 
17.8 
9.6 
17.7 
2.9 
6.4 
9.5 
9.4 
64.8 
12.0 
1.1 
89 
18.6 
9.7 
18.3 
3.8 
5.6 
8.6 
12.4 
66.5 
15.3 
1.0 
90 
18.4 
8.9 
14.0 
4.3 
4.7 
8.0 
10.1 
60.0 
8.7 
1.2 
91 
15.5 
8.9 
14.7 
3.3 
4.8 
7.5 
9.5 
5.8 
6.0 
1.1 
92 
12.2 
8.0 
15.0 
4.2 
3.2 
5.2 
8.7 
56.6 
6.4 
9.8 
4.1.2 Fleets and countries involved 
Table 4.1 gives the tonnage of catches from 1983 to 1992 for various spe-
cies subject to quota in an area that corresponds most to the one being sur-
veyed. Figure 4.2 shows the share of French fleets in the landings. 
One should note that for hake the area includes VI, VII and VIII. This em-
phasizes the importance of Spain. Area VII and area VIM are also included in the 
anglerfish figures. 
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Table 4.2 Fisheries units identified by the southern shelf ICES working group (adapted from 
ICES, 1987) 
Fishery unit 
1. Long line in 
medium to 
deep water 
2. Long line in 
shallow water 
3. Fixed net 
4. Non-nephrops 
t rawl ing in 
medium to 
deep water 
5. Non-nephrops 
t rawl ing in 
shallow water 
6. Beam t rawl ing 
in shallow 
water 
7. Nephrops 
t rawl ing in 
medium 
depth 
water 
Country 
France 
Ireland 
Spain 
UK 
France 
UK 
France 
UK 
France 
Ireland 
Spain 
UK 
France 
Ireland 
UK 
Belgium 
UK 
France 
Ireland 
<17 
<20 
Number 
of boats 
8 
4 
48 
13 
42 
23 
38 
152 
106 
13 
124 
18 
108 
<130 
342 
15 
117 
72 
<25 
400 
330 
kW 
110 
428 
428 
536 
144 
179 
156 
128 
421 
760 
557 
693 
549 
230 
152 
740 
389 
341 
330 
110 
60 
GRT 
50 
130 
130 
202 
34 
37 
25 
18 
163 
240 
207 
242 
166 
65 
29 
78 
54 
70 
Target 
species 
skates, dogfish 
hake 
hake 
hake, l ing, cod 
pollack, l ing, 
dogfish 
gadoids, skates, 
spurdog 
hake 
hake, monk, 
cod, pollack 
monk, megrim 
hake, megrim, 
monk 
hake, megrim 
hake, monk 
gadoids 
gadoids 
monk, gadoids 
sole 
monk, sole 
nephrops 
nephrops 
nephrops 
nephrops 
Bycatch 
l ing, greater. 
forkbeard, cod 
monk, l ing 
wh i t ing 
skates 
pollack 
spurdog 
hake, skates. 
gadoids 
cod, wi tch 
cod, nephrops 
megrim 
monk, skates, 
dogfish 
megrim, monk, 
ray, place, sole 
f latf ish, skates, 
rays 
place, rays 
megrim 
hake, gadoids, 
monk, megr im 
wh i t ing , hake, 
monk, megrim 
unknown 
hake, monk, 
wh i t ing , 
megrim 
a) Average per vessel. 
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For the main species in the area (anglerfish, nephrops, cod, whiting...), 
French landings are particularly important. Globally, contributions by fleets 
from other nations remain comparatively low, though they may be quite signif-
icant for a particular species, for instance megrim in the Spanish fleet. 
4.1.2.1 Fleets other than French 
Though French vessels are dominant in the area, other nationalities are 
also present (see table 4.2). 
The Spanish fleet is made of trawlers, netters and longliners operating 
more particularly in west of Ireland. Its share is fairly important in the 
case of hake, megrim and anglerfish. 
The Irish fleet is made of small trawlers predominantly, and also some 
netters. It operates mostly in coastal areas. 
The UK fleet is made of units wi th low engine power and tonnage. It 
practices various types of fishing. 
The Belgian fleet, marginally present in the area, numbered about 15 
beam trawlers in 1989. They pursue flatfish (sole, plaice). 
White Angler 
Black Angler 
Megrim 
Nephrops 
Pollack 
Ling 
Whiting 
Hake 
Cod 
Sole 
mmmmmmm/////////////////////////A 
mmmmmmw////////////////////////A 
mmmv////////////////////////////////////A 
mmmmmmmm//////////////////////x 
mmmmmm////////////////////////y//A 
wmmm///////////////////////////////////A 
^mTA 
mm//////////////////////////////////////777A 
0 20 
E v v v i France 
40 60 
V//A others 
80 100 
% 
Figure 4.2 French share in landings for the main species managed by TACs in area VII (1992) 
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4.1.2.2 The French fleets 
The French fleets operating in area VII can be broken down in four main 
categories. 
'Petits artisans': vessels of 16-18 m length and 330-350 kW engine power. 
The word 'artisan' means a vessel whose owner works on board. The fleets 
based in Port-en-Bessin, Cherbourg and other harbours in the Cotentin penin-
sula also belong to that category. But most of them operate in the Channel; 
and their fishing strategies are fairly different from the ones used in the Celtic 
Sea. 
'Gros artisans': vessels of 20-24 m length and 360-400 kW engine power. 
Most of them are based in southern Brittany, but some units come from Saint-
Malo, La Rochelle and Les Sables-d'Olonne. They are the hard core of the fleets 
studied here. Most of them operate almost exclusively in area VII. 
'Semi-industriels': vessels of 24-38 m length which are owned by fishing 
companies. They represent an important part of the fishery, though several of 
them also exploit other areas (west of Ireland and west of Scotland). Their op-
erative logic therefore goes beyond the patterns of the Celtic Sea. 
Some 'Industriels': vessels of 38-55 m length also owned by fishing compa-
nies. They operate in area VII only occasionally, either on their way back from 
fishing grounds in west of Scotland or in deep waters on the edge of the shelf 
of area VII. 
Table 4.3 sums up the mean technical characteristics of each of the above 
segments. The figures give a first insight into the structural heterogeneity of 
the French fleet in area VII. Out of the 498 listed vessels, more than half come 
from southern Brittany ports (Le Guilvinec, Concarneau, Lorient, Douarnenez). 
The others come from various ports along the Atlantic coast, mostly La Ro-
chelle, l'île d'Yeu, Cherbourg and Port-en-Bessin. 
Table 4.4 summarizes the main data of 1993. A breakdown of fishing 
effort and production by sub-areas (Vllh, Vllg, Vile etc.) highlights the impor-
tance of each particular sub-sector. 
Qualitatively, catches in area VII include a multitude of species which be-
long to various zoological groups. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the tonnage and 
value of the 15 most important species which appeared in the 1993 French 
production of area VII. The two main species (anglerfish and nephrops) repre-
sent 30% of the aggregate value. And the first 15 species represent only 79% 
of the aggregate value, and 70% of the volume. 
This shows the diversity of the region's resources. In addition to standard 
species, some less common ones such as squid, cuttlefish, orange roughy, John 
Dory are of importance. 
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Figure 4.3 French landings of the 15 main species caught in area VII (except Vila and 
Vlld) in 1993, 1,000 tonnes 
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Figure 4.4 French landings for the 15 main species caught in area VII (except Vila and Vlld) in 
1993, million FRF 
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4.1.3 Métiers and fishing strategies 
The French fleets have been presented above in four segments, according 
to size of vessels and status of owners. 
This general approach tends to overshadow the actual complexity of the 
fishery which is linked to: 
the diversity of métiers; 
the multi-species nature of metiers; 
the flexibility of fishing strategies. 
In the first place the word 'métier' refers to the type of gear used. Some 
netters, potters, longliners, occasional mid water trawlers and seasonal driftnet 
vessels targeting albacore are to be found operating in area VII. Bottom trawl-
ers are nevertheless largely predominant in the French fleet. The analysis shall 
therefore deal with trawling mostly. 
For a given type of vessel, and here this means trawlers in particular, the 
word 'métier' refers also to: 
the targeted species (single or multi): nephrops, anglerfish, gadoids, etc.; 
the fishing area: the grounds at the bottom of the Celtic Sea vary appre-
ciably from one sector to another. 
However, these two criteria intermingle largely. 
In order to highlight the diversity of the métiers, the multi-species fea-
tures and the flexibility of the fishing strategies, a file of 7,628 entries was stud-
ied representing the 'vessel-area' combinations for each month of 1993. Each 
such entry states the characteristics of the vessel (size, engine, kW, GRT, port...), 
the fishing effort as well as tonnage, and value of landings for about 30 species 
(anglerfish, cod, megrim, haddock, albacore, grenadier, orange roughy, pol-
lack, saithe, ling, blue ling, whit ing, hake, nephrops etc.). 
4.1.3.1 Methodology 
The ICES working group (1987) segmented the French trawlers into 3 
main categories according to the major species in their catches: 
nephrops (fishery unit 8); 
benthic species (anglerfish, megrim, ray) (fishery units 4 and 14); 
gadoids (cod, whiting) (fishery unit 5). 
The case study endeavoured to carry the analysis further in order to 
clearly work out the issues resulting from the implementation of new manage-
ment measures, in particular multi-species and effort measures. 
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Table 4.5 Production in value by species and by métier ('000 FRF) 
Species Mét 1 Mét 2 Mét 3 Mét 4 Mét 5 Mét 6 Mét 7 Mét 8 Mét 9 Total 
Nephrops 7,512 84,261 1,521 46,793 260 2,398 
Anglerfish 58,514 10,405 6,103 13,148 2,801 551 
11,197 7,204 33,290 5,475 2,307 1,174 Cod 
Megrim 30,468 4,631 3,208 12,939 705 207 
Whiting 5,375 3,582 31,000 2,230 1,977 1,083 
8,140 150,884 
1,203 18,955 111,681 
105 20,348 81,100 
40 5,218 57,415 
6 10,512 55,766 
Squid 
Cuttlefish 
Hake 
Hoplostete 
Ling 
Cuckoo ray 
Pollack 
John dory 
Albacore 
Various rays 
Lemon sole 
Bass 
Grenadier 
Haddock 
Sole 
Red gurnard 
Sait he 
Picked 
dogfish 
Goatfish 
Grey bream 
Turbot 
Ray do. 
Dogfish 
Blue ling 
Others 
Total 
Effort 
(hours) 
Number 
of trips 
5,457 
3,096 
7,931 
22 
3,943 
12,082 
2,058 
4.279 
497 
2,899 
62 
50 
2,249 
2,257 
393 
1,083 
1,218 
793 
6 
3,077 
1,225 
1,191 
21 
12,959 
181,913 ' 
283 
1.9 
152 
17 
2,654 
1,314 
127 
301 
499 
282 
452 
18 
129 
699 
7 
369 
846 
19 
1 
459 
119 
438 
3,874 
1,632 
32 
4,075 
2,378 
888 
2,629 
969 
1,308 
2,903 
135 
17 
2,033 
384 
83 
874 
792 
36 
0 
751 
1,026 
689 
6 
6,152 
122,858 104,916 
149 
1 
111 
0.9 
183 
17 
2,921 
1,216 
150 
163 
489 
330 
389 
9 
169 
636 
6 
235 
926 
10 
0 
550 
183 
592 
0 
4,899 
94,657 
130 
0.9 
273 
7 
517 
264 
182 
184 
133 
47 
299 
3 
2 
262 
108 
6 
116 
47 
4 
0 
139 
179 
80 
0 
663 
11,564 
16 
0.1 
29 
3 
112 
85 
13 
58 
28 
13 
42 
2 
20 
51 
1 
42 
36 
1 
58 
18 
21 
207 
6,250 
9 
0.7 
15,989 
0 
792 
16,781 
8 
1.1 
74 
3 
389 
31,585 
105 
53 
78 
74 
68 
19 
9,867 
112 
6 
368 
39 
3 
2 
1 
1 
10 
636 
13,121 
30,718 
32,333 
15,588 
128 
8,335 
3,880 
10,981 
9,531 
10,196 
4,799 
10,586 
323 
4,425 
4,517 
7,937 
5,275 
4,164 
7,032 
7,850 
2,747 
3,859 
3,369 
278 
33,231 
57,965 285,253 
28 
3.1 
313 
2.3 
38,518 
35,507 
34,186 
31,735 
17,638 
17,374 
16,452 
16,003 
15,989 
12,740 
11,802 
10,814 
10,259 
9,398 
8,652 
8,437 
8,362 
8,067 
7,897 
7,859 
7,782 
6,609 
6,390 
942 
75,898 
882,157 
1,047 
7.6 
Among the most recent studies focusing on a similar approach, one 
should quote Biseau (1994) who, on the basis of catch components, defines for 
each trip target métiers (major species captured), and for each vessel types of 
métiers (yearly average). This approach leads to a more realistic view of the 
prevailing situation in the area under scrutiny. It highlights the flexibility of the 
fishing strategies. In order to define the métiers, the 7,628 monthly entries of 
vessels visiting the area were classified into 8 target métiers on the basis of the 
specific contents of catches. Métier 9 covers entries that could not be otherwise 
classified in line with fixed thresholds. Percentages refer to the share of major 
species in that value of landings. 
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Métier 1: + 25% anglerfish and megrim 
Métier 2: + 30% nephrops 
Métier 3: + 30% cod and whit ing 
Métier 4: + 25% anglerfish and megrim, + 30% nephrops 
Métier 5: + 25% anglerfish and megrim, + 30% whit ing and cod 
Métier 6: + 25% nephrops, + 30% whiting and cod 
Métier 7: + 20% grenadier and orange roughy (deep sea) 
Métier 8: + 40% albacore 
Métier 9: other métiers 
Such typology comes close to the classification of activities as observed by 
Biseau (op. cit.) while retaining the 3 main métiers traditionally associated with 
the Celtic Sea: benthic, nephrops, gadidae (Charruau & Biseau, 1989). 
It also makes it possible to outline albacore fisheries (métier 8) and deep 
sea species fisheries (métier 7). These diversifying métiers may represent the 
main activity for some vessels. For others they remain a seasonal, though essen-
tial, diversification of effort. 
This typology highlights the 'mixed métiers' and the importance of the 
'unclassifiable'. More generally, it underlines the heterogeneous nature of the 
fishery in terms of catch composition. 
Such typology based on monthly rather than annual data has one par-
ticular advantage: it makes it possible to describe the diversity of operational 
patterns and the flexibility of fishing strategies. 
Our methodology, and therefore the typology, could be further refined 
through additional segmentation based on the type of fishing enterprises (pe-
t i t or gros artisan, semi-industriel) and by isolating the métiers that use various 
fishing gears other than trawls. It was possible to tackle all the main points 
within the scope of the present study by using the above methodology. 
4.1.3.2 Multi-species métiers 
The data in table 4.5 and the graph of figure 4.5 provide a general pic-
ture of the results. Some features can clearly be distinguished. 
The 8 métiers defined by thresholds of catches of specific species account 
for only 68% of the value of catches. The three 'pure' métiers of bottom trawl-
ing (benthic, gadidae, nephrops) account for only 47% of the value of landings. 
The contribution of other métiers, which represent a significant diversification 
of fishing strategies, should not therefore be neglected. Targeting of certain 
species - albacore, grenadier, orange roughy, ling, squid, etc, is primarily done 
by vessels engaged in these 'secondary' métiers. 
If the three major mixed métiers fisheries are added up, they account for 
15% of the aggregate value. One of them mixing anglerfish+megrim/nephrops 
(métier 4) accounts for 12%. The other métiers that mix majors therefore repre-
sent only 2.5% of the total. Métier 7 (deep sea) accounts for 6.6%. Métier 8 
(albacore) accounts for 1.9%. 
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Figure 4.5 Effort, total value and value by species and by métier in 1993 
Métier 9 (others) refers to: 
petits artisans operating at the entrance of the Channel, in particular; 
industrial métiers (ling, saithe etc.); 
gros artisans targeting other species (ray, sole, cephalopods particularly) 
during certain seasons. 
The five main decisive species of the first 6 métiers account roughly for 
only 51 % of the aggregate catches. The sum of the 29 other species that have 
been analysed, amounts to 91 % of the value of landings. The share of TACs 
species stands at 60% of the production (value). 
Analyses of the composition of catches of each métier indicates that tar-
get species seldom represent more than 50% of the production. This proves the 
importance of bycatches. 
Apart from albacore and deep sea species, most other species are cap-
tured at the same time by vessels engaged in several métiers (figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.6 Composition of the production by species and by métier in 1993 (value) 
4.1.3.3 Flexibility of fishing strategies during the year 
In order to evaluate the significance of changes of strategies for vessels 
visiting the area, the file of 7,628 entries for 1993 was processed. Having classi-
f ied the entries for each month and each vessel, all the transfers between 
métiers, together with entrances and exits from area VII were listed (table 4.6). 
For a total number of 498 vessels, 3,238 changes were recorded through-
out that year. 
Métier 1 (anglerfish) totalled 1,908 trips. 646 'exits' were recorded, 115 
of them going to métier 2 (nephrops), 86 to métier 3 (gadidae), 172 to métier 
4 (nephrops+anglerfish), 41 to the other mixed métiers and 232 to métier 9 
(other). The rate of change stands at 34% from which 30% is to basic métiers 
and 70% to mixed and other métiers. 
Globally, switching to other métiers occurs as follows: 
14.7% between 'pure' métiers (1 to 3); 
28% between métier 4 and 'pure' métiers; 
8% between métiers 5 or 6 and 1/2/3/4; 
1 % between métiers 1 to 6 and métiers 7 and 8; 
35% between 1 to 8 and métier 9 (others). 
The remainder are changes of areas. 
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Table 4.6 Number of observed changes from one métier to another 
From: 
To: 
Métier 1 
Métier 2 
Métier 3 
Métier 4 
Métier 5 
Métier 6 
Métier 7 
Métier 8 
Métier 9 
Out of area 
TOTAL 
Mét. 
1 
0 
115 
86 
172 
32 
9 
2 
1 
196 
33 
646 
Mét. 
2 
120 
0 
32 
237 
13 
21 
0 
0 
55 
21 
499 
Mét. 
3 
92 
31 
0 
41 
30 
8 
1 
3 
201 
15 
422 
Mét. 
4 
161 
263 
34 
0 
14 
18 
0 
0 
68 
6 
564 
Mét. 
5 
48 
13 
14 
14 
0 
1 
1 
0 
21 
0 
112 
Mét. 
6 
16 
19 
8 
13 
1 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
62 
Mét. 
7 
3 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
11 
12 
29 
Mét. 
8 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
13 
19 
35 
Mét. 
9 
180 
63 
224 
65 
25 
5 
4 
11 
0 
93 
670 
Out To-
of area tal 
32 
6 
11 
13 
2 
3 
27 
18 
87 
0 
199 
654 
510 
411 
557 
117 
65 
35 
33 
657 
199 
3,238 
Nearly half of the changes occur between the 3 basic métiers, more than 
30% of them taking place between 'pure' métiers. The rate of incidence of 
such changes stands at 41 %. If the mixed métier 4 is included, this percentage 
increases to 66%. Interestingly, less than 50% of the changes to métier 4 origi-
nate in métier 2 (nephrops). The rate of incidence is then 45%. 
Changes between métiers 1 to 6 and métier 9 ('others') are also fairly 
frequent. They are quite often due to a significant occurrence of species other 
than the main ones (cephalopods in particular). 
Each métier remains very heterogeneous. Within a particular métier, the 
composition of catches varies wi th vessels and seasons. For example, the total 
number of entries listed under métier 1 (+25% anglerfish and megrim) breaks 
down as follows: 
Table 4.7 Composition of entries by share of major species 
No. of Entries 
551 
464 
341 
325 
227 
Share of total (%) 
28.9 
24.3 
17.9 
17.0 
11.9 
Percentage of major species 
25-35 
35-45 
45-55 
55-65 
+ 65 
Total 1,908 100 
The seasonal nature of the métiers is indicaded in figure 4.7. The global 
production of each particular métier varies markedly over different periods. For 
instance, the total value produced by métier 1 goes up significantly from Sep-
tember to January. For métier 2, on the contrary, production is highest be-
tween March and July. As for métier 3, catches are at their best at the begin-
ning of the year. 
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Figure 4.7 Seasonal variation of production by métier ('000 FRF) 
Number of boats 
100 
80 
60 -
40 
20 
Usa 1 EË ZZZL u 
1 métier 2 métiers 3 métiers 4 métiers 5 métiers 6 métiers 7 métiers 
^ 1 industrial semi-
industrial 
big EXXXH small 
artisanal artisanal 
Figure 4.8 Number of boats which practised several métiers during the year 1993 
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Most vessels engage in several métiers. Figure 4.8 shows that a majority 
of gros artisans engage in different target métiers. Though 31 % of vessels keep 
to one métier, 44% of them engage in more than 4. Fishing strategies are 
therefore flexible. Flexibility characterises the practices of French artisanal high 
sea fleets. This is also true for the semi-industrial fleets. Flexibility seems to be 
important among the petits artisans. However, a majority of them are classified 
under métier 9, which in fact includes different types of métiers. 
Because of the demonstrated flexibility, cautious action is required when 
tackling resource management on the basis of 'métiers'. 
4.1.3.4 Switching to different métiers over the years 
It is difficult to follow the evolution of the various métiers over the years 
as this includes: 
evolution of the composition of catches for one particular fishing strategy 
(= same species targeted in same area), because the resources that are 
available or that can be captured vary in time; 
evolution of the distribution of vessels among various métiers. Shifting 
from one to another being at times a very slow process. 
A fluctuating resource leads to a changing distribution of the main 
métiers. It also significantly changes the composition of catches for vessels en-
gaged in the same métier. The statistical series which have been studied are 
not long enough to trace such evolution. Biseau (1994) has carried out a retro-
spective analysis of target species percentages in the catches made by the main 
fishery units of area VII. By examining the relative importance of the various 
target métiers, the author shows that specific features of the 'métiers types' in 
the Celtic Sea are undergoing constant changes. 
As a consequence, the catch composition in particular varies. For instance, 
figures for 1985 and 1992 (table 4.8) show that the anglerfish percentage went 
down markedly in the landings of fishery units 4 and 14 (benthic trawling). By 
contrast, the cod percentage went up. Scientists who specialise in demersal fish 
observe that cod and whiting are now representing a bigger share. An analysis 
of the evolution of métiers between two different years based solely on catch 
data may therefore be thwarted by a varying resource. 
Evolution of the composition of activity by métiers can be illustrated by 
changes in activity (fishing effort) by fishing zone. For example, figure 4.9 gives 
the evolution of fishing effort (1991-1992) of vessels registered at Le Guilvinec. 
The transfer from area Vllh to area Vllg and area Vllj-k means that units of 
métier 1 (anglerfish+megrim) shifted to métiers 2 to 4 (in Vllg) or to métier 8 
(deep sea species in Vllj-k). 
Likewise, between 1989 and 1992 there occured a significant shift of the 
Concarneau semi-industrial fleet from the Celtic Sea (- 57% of fishing effort) 
to west Scotland (+50% of fishing effort). 
The evolution of activity according to métiers can also be outlined 
through statistical data on gears. Between 1990 and 1993, use of gears other 
than bottom trawl increased: driftnet for tuna, midwater trawl, gill net, etc. 
Although by 1993, these gears played still a relatively small role only. 
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Table 4.8 Evolution between 1985 and 1992 of characteristics. Mean (ecart-type) of various 
species share (%) in landings for all trips and all boats in main fishery units 
Fishery-
unit 
Angler- Me-
fish grim 
Cuckoo 
ray 
Ling Hake Cod Whit- Nephr-
ing ops 
Bot tom t raw l -
ing in Celtic 
Sea (4) 
Bottom t rawl -
ing in Bay of 
Biscay (14) 
Bot tom t rawl -
ing in Celtic 
Sea shallow 
water (5) 
Nephrops 
t rawl ing in 
Celtic Sea (8) 
1985 
1992 
1985 
1992 
1985 
1992 
1985 
1992 
36(15) 
24(13) 
48(11) 
29(17) 
12(10) 
7 (5) 
14 (4) 
11 (4) 
8 
9 
7 
8 
3 
4 
8 
9 
(4) 
(6) 
(4) 
(5) 
(4) 
(3) 
(4) 
(4) 
13 (8) 
13(10) 
18 (8) 
14(10) 
3 (4) 
3 (3) 
1 (2) 
0 (1) 
5 
5 
2 
3 
5 
3 
5 
3 
(4) 
(4) 
(2) 
(4) 
(5) 
(3) 
(3) 
(1) 
4 
4 
3 
4 
6 
4 
3 
3 
(5) 
(4) 
(4) 
(5) 
(5) 
(3) 
(2) 
(2) 
3 
6 
0 
1 
11 
17 
10 
11 
(4) 
(6) 
(1) 
(2) 
(9) 
(8) 
(4) 
(4) 
2 (4) 
2 (3) 
0 (1) 
1 (2) 
12(12) 
21(18) 
6 (7) 
10 (8) 
2 (6) 
2 (4) 
1 (2) 
3 (6) 
1 (4) 
3 (5) 
31(12) 
31 (9) 
Source: Biseau, 1994. 
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Figure 4.9 Fishing effort in Le Guilvinec' 'quartier' (1991 and 1992) 
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4.2 Biological basis 
Another feature of this area is the great diversity of the ichthyological 
population. Almost all the species encountered are exploited to various de-
grees. But the fishery is based largely on the exploitation of about 30 species, 
some of which are of great economic interest. Among the high commercial 
value species, only 10 or so are being regularly monitored by scientists within 
the framework of ICES working groups. These are species subject to a TAC re-
gime. 
4.2.1 Stocks exploited by the French fleets 
The analysis of the biological basis adopts the assessments made by the 
ICES working group (1994a, b) together wi th relevant elements of the 
IFREMERs report (Mellon et al., 1994). 
A synoptic compilation of topical data is shown on table 4.9, with signifi-
cant indicators on stocks and exploitation rates. 
The case study sticks to the conclusions of biologists wi th respect to the 
main species exploited by the French fleets. These are: nephrops, anglerfish, 
cod, megrim, whit ing, hake, ling, cuckoo ray and pollack. These nine species 
account for 55% of French tonnage produced in area VII (except Vila and Vlld), 
and more than 60% in value. 
Available data on biological and ecological aspects of the fish population 
remain inadequate. This lack of information may in some cases unsettle assess-
ments of stocks. 
Nephrops 
Within area VII, two different populations are to be found, the Celtic Sea 
one (Vllf,g,h) and the Porcupine Bank one (Vllb, c, j , k). 
In both cases, the male and female components of the population are 
considered separately and treated as independent stocks in scientific analysis. 
This distinction is based on differing biological and behavioural features. 
Celtic Sea nephrops stock 
Because they are less accessible and smaller in size, nephrops females 
have a lower fishing mortality than males. They account for only a small part 
of the catches (10% of landings). As for males, the yield curve per recruit shows 
that the present level of exploitation is slightly above the Fmax value. IFREMER 
biologists note that 'despite this slight overexploitation, the stock does not 
seem to show alarming signs of spawning biomass decline'. 
Porcupine nephrops stock 
Assessment indicates that the current level of exploitation of nephrops 
is slightly above optimal level. It is true that landings and yields have been in 
decline ever since 1987. According to scientists, though, this situation is due to 
changed accessibility and catchability for that species rather than to stock de-
cline. 
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Table 4.10 Discards, landings and discarding rates for main species (thousand fish) 
Species 
White anglerfish 
Black anglerfish 
Megrim, male 
Megrim, female 
Whiting 
Hake 
Cod 
Cuckoo ray, male 
Cuckoo ray, female 
Discards 
318 
219 
2,012 
2,281 
2,132 
307 
161 
454 
495 
Landings 
5,225 
1,615 
507 
7,428 
17,138 
1,818 
1,873 
470 
430 
Discard rate (%) 
6 
12 
80 
24 
11 
14 
8 
49 
51 
Source: Charuau and Biseau, 1989. 
Anglerfish 
Though fisheries statistics do not make a distinction between the two 
species (white and black), scientific analysis is carried out separately. Landing 
figures are divided by applying proportional coefficients based on fish auctions 
sampling. 
The yearly assessment of both stocks is done jointly in area VII and area 
VIII, integrating two sectors respectively subject to a particular TAC. 
White anglerfish (Lophius piscatorius) 
Daily yields and landings have declined significantly over the last years. 
Fishing mortality, which remains comparatively low, is appreciably higher than 
the mean figure (1989-1993). The present figure is well above Fmax. 
After undergoing a drop, recruitment seems to have been picking up 
since 1992. Its 1993 level, remains below the average figures as observed in the 
series which is available. 
According to IFREMER and ACFM reports, the stock does not seem to be 
in danger, despite overexploitation. From available data, one cannot define its 
minimum acceptable biological limit. 
Black anglerfish (Lophius budegassa) 
Landings have remained comparatively stable over the last years, while 
yields have shown a marked decline. Stock assessment concludes that the situa-
t ion is satisfactory. The levels of fishing mortality, spawning biomass and re-
cruitment are close to average. 
Megrim 
Statistics put together two species of megrim. Scientists monitor only one 
(in area Vllb-k and area Villa, b). Structural analysis is made difficult because of 
biological features (differences between sexes and between year classes, etc.). 
The situation of the stock is said to be globally satisfactory. Though re-
maining at a low level, fishing mortality has been on the increase since 1984. 
Its present level practically equals Fmean. After markedly declining between 
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1989 and 1992, spawning biomass now shows an upward trend. Biologists are 
advising continuing caution and the maintenance of the biomass at the current 
level. 
Cod 
Strong variability characterises the stock. The situation varies with fluctu-
ating recruitment as only a small number of year classes are exploited. Landings 
and yields are currently at their lowest annual level. Fishing mortality is rather 
high (0.93): it exceeds its historical mean and is well above Fmax. Spawning 
biomass is also in a critical state. But according to ACFM, the stock is staying 
within the minimum biologically acceptable limit. In order to go back to F opti-
mal level, it is recommended that present fishing mortality be reduced by 80%. 
However, one should note again that a gap between current mortality 
and Fmax has always been observed among gadoids in the Celtic Sea (Ould el 
Kettab, 1993). Even during periods of high recruitment, the difference between 
the fishing mortality level and the theoretical optimal level remains significant. 
One should also notice that evaluation is conducted only in a portion of the 
stock's habitat (Vllf,g,h), which is the region where cod concentration is high-
est. But also exchanges between the Celtic Sea stock and those in neighbouring 
zones (Irish Sea, Channel) are not known. 
Whiting 
Similar/ to cod, fluctuations of biomass and production are closely linked 
to variations of recruitment three years earlier. Dependence on exploitation of 
only two year classes renders the stock most vulnerable. 
Thanks to comparatively large recruitment in 1990 and 1991, the stock is 
not in danger at the present time, despite a fishing mortality which remains 
high. ACFM recommends a significant reduction of fishing mortality, while 
admitting that the stock is not threatened. 
Hake 
Hake exploited in area VII is part of the so-called 'north stock' which 
spreads all over the North-East Atlantic (areas IV, V, VI, VII, VIM). Scientific evalu-
ation is conducted over the whole region whereas TACs are set for more lim-
ited areas. In addition to this wide geographical dispersal, another significant 
feature is the gradient like localization of various year classes. Younger fish stay 
in coastal areas while older ones live in deep water. As a result, exploitation 
takes place in a sequential manner: the particular segments of the fleets come 
in successively to capture different year classes. Hence the importance of 
bycatch rates and discards. 
Assessments show that F level remains low (0.36) but has been fol lowing 
a slow upward trend for several years. Since 1986, the spawning stock biomass 
has been drastically eroded. It is now at its lowest level. The hake stock is seen 
as being below the minimum biologically acceptable limit. 
Observers are therefore advocating a significant reduction in the fishing 
effort applied to the stock and to the younger population in particular. Exploi-
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tat ion of juveniles is indeed the main problem of particulary together wi th 
nephrops in mixed coastal fisheries. 
Pollack, ling and cuckoo ray 
These three species are not regularly monitored within the framework of 
ICES. IFREMER has been analysing the stocks for some years. Published reports 
show that their situation is relatively healthy. They constitute bycatches for 
fleets which focus on other species. This makes forecasting difficult and caution 
in their management is desirable. 
4.2.2 Discards and bycatches 
This multi-species fishery inevitably produces bycatches. The above section 
has shown that most resources in the area are exploited by vessels pursuing 
them as target species or by vessels catching certain species occasionally. 
When bycatches contain substantial quantities of juvenile or undersized 
fish which are not marketable, discards may reach high levels. This may have 
damaging effects on the stocks concerned. 
In the Celtic Sea, for instance, the 'Langoustiniers' capture large quanti-
ties of young whit ing. According to IFREMERs estimates (Mellon et al.,1994), 
discards may vary seasonally between 45 and 70% of the total whit ing catch. 
Discarding rates are also quite significant for other species, for instance 
anglerfish, megrim and ray (table 4.10). 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
All the stocks which have been analysed are at present fully exploited. 
Indeed, some are overexploited with regard to biological criteria (Fmax, SSB, 
R). But, on the whole, the situation of the resource is considered less alarming 
than in other EU regions (North Sea, west Scotland). 
The very mixed nature of the fishery, coupled in some cases with exploita-
tion patterns that affect younger year classes, leads to high levels of bycatches 
and discarding. 
4.3 Current regulations 
4.3.1 EU regulations 
Area VII fisheries come within the remit of the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP). As regards conditions of access, quantitative limitation of captures and 
technical and enforcement measures, the standard rules and regulations apply, 
without any derogatory clause. 
The Commission has recently presented a draft regulation which sets as 
a management objective for area VII demersal stocks for the 1994-1997 period 
'preventing any increase of fishing effort' (COM (93) 663 final). 
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4.3.1.1 TACs and quota 
Eleven of the demersal species exploited in the area are subject to the 
TACs regime (table 4.11). These TACs are generally 'precautionary' and based 
on historical levels of capture, not on scientific assessments and advice. They 
cover at times wider areas than the one studied here. At times, they cover only 
sub-areas of the same area. 
Table 4.11 TACs by species and quota by country in 1993 
Species Area TAC France UK Ireland Spain Bel-
gium 
Anglerfish VII 19,240 quota 10,478 4,390 1,865 1,232 1,050 
landings 700 4,153 1,768 1,062 328 
utilization rate (%) 67 95 95 86 31 
Cod Vllb-k 17,500 
VIII 
quota 13,815 1,560 1,345 
landing 12,121 1,600 1,212 
utilization rate (%) 88 103 90 
780 
556 
71 
Megrim VII 19,000 quota 6,930 2,520 3,340 4,500 510 
landing 3,139 2,381 2,341 4,145 40 
utilization rate (%) 45 94 70 92 8 
Saithe VII-VIII 14,000 quota 7,870 2,150 3,940 
landing 2,317 2,093 1,837 
utilization rate (%) 29 97 47 
40 
8 
20 
Whiting Vllb-k 22,000 quota 14,700 2,470 4,540 
landing 14,061 2,307 4,271 
utilization rate (%) 96 93 94 
290 
213 
73 
Haddock VII-VIII 6,000 quota 3,800 600 1,530 
landing 2,047 670 1,487 
utilization rate (%) 54 112 97 
70 
58 
83 
Neprops VII 20,000 quota 4,860 6,565 7,375 1,200 
landing 4,600 6,162 2,766 1,011 
utilization rate (%) 95 94 38 84 
Pollack VII 14,000 quota 9,965 2,440 1,135 30 430 
landing 2,347 2,002 913 7 46 
utilization rate (%) 24 82 80 23 11 
Hake V, VI, 40,200 
VII 
quota 17,112 7,190 2,920 12,488 150 
landing 3,294 6,731 2,361 12,118 30 
utilization rate (%) 19 94 81 97 20 
Sole Vllf.g 1,100 quota 85 310 55 
landing 120 295 16 
utilization rate (%) 120 95 29 
650 
532 
82 
Source: DG XIV Data. 
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The TACs of the two main species have been appreciably adjusted down-
wards. In 1993, the anglerfish quota went down from 19,620 to 10,478 tonnes. 
In 1990, the nephrops quota went down from 6,320 to 4,620 tonnes. 
France's share in the distribution of quota (51.7% of aggregate TACs) seems 
noticeably less important than French activity in the Celtic Sea. 
The reason is that TACs are set on areas which spread beyond the Celtic 
Sea. The nephrops TAC in particular covers also area Vila, which increases Ire-
land's and the United Kingdom's shares. The hake TAC covers area V and area 
VI, which increases Spain's share. 
An analysis of quota uptake in 1993 (table 4.11) shows that the main 
French TACs are not exhausted despite having been adjusted downwards. 
Since 1988, some cases of overshooting have been occasionally observed. 
This is linked with high availability of resources (cod in 1988 and 1989) or ex-
ceeding of small quota for bycatches (sole). Overshooting of TACs has only oc-
curred regularly for whiting. This trend is disappearing with the decline of the 
semi-industrial fleet of Lorient which targets that species. 
After the 1992 adjustment, the nephrops TAC is presently well utilized. 
Returning to catch levels of some past years would lead to the overrunning of 
quotas. Same applies to anglerfish. 
Exceeding of quota is therefore limited and largely occurs with bycatches. 
As a whole, the TAC and quota regime has not really restrained French fisheries 
in area VII over these last few years. 
This explains why France has not so far implemented a real system of 
quota management. Allocation by producers' organizations (POs) concern only 
a few sensitive TACs in area VII: cod, whiting and sole. There is no allocation of 
individual quota in the area. 
On the other hand, utilization rates for the main English and Spanish 
quota go beyond the 90% mark. On the English side, underutilization occurs 
only for pollack (<90%). On the Spanish side, uptake of anglerfish and 
nephrops is only of the order of 85%. 
For English fleets and, to a lesser degree, Spanish fleets which visit the 
area, the TACs regime seems to impose real constraints. For the Spanish vessels, 
the main limiting factor is the system of access to EU waters. 
Irish quota are not exhausted except for anglerfish and haddock. The 
TACs system is no real constraint there. 
4.3.1.2 Technical measures 
Technical measures in area VII apply to minimum mesh size and minimum 
size of catches. 
Mesh size 
The technical features of fishing gears used in EU waters have always 
been subject to strict regulations. 
In its 1978 report (ICES, 1979), the ACFM Committee of ICES had advo-
cated minimum mesh sizes of 80 mm for fish trawls and 70 mm for nephrops 
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trawls. These recommendations were integrated by the European Commission 
in its resource conservation policy (Regulation EEC n° 171/83). 
For several years now, the prescribed 70 mm size for the French 
'langoustiniers' of the Celtic Sea has not been used. These vessels have rather 
adopted an 80 mm mesh size so that they could simultaneously operate on fish 
and nephrops stocks. Such practice enhances the selectivity of gears as regards 
the target species. Over the last years, a size growth was observed. 
Minimum landing size 
Mesh size regulation is generally associated with the minimum size of 
fish. The prescribed sizes for each species appear in appendix II of EU Regula-
t ion n° 3094/86. Until recent years, the French 'langoustiniers' operating in area 
VII had been respecting a minimum size of nephrops of 11.5 mm that was 
above European standard (8.5 mm). 
4.3.1.3 MAGPs 
Compared to MAGP II objectives, the third Multi-Annual Guidance 
Programme covering the 1993-1996 period imposes a 20% reduction of capac-
ity for trawling fleets and a stabilization of aggregate capacity for other fleets. 
This applies to the other fishing zones of the Union as well. 
The French MAGP does not differentiate between fleets targeting benthic 
species such as nephrops and those pursuing demersal species. This is not al-
ways the case in other countries. 
4.3.2 National regulations 
4.3.2.1 'PME' and 'Aides au retrait' 
In 1989, the French established a PME system (Permis de mise en exploita-
tion) whereby the building of a new vessel entails the simultaneous decommis-
sioning of greater capacity. Because of favourable circumstances in the 1985-
1990 period, the measure was viewed as too restrictive in the first stage. This 
resulted in an appreciation of kWs meant for decommissioning. 
The authorities also launched various decommissioning (aides au retrait) 
schemes which have facilitated the permanent laying up and writ ing off of 
vessels whose profitability was often rather marginal. Thanks to such schemes, 
France came very close to meeting its MAGP II objectives. 
Since the beginning of 1993, fish prices have experienced a drastic drop. 
Because of that, the PME system is no longer viewed as constraining. Decom-
missioning aids are no longer a decisive factor, the economic plight of the fish-
ing enterprises acts as the trigger. 
MAGP III: Objectives within easy reach 
The French MAGP II virtually reached its objectives. As the country has not 
decided to reduce the fishing effort, the expected fall in the aggregate capac-
ity of the trawling fleets is in the order of 20%. 
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On December 31 1994, for the main segments of southern Brittany's 
fleets, the fol lowing reductions were achieved: 
16 to 25 m units (gros artisans): 9.4% from the beginning of 1992 to the 
end of 1994 (6.7% since the beginning of 1994); 
25 to 38 m units (semi-industriels): 21.5% from the beginning of 1992 to 
the end of 1994) (9.8% since the beginning of 1994). 
As the 16-25 m fleet includes vessels other than trawlers, one may con-
sider that a fall of 9.4% is quite in keeping with objectives after 3 years of 
MAGP III. The trend seems even to have markedly accelerated during 1994. A 
significant effort reduction of the fleet in area VII can therefore be expected, 
though individual vessels might have increased their effort because of the pres-
ent crisis. 
The reduction of the semi-industrial fleet goes on faster than MAGP rec-
ommended objectives. The trend is quite apparent in area VII. 
4.3.2.2 Market management 
French producers organizations enforce withdrawal prices on almost all 
species that are landed. 
Stabilising systems may have been viewed as an encouragement to over-
fishing in the case of species which were not properly commercialized. With-
drawal prices can also be tuned up to discourage a particular fishery, for in-
stance restraining the exploitation of size 4 whit ing. 
The producers organizations which intervene vigorously on the market 
could act also as intermediaries in the implementation of resource manage-
ment measures. 
4.4 Definition of the management problems in the area 
This chapter evaluates the current system of resource management. It 
identifies the problems from a French point of view, using the criteria specified 
in the methodology of this report. 
4.4.1 Economics 
4.4.1.1 Flexibility 
Flexibility of fishing strategies (between various métiers) is one of the 
prominent features of high sea fisheries in area VII. This is in no way the result 
of arbitration or bargaining linked to resource management pressures. It stems 
from economic considerations which result from an awareness of constraints 
regarding catchability, prices and production costs. 
Most vessels must necessarily maintain such flexibility to secure a fair re-
turn on investments, insofar as this means optimization of effort and optimiza-
t ion of commercial value. 
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4.4.1.2 Planning 
For French fishermen, planning, which here means a yearly or medium-
term organization of fishing activities according to resource management con-
straints, is not a real problem because quota have had little limiting impact so 
far. 
The present TACs regime does not interfere with the principles of invest-
ment. Limitation of investment at the moment is rather linked to MAGP and 
reduced profitability. 
The notion of planning taken as forecasts of returns which make it possi-
ble to depreciate the means of production is no longer meaningful. For a large 
number of vessels, profitability on capital goods is in itself quite difficult to 
attain. 
4.4.1.3 Market consistency 
Because it has so far led to little constraints, the current quota system has 
not given rise to market consistency problems. One must, however, emphasize 
the potential impact of fishery closures during the last weeks of the year. This 
period offers excellent market opportunities for high value species like 
nephrops, anglerfish, etc. 
Another aspect of market consistency is that for certain species, restrictive 
measures in terms of limitation of guaranteed prices may discourage landings. 
4.4.1.4 Daily practice 
The quota system hardly influences the habits and practices of skippers. 
If it were to become restrictive, the skippers may come up against serious diff i-
culties because of the multi-species features of the various métiers. 
Indeed, if it is decided to stop fishing a bycatch species (which is inevitably 
caught with the target species), the closure would lead to increased discarding. 
If the closure is anticipated, 'high grading' may occur as well. 
If the importance of the species whose quota is exhausted is such that 
going on with the métier is being questioned, vessels will turn to other métiers 
because of flexibility of fishing strategies. Considering the present level of in-
formation on stocks, it is uncertain whether such transfer of effort would be 
beneficial to the resource. Paradoxical situations may arise. For example in case 
of a fishery wi th two main target species (anglerfish and nephrops), quota of 
one of them may be quickly exhausted because of stock improvement or can-
not be fully utulized because of stock depletion. 
Closure of fishing for the species whose stock is in better state leads to a 
transfer of effort on the species whose stock may be poor or declining. 
4.4.1.5 Race for fish 
Race for fish is non existent because there is practically no closure of fish-
ing. 
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If the system were to become more restrictive present choices between 
fishing strategies would be modified. Vessels wishing to operate with strategies 
limited by quotas, will in the first stage favour such strategies for fear that they 
might not be able to take advantage of them after quota become restrictive. 
4.4.2 Biology 
4.4.2.1 Spawning stock, fishing mortality 
Stock assessments and the small significance of TACs in the Celtic Sea have 
already been discussed. Control over capacity through MAGP in France and 
limited access for Spanish vessels are objectively the determining factors of 
resource management in the area. 
It is quite obvious that Celtic Sea stocks suffer less from overfishing than 
stocks in the North Sea, west of Scotland and the Bay of Biscay. Even if more 
elaborate assessments are needed, one may suggest among possible explana-
tions: 
1. Exploitable biomass is perhaps less abundant here than in the other im-
portant European zones in the North-East Atlantic. Hence it takes more 
time for vessels to reach the profitability and the effort remains limited 
in the area. 
2. Targets are essentially benthic species (anglerfish, megrim, nephrops etc.) 
which cannot be spotted with current fish finding technology (unlike 
demersal species). There is less concentration and this reduces 
catchability. Knowledge and experience of skipper are the determining 
factors. In the Celtic Sea, gadoids stocks (whiting, cod) are indeed more 
affected by overfishing. 
3. Operating costs are high, for the French fleets in particular (high sea ves-
sels, built rather recently). This raises the profitability threshold and re-
stricts the pressure that can be exerted. For French fleets an additional 
problem is the relative fall of fish prices caused by revaluation of the 
French franc against the currencies of France's main commercial partners 
(United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain). 
4.4.2.2 High-grading and discarding 
Discarding 
Discarding remains fairly important in the Celtic Sea for various technical 
reasons, for instance composition of species and sizes (anglerfish, megrim) and 
mesh sizes regulations which lead to bycatches of juveniles (hake, whiting). 
A large number of scientists agree that protection of juveniles should be 
the central line of any resource policy, even taking precedence over a quota 
policy. 
Restrictive quota can generate further an appreciable development of 
discarding, in particular of bycatch species whose quota has been exhausted. 
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High-grading 
The causes of high-grading are not related to resource management. 
They are rather linked to the market. For instance, producer organizations 
sometimes put a ceiling on landings of small whit ing for each vessel because 
of market considerations. 
The setting of restrictive quota may lead to greater high-grading of tar-
get species as well as of bycatch. 
4.4.2.3 Ecosystem management 
To date, little assessment of damage caused to the ecosystem has been 
conducted. 
The debate on the protection of marine mammals has focused on drift 
nets. This technique can, in fact, be associated with the fixed gear category 
which is not subject to fleet reduction measures. 
4.4.3 Policy/Institutions 
4.4.3.1 Political acceptance 
The present quota regime has not led to strong state intervention. An 
exception is the collection of the statistical data which is quite reliable because 
the bulk of catches goes through auction halls. 
French authorities never had to sanction an overrunning of quota. When 
taking a chance, vessels do so vis-à-vis the national authorities who govern the 
waters where they fish. 
Fishery closures have been comparatively few, with little restrictive impact 
on the fleets. 
The government has no real experience of coercive management of 
quota. Having to deal wi th the sector's economic difficulties, it gives little at-
tention to questions of resource. 
It has not been decided yet whether the principle of allocation of fishing 
rights, let alone the practical details, should apply to groups or to enterprises. 
For the time being, quota are allocated only for sensitive species at producer 
organization, region or port levels. 
4.4.3.2 Sectoral acceptance 
Because of the reasons already mentioned, the sector does not f ind the 
present quota regime very constraining or credible. 
A lot of debating and strong opposition from people in the industry 
would inevitably fol low the setting up of more restrictive quota, as happens 
everywhere whenever such coercive systems are established. All the more so in 
this case given multi-species métiers and multi-species fleets. 
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4.4.3.3 Relative stability 
Respecting relative stability in area VII through the TACs and quota sys-
tem is not currently seen as the major issue. In France, because the main quota 
were underutilized, abiding by the MAGP is rather seen as the limiting factor. 
The situation is much the same in Ireland. 
In Spain, limitation of the number of vessels allowed in the area is seen 
as the limiting factor. 
It is only in the UK that the quota system appears to be the main instru-
ment intended to limit the exploitation of the resource. But in this country, 
applying the MAGP proves to be more difficult than respecting the quota. 
The distribution of rights in terms of fishing capacity (hence of effort) 
therefore seems to become the major framework for relative stability well be-
fore the TACs and quota system. 
One should finally bear in mind that it is possible to get round the reali-
ties of relative stability through reflagging. 
4.4.3.4 National enforcement 
This point has been dealt with under 'Political acceptance' to some de-
gree. 
Implementation of control measures should be possible thanks to tradi-
t ion, i.e. landing and selling at auction halls and producers organizations inter-
vening on the market. It should not be that difficult to make people respect 
some simple rules, for instance announcing arrivals and unloading time. 
4.4.3.5 Subsidiarity 
In theory, the quota system must be established within a framework 
which adheres to the principle of subsidiarity. However, the involvement of POs 
in its implementation remains very limited. 
Only a few stocks targeted by industrial fisheries (saithe) are really man-
aged by POs. 
Many questions remain to be answered in relation to subsidiarity, for 
instance: 
should quota be allocated to POs or to vessels? (vessels may find them-
selves confined to rigid fishing strategies); 
definit ion of the practical details of quota distribution among POs (to 
date, the two POs federations disagree on the basic terms of such distri-
bution); 
the practical details of quota management, for instance ways for ex-
changing quota between POs, what kind of sanctions should be imposed 
and by whom if any member brakes the rules of management. 
It is desirable that the allocation of quota be conducted with a sense of 
responsibility at the PO level. But technical and human resources of PO are 
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rather scarce. This hardly puts them in a position to carry out the practical work 
of quota management. 
4.4.3.6 Local communities 
Today the interests of local communities are threatened on two respects: 
relative stability is not respected. If controls are not strictly and equally 
enforced everywhere, the rights of a 'national' fishing community may 
not be guaranteed and retained; 
individualization of fishing rights in terms of inputs (PME) and outputs 
(ITQ) leads to transfers of rights between regional fishing communities 
and between countries (reflagging). 
4.4.3.7 Beyond 2002 
The take-over of some French fishing companities by foreign groups (ves-
sels staying under French flag, but wi th part of the crew or entire crew being 
foreigners) is a decisive step towards 'Beyond 2002', if this is considered as a 
free circulation of fishing rights in Europe. 
4.4.4 Conclusion: definition of the management problem 
As it is not really restrictive, the present system remains rather 'virtual' 
indeed. 
It is rather inconsistent because, in spite of underutilization of quota, 
stocks are declining (they are in better condition than in other areas, though). 
It is indeed inconsistent wi th the structural policy because the MAGP makes it 
compulsory to reduce fleets operating on stocks whose quota have not been 
fully exhausted. 
If the system were to be more restrictive, it would lead to serious techni-
cal problems at administrative, political and commercial levels. Because of the 
multi-species nature of the fisheries and the multi-strategies nature of the 
fleets, enormous defects may arise. 
The system is not satisfactory because, in the absence of any clear defini-
t ion of fishing rights allocation to local communities, it allows transfers to be 
made, which in turn challenges the relative stability to the detriment of these 
communities. 
Looking for new measures they should: 
be conducive to improved resource management at grassroots level in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity; 
ensure improved consistency with current structural policy; 
take into account the multi-species and muti-strategies nature of the 
fisheries; 
ensure lasting fishing rights to local communities (relative stability). 
These are well founded endeavours as regards area VII fisheries and 
French fleets in particular. 
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This is the subject matter of Part B which scrutinizes the different mult i-
annual and/or multi-species measures. 
Part B Evaluation of new management measures 
4.5 Multi-annual measures 
Four definitions of multi-annual measures are addressed successively: 
constant TAC for several years; 
multi-annual TACs with limited adjustments; 
l imited compensation from one year to the next (carrying over and/or 
borrowing); 
multi-annual biological objective. 
Detailed evaluation of these definitions is presented in appendix 4.1. 
Possible compensation from one year to the next is not necessarily linked 
to fixed multi-annual quota. Some measures are even contradictory. For in-
stance, in view of the variability of recruitment, a stable biomass objective re-
quires a yearly setting of TACs. 
4.5.1 Equal quantity for several years 
4.5.1.1 Economics 
Looking for improved planning of activity and trying to avoid hard bar-
gaining during the annual setting of quota are the main motives that favour 
MATACs. As regards area VII, these motives are not really relevant wi th French 
fleets at least. 
So far, fishing activity has not really been limited by the quota system. 
Furthermore, if a major quota is exhausted, it is possible to transfer the effort 
onto other métiers. 
For area VII fisheries, the MAGP (creation of PME and institution of a de-
commissioning scheme) is a limiting and structuring factor which today plays 
a more decisive role than quotas. 
At a time of fleet capacity reduction, setting guarantees for investors 
appears to be in contradiction with the structural policy. Moreover, in the ab-
sence of constraining quota, the objective of intra-annual planning to avoid 
the race for fish remains an abstraction. 
4.5.1.2 Biology 
Compared with the present system, MATACs increase the risks and the 
uncertainty as to what should be the optimal quota level because they do not 
allow upward or downward adjustments to account for the abundance or scar-
city of the resource. Indeed, it will not be possible to take into account certain 
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factors such as annual fluctuation of recruitment or variation of fishing mortal-
ity. 
In case of relative abundance of a target species, the risks of high-grading 
increase. In the case of growing scarcity, discarding of bycatch species occurs 
more frequently. In the case of abundant bycatch species, the risk of high-grad-
ing, and later of discarding, increases. The risks are higher when the number 
of exploited year classes is low, when the level of fishing mortality is high, 
when the spawning stock is small and when recruitment varies. 
In area VII, these various indicators are rather positive (see table 4.9) for 
benthic species (anglerfish, megrim, nephrops) but not so for gadoids (whiting, 
cod) because fishing mortality is high and exploited year classes are few. The 
indicators are not positive for hake either because of low spawning stocks. 
Setting multi-annual quota is therefore less risky here than in the North 
Sea, at least for benthic species. 
4.5.1.3 Policy/Institutions 
Equal quantitiy for several years means little change. Indeed, area VII 
quota have, until now, been 'precautionary' ones, aimed at maintaining fishing 
mortality at the previous years' mean level. 
TACs have remained relatively stable for anglerfish, nephrops, hake, pol-
lack, megrim and whit ing. Admittedly, adjustments have been made for 
anglerfish and nephrops; but they were based on a decision to reduce excessive 
catching capacity rather than on a diagnosis of stock deterioration. 
For some species, the small variation of annual quota may also be explained by 
the facts that exploitation applies to numerous year classes, that variability of 
recruitment is limited and that catchability is lower for certain benthic species 
which are not detectable and do not concentrate in shoals. 
The establishment of multi-annual quota would not therefore be some-
thing really new in area VII. 
Annual quota may paradoxically lead to risky transfers of fishing effort 
from stocks whose biological conditions are picking up to stocks whose condi-
tions are declining. 
If MATACs levels in area VII happen to be below fleet capacity, in addition 
to problems described in Part one, specific problems that are linked wi th the 
flexibility of fishing strategies and the diversity of métiers targeting the same 
resource may arise. 
When the stock situation improves, increasing availability leads to higher 
catchability, and earlier consumption of quotas. Because of flexible fishing 
strategies, the fleets involved would then transfer their effort onto target spe-
cies whose quota have not yet been fully utilized. That is to say, stocks whose 
conditions may have been declining. 
This paradoxical situation may threaten the credibility of the system. It 
can be remedied only by putting in place measures to limit transfers between 
métiers. This takes us back to multi-species measures and effort measures per 
métier which are analysed below. 
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4.5.2 Limited adjustments 
Limited adjustments allow upward or downward variations from a mean 
TAC level set for several years. 
Only economic considerations can lead to downward adjustments while 
upward adjustments may stem from economic or biological considerations. 
4.5.2.1 Economics 
When a drastic cut in the quota is deemed necessary to quickly reach a 
sound biological equilibrium but when such a decision may in the short-term 
badly disrupt the economy (drop of profitability, loss of markets), a plea for a 
more limited cut may be justified. The risk of surplus supply on the market may 
also justify a limited upward adjustment. 
As regards area VII fisheries, such economic considerations on the impact 
of excessive TAC variations are not really relevant, except for gadoids. 
4.5.2.2 Biology 
On this point, the wish to capitalize good recruitment may justify a lim-
ited upward adjustment. The wish to limit discarding or high grading for associ-
ated species in a multi-species fishery may also justify limited adjustment of the 
TAC. This system does not ease problems that arise from a multi-species popula-
t ion. 
4.5.2.3 Policy/Institutions 
At the political level, determining the percentage of adjustment may 
prove to be rather tricky as biologists' recommendations have to be confronted 
with social and economic considerations. 
Political pressure may be even stronger than in the past insofar as the 
social and economic foundations of quota definition are recognized. 
4.5.3 Limited compensation 
Limited compensation allows carrying over a portion of a quota from one 
year to the next or overshooting a quota by 'borrowing' f rom next year. 
The motives in such a scheme are purely economic: 
good prices at the end of the year; 
avoiding the risk that quota cannot be caught because of poor weather 
at the end of the year; 
making the best of isolated high availability of the resource, and being 
able to 'borrow' it from next year's quota; 
allowing the 'carrying-over' of behind schedule activity when adverse 
weather conditions prevent end of year fishing activity. 
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However, the possibility of carrying over the portion of quota that is left 
from one year to the next may be excluded on the grounds that under-
util izitation of quota globally improves the resource and that incompletely 
consumed quota can be traded at the individual level. 
4.5.3.1 Economics 
The possibility of limited compensation is clearly of economic interest for 
area VII fisheries. Some of the catches fetch very good prices at the end of the 
year. 
4.5.3.2 Biology 
As the level of borrowing is limited, so is its negative impact on biological 
factors. To correct this impact, one may slightly reduce the quota in the first 
year. 
4.5.3.3 Policy/Institutions 
The system of limited compensation entails improved awareness and 
sense of responsibility among operators who exceed quota. This may speed up 
the establishment of a system of individualized management of quotas, hence 
the involvement of POs in a system/logic of fishing rights allocation/distribu-
t ion. 
4.5.4 Multi-annual biological objectives 
Biological objectives may be defined in terms of: 
levels of spawning stocks; 
fishing mortality rates. 
Such objectives can be stable or progressive (improvement of a particular 
criterion). The setting of multi-annual biological objectives does not entail 
multi-annual quota. On the contrary, fluctuations of recruitment and variations 
of fishing mortality modify the TAC from one year to the next, hence annual 
quota for the same multi-annual biological objective. 
4.5.4.1 Economics 
As this system is reverting to annual quota per species, evaluation is simi-
lar to the present system. 
4.5.4.2 Biology 
For area VII, which has so far been managed mostly by precautionary 
TACs, defining biological objectives would constitute progress - subject to avail-
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ability of scientific data - because it would help to an improved determination 
of quota levels. 
For multi-species fisheries as those in area VII, defining identical objectives 
for associated target species or bycatch species inevitably leads to discrepancy 
between capture levels hoped for and levels ascertained by technological crite-
ria. Absolute respect for biological objectives then requires reduced quota lev-
els for the stocks which are in a relatively better situation. 
The risk of paradoxical transfers between various métiers and the risk of 
increased discarding, as explained above, are also greater. 
4.5.4.3 Policy/Institutions 
Insofar as stocks conditions in area VII are not excessively deteriorated, 
the trend should be to define and combine biological objectives which may 
differ among the various species while remaining technically coherent (accord-
ing to mean levels of bycatches). This type of compromise corresponds in fact 
to multi-species or effort measures. 
4.6 Multi-species measures 
Multi-species measures are prompted by the technical constraints of the 
fisheries, benthic fisheries in particular where catching various species simulta-
neously is the rule. Because of the importance of multi-species and benthic 
métiers in area VII, these motives are of great significance here. 
The multi-species and multi-métiers aspects of the fisheries and the multi-
strategies feature of vessels combine and multiply possible arrangements. This 
of course brings more complexity to multi-species measures than in the other 
two cases which are also studied in the report. 
The first multi-species measure being scrutinized, i.e. a total quantity cal-
culated by a common denominator (cod equivalent type), raises the problem 
of integrating into the calculation of this global quota species that are not 
subject to capture limits (cephalopods, ling ect). 
The second measure allows limited transfers between species. These lim-
ited transfers are insignificant except when they are made between species 
that come under the same métier. 
The third measure, i.e. bycatch arrangements, can be envisaged only in 
relation to specific métiers. Indeed, a bycatch species for a particular métier can 
be a target species for another one or an associated target species for a third 
one, etc. A particular vessel may, in the course of one year, pursue these differ-
ent métiers. 
As regards area VII fisheries, measure one and measure two (limited trans-
fers between species and bycatch 'limitation/arrangements' are therefore eval-
uated here at the same time. 
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4.6.1 Total quantity in one common denominator 
The total quantity and its utilization are recalculated on the basis of a set 
of coefficients, cod equivalent type. 
As regards multi-species fisheries of area VII, where resources are highly 
mixed and fleets highly flexible, the MSTACs system may alleviate some nega-
tive impacts in a system of restrictive quota per species, for instance: 
increased discarding for species with overexploited quota; 
shifting the effort of métiers hit by closure of fishing for their target spe-
cies to other métiers where quota are still available. 
4.6.1.1 Economics 
Flexibility of the fleet is maintained. Each vessel seeks optimal economic 
performance according to available opportunities within the limits set by the 
global quota. 
If this quota is allocated among vessels, a vessel's total activity will be 
limited by its catching capacity. The more competitive vessels wil l therefore 
have fewer days-at-sea than the others because they consume their quota more 
rapidly. This reduces competition between vessels and constitutes a significant 
sociological change for fleets that have so far been exerting their own effort 
level freely. 
If this quota limits the yearly fishing effort, market opportunities become, 
on the other hand, a decisive factor for effort planning over the year. If the 
total quantity is restrictive, the trend will be to privilege species with the high-
est price/costs ratio in the given season. Effort may be oriented towards species 
which are not subject to quota. Vessels may also turn first to species whose 
(low) quota may be exhausted first, thus worsening that races for fish further. 
4.6.1.2 Biology 
A MSTACs scheme means setting different exploitation rates among spe-
cies. It is, however, very difficult to simultaneously maintain the various levels 
that have been determined. Indeed, the spontaneous behaviour of the fleets 
concerned tends to show disregard for the combinations that were hoped for. 
This finally leads to a disruption of the recommended exploitation scheme. 
As regards bycatch species, the situation is not fundamentally different, 
except when a system of monospecies quota leads to discarding. Excessive ex-
ploitation of certain target species stocks remains a major threat. 
That threat can be alleviated by acting on specific coefficients to penalize 
excessive capture of a given species or to orientate the fishing effort on alter-
native species. In the case of species suffering from excessive captures of juve-
niles the system can be theoretically corrected by increasing the coefficient for 
small sizes. 
Such adjustments raise technical and political problems which are difficult 
to overcome. 
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The risk of high grading is not done away with either, especially if one 
penalizes small sizes. Besides, certain species with low market value may be 
systematically discarded if the quota is too restrictive in relation to fishing op-
portunities. 
In area VII, where the monospecies TACs regime is not too limiting, espe-
cially for French fleets, a restrictive global multi-species TACs regime wil l not 
generate a further decline of the resource. 
4.6.1.3 Policy/Institutions 
From an economic point of view, the multi-species total quota scheme is 
appealing in many respects, for instance continued flexibility, looking for opti-
mal value, limitation of discards, etc. 
If these advantages are not offset by disadvantages which may be too 
serious from a biological point of view, the scheme can be easily defended at 
the political level. Serious problems may, however, arise at technical and politi-
cal levels when defining total quotas. 
First, the existence of 'paper quota' (i.e. quota which are never consumed) 
in the area leads to a potential total quota which is well above actual availabil-
ity of resource and fleet capacity. In order to make this total quota restrictive, 
a negative coefficient would have to be assigned to its calculation or at least 
to the calculation of some specific quota. At first sight, it would seem very diffi-
cult to gain acceptance for this. 
If relative stability among species is fundamentally challenged, so will 
global relative stability, unless the impact of paper quota, whose significance 
varies from one country to another, is dealt with. 
The system of global multi-species quota presupposes that the various 
partners agree on coefficients (cod equivalents?). Value differentials, varying 
shares and significance of species among countries and stocks exploitation dif-
ferentials all mean lengthy negotiations. 
In terms of quota technicalities, this system raises, in theory, fewer prob-
lems of individualized management than the monospecies quota regime. Cal-
culation of quota and transfers between vessels is made globally, and no lon-
ger separately for each species. Within this framework, the possible role of POs 
is less demanding. For instance, they can easily reallocate the global quota 
which have not been utilized. 
Under such a scheme, fishing rights can be easily allocated per vessel, and 
possibly privatized (ITQs). This raises the risky question of transfers of rights 
between regions to the detriment of local communities that are dependent on 
fishing activities. 
4.6.2 Limited transfers between quota and bycatch arrangements 
In area VII, these two points are linked. They relate to a quota system per 
métier. 
The notion of limited transfers, where any particular species may, to some 
extent, replace each one of the rest, cannot be envisaged globally within a 
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fishery that numbers about ten target species. Limited substitution of that kind 
can only apply within a given métier (for instance, between megrim and 
anglerfish, or between cod and whiting). 
Likewise, as one species may be a bycatch in a particular métier and a 
target species in another one, bycatch arrangements become significant only 
within a given métier. 
A system of'quota per métier would have to be installed, each vessel be-
ing 'appointed to' a particular métier for every trip; and each vessel, or the POs, 
owning quota per métier. 
Within that regime, vessels operate under a métier's quota. They must 
therefore respect minimum catch percentages of target species. Utilization of 
quota corresponds to volumes of target species, with limited transfers between 
target species allowed. Bycatch arrangements are defined per métier. 
If it becomes necessary to reduce the effort on a particular species, the cut 
will affect the métiers which have it as a target species, not the métiers which 
have it as a bycatch. 
The following question is then raised: should the rate of bycatch arrange-
ments be the only way to limit capture of species which are mere bycatches? 
4.6.2.1 Economics 
Under such a system, if each vessel is tied to predetermined volumes of 
activity per métier, the flexibility of the fishing strategy is restricted. 
If the rights are owned by a group (PO), the group may allow vessels to 
transfer to another métier within the limits set by availability of quota. Should 
a quota reduction happen in a particular métier, negotiating within the PO a 
redistribution of the effort of vessels concerned among the other métiers' 
quota will prove difficult. 
Fishing strategies can no longer adapt to market opportunities or 
catchability of species. This will affect the economic performance of the fishery, 
in particular vessels used to deciding on the right strategy. 
Profitability differentials will be difficult to accept especially during the 
years of quota reduction for a particular métier, whilst flexibility might have 
ensured some degree of uniformity. 
If switching to other métiers remains free until quota are fully consumed, 
the risk of vessels rushing to the most profitable métier is still there. 
If the species not subject to quota (cephalopods, ling, John Dory) are not 
integrated in the definition of quota limits per métier, differentials between 
vessels will ensue. This will negatively affect the equity of the system. 
4.6.2.2 Biology 
The notion of limited transfers between quota rests on the wish to restrict 
the effort per target species while allowing some degree of adjustment to the 
natural composition of catches (anglerfish/megrim, cod/whiting). Likewise, 
bycatch arrangements rest on the acceptance of landing captures which are 
unavoidable. 
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As compared to the multi-species quota without permission to transfer, 
this system cares more about preventing biological threats of overexploitation 
while safeguarding consistency with the technical realities of each métier: tar-
get species/bycatch ratio. As compared to the monospecies quota, it also leads 
to a reduction of discard levels. 
4.6.2.3 Policy/Institutions 
The notion of limited transfers between quota and limitation of 
bycatches is fairly easy to envisage in the case of a 'dual' fishery (plaice-sole in 
the North Sea). It would be difficult to implement it in area VII fisheries. 
This kind of measure first raises the question of properly defining the 
métiers. The description of the French high sea fishery, with its great variety of 
practices, has helped to outline this difficult point. 
It then raises the question of attaching each vessel or each trip to a partic-
ular métier. And then comes the problem of acceptance by skippers who are 
used to freely deciding between various strategies. 
The definition of MSTACs per métier challenges the present relative sta-
bility without offering a basis for a new definition of relative stability. In that 
respect, it raises enormous problems of implementation in area VII. 
Definition of quota per métier entails a lot of research work i.e. analysis 
and measures of fleets'activity in the various countries involved. 
Transparency in the establishment of such scheme is extremely difficult 
to obtain, at international level in particular. 
Implementation at national level raises the same problems as the setting 
of restrictive monospecies quota when it comes to control of landings. 
The implementation of the notion of subsidiarity becomes rather delicate 
when POs have to manage numerous métiers, for instance handling of 
transfers, distribution of effort reductions, etc. 
Handling exchanges of quota becomes more complicated. 
Finally there is the problem of defining the areas coming under quota per 
métiers, as the areas defined for monospecies quota already differ from 
one species to another. 
4.7 Effort measures 
4.7.1 Definition 
Effort measures limit inputs. TACs limit outputs. As a policy of input re-
striction is already being implemented through MAGPs, effort measures appear 
to be complementary. Their aim is to: 
ensure that no compensation for fleet reduction takes place through an 
increase of each vessel's mean effort; 
encourage the effort reduction policy while alleviating social conse-
quences in terms of employment (in favour of effort cuts for each vessel 
instead of fleet reduction). 
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A regime of effort quota may be viewed as more realistic in area VII than 
a TACs system for two reasons: 
difficulties in implementing control of captures in the area; 
the system of quota per species has proved unconvincing in the conserva-
t ion of stocks. Its implementation has not prevented an imbalance be-
tween catching capacity and available resources. 
In fact, MAGP measures and effort ceilings presently appear to be the 
limiting factors for the exploitation of stocks in area VII, well before the quota 
system. 
In addition to the above considerations, an effort-based regime may con-
stitute an interesting instrument for area VII. 
It allows continued flexibility of fishing strategies and a continued variety 
of multi-species métiers. 
It connects to technical measures aimed at achieving a more rational ex-
ploitation of the resource (reducing capture of juveniles, which is a major 
aspect of area VII). 
It allows a simple appropriation of fishing rights by enterprises (or POs) 
without a complicated system of multiple quota per species or multi-spe-
cies quota per métier. 
In the first stage, the case evaluates a system of effort quota allocation 
per individual vessel. The multi-annual feature is of secondary importance com-
pared with the choice of management through effort measures. 
In the second stage, the case evaluates a more complicated system of 
effort quota per métier, with adjustments according to stock conditions of tar-
get species, as well as the possible adoption of more selective practices by ves-
sels. 
4.7.2 Effort quota per vessel 
4.7.2.1 Economics 
Effort quota ensure lasting fleet flexibility, within the authorized fishing 
time limits. In that sense, it is a measure which is more compatible with the real 
nature of area VII fisheries. 
Optimization of vessels management is achieved according to potential 
captures prices/costs ratio. 
As compared to a regime of global multi-species quota, allocation will be 
conducted a little more on the basis of expected captures and a little less on 
the basis of commercial value. 
Each vessel will be able to plan activity throughout the year. The choice 
of possible periods of non activity can be expected as a commercially rational 
decision. 
In a system of effort quota, race for fish is, by definition, limited. An ef-
fort quota implies that a vessel will pursue a high rate of utilization of its allo-
cation of fishing time. This can deteriorate working conditions and safety on 
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board. In fact, high sea trawlers of area VII are already working virtually non-
stop. 
On the other hand, the setting of restrictive effort quota would lead to 
an increase in the number of days off, and consequently an improvement in 
living conditions. 
4.7.2.2 Biology 
From a biological point of view, effort quota present the same risks as 
multi-species quota i.e. concentration of effort on high value species, whose 
stocks are already fragile. 
In area VII where people have so far been quite free to switch fishing 
strategies, where no stock is being unsustainably exploited, risks are relatively 
limited. This is particularly true of benthic species (anglerfish, megrim, neph-
rops). It is less so for gadoids (whiting, cod) and hake. If a particular stock is 
thought to be fairly endangered, an effort reduction on the species may be 
considered: 
either by penalising the effort pursuing that species through days-at-sea 
restrictions; 
or by encouraging more selective practices in case the problem is linked 
with excessive capture of juveniles. 
That system offers another advantage: limiting the waste of resource 
arising from discarding. In fact, discarding occurring because of overshooting 
of quota is, by definition, abolished and so is high-grading. 
4.7.2.3 Policy/Institutions 
Compared with the restrictive systems of quota per species, a restrictive 
system of effort quota offers advantages in economic terms (ensuring flexibility 
of fleets, optimization of yearly effort) which make it more acceptable for a 
fishery of area VII type. 
In biological terms, it does not appear as a setback compared with the 
present situation where quota per species are not particularly restrictive and 
no particular stock is considered to be really threatened. The system also pre-
vents discarding and can encourage more selective practices. 
It is possible to limit its disadvantages (excessive effort on certain species) 
through penalization of efforts targeting species whose conditions are fragile 
(see point 3.3). 
This system may therefore prove to be well suited for area VII particularly 
as it is easier to carry out controls on efforts than controls on landings. How-
ever, implementation of that scheme presupposes that three types of problems 
have been solved. 
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1. Distinction must be made between fleet overcapacity and implementa-
t ion of resource management through effort quota. 
Within a particular fishery, effort quota cuts cannot be accepted by the 
operators of a particular country if rival fleets would not face comparable re-
strictions. Therefore, the countries concerned should not have the right to 
choose between fleet reduction and effort reduction for the MAGPs. They must 
abide by the same policy, at the same tempo. The effort quota must be a regu-
latory and steering instrument for the fishery. By itself, it can only correct a 
marginal percentage of overcapacity (10-20%). The rest must be taken care of 
within the framework of fleets reduction. 
Acceptance of potential overcapacity curbed by effort quota is not absurd 
in itself. This occurs in other sections of the economy too. Some overcapacity 
may be acceptable as it may limit job losses in regions with few alternative 
activities. 
2. Relative stability in the area must be defined and managed according to 
the principle of subsidiarity. 
Relative stability will have to be redefined on the basis of fishing areas 
which will not be the same as the present ICES areas under quota per species 
(different areas for different species). The new relative stability will therefore 
will be based on fishing effort per area, possibly segmented into vessel sizes (or 
métiers). 
In order to maintain relative stability through the structural and segmen-
tal evolution of fleets, captures per segment will have to be monitored. This 
will make it possible to define equivalents between segments (or métiers). The 
evolution of fishing effort quota in a given area can be managed according to 
the principle of subsidiarity through an area conference, gathering the various 
partners from all the countries involved (sector representatives, administration, 
scientists). The conference may propose the effort limitations (and possibly 
encouragement for more selective practices) but the European Commission 
remains the decision-making body. 
3. A temporary aid scheme should be created while the effort based system 
is being established. 
Acceptance of a new kind of regime by the operators is always doubtful 
as they are not convinced that lowering the effort would conserve the re-
source. Above all, they do not think they could withstand any reduction of 
effort. One may then envisage a temporary aid scheme (one or two years) to 
accompany that transformation, as provided for by the CFP regulations. 
The system of effort quota constitutes the easiest way to distribute fishing 
rights. A system based on numerous mono-species TACs is in area VII less suit-
able for this purpose. A system of licences that could be traded only globally 
may be considered. 
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Here again there are risks of transfers between regions occurring to the 
detriment of the local communities. 
4.7.3 Limited adjustment of effort per métier 
This relates to a system of effort quota with segmentation per métier. 
According to the target species and selectivity levels of fishing gears and tech-
niques, effort quota per métier will vary. It is a matter of fine-tuning the system 
of effort quota to take into account differentials in the conditions of target 
stocks. 
4.7.3.1 Economics 
Flexibility will be maintained if vessels remain free to switch métiers as 
long as effort quota per métier are globally respected. 
One encounters the same problems as in multi-species quota per métier, 
for instance vessels stuck in one particular métier and handling tricky transfers 
of effort from one métier to another. 
4.7.3.2 Biology 
Adjustment of effort to the situation of targeted stocks constitutes a 
progress compared with a basic system of effort quota management. The prob-
lems arising from the bycatch species stocks remain unsolved. 
4.7.3.3 Policy/Institutions 
Here again, one finds the problems of definition of métiers and listing of 
vessels or trips under a specific métier, as pointed out above. The system of con-
trol acquires greater complexity as the catch composition of each vessel has to 
be checked. 
Definition and monitoring of activity for the various métiers at interna-
tional level may lead to a recognition of the 'historical rights' of certain fleets, 
and therefore to a preservation of the relative stability on some particular 
stocks (nephrops in south Ireland, longline for hake). 
The system of resource management through effort quota per métier can 
be established at the end of a period where a system of individual manage-
ment of effort and a system of TACs per country will be simultaneously en-
forced. 
4.8 Conclusions 
Area VII (except Vila and Vlld) is characterised by diverse and mixed re-
sources, a variety of fleets and flexibility of their fishing strategies. The activity 
is largely due to French vessels; and most of them are registered in southern 
Brittany's ports. 
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The French fleet is structurally composed of different categories of vessels 
(size: 16 to 35 m). Most units belong to the 'artisans' category (owner on 
board). But quite a number are listed as 'semi-industriels' (owned by fishing 
companies). 
These fleets are engaged in a number of métiers. The métiers are gener-
ally multi-species in nature. Furthermore, each vessel shows a degree of flexibil-
ity in her fishing strategy. A choice can be made between various métiers 
throughout the year or in the medium-term. Such flexibility is a fundamental 
factor for the bio-economic stability of the fisheries. 
The main stocks of the area are currently subjected to maximum levels of 
exploitation. Some are overfished. However, decline is thought to be less than 
in other large zones (North Sea, west Scotland, Bay of Biscay). 
So far, the resource management regime through TACs and quota has 
not generated major constraints for the French fleets, though downward ad-
justments of TACs for important species (nephrops, anglerfish) may lead to 
premature closure of fisheries whilst stocks are may be picking up. 
The setting of MATACs gives rise to three types of criticism: 
possible inconsistency in terms of natural variation (or incorrect estimates) 
of the resource. However, this is generally less important wi th benthic 
species than with gadoids; 
unsolved multi-species problems, for instance how to handle exhausted 
bycatch quota or associated catch quota (e.g. megrim/anglerfish) whilst 
the target species quota has not run out; 
because of the flexibility of fishing strategies, possible paradoxical trans-
fers of fishing effort from stocks which are picking up (consumed quota) 
to declining stocks (quota not fully consumed) may occur. 
Multi-annual measures are no solution to the problems of the area, ex-
cept on one point - in the case of limited compensation for overshot quota. 
Fishermen may go on working at the end of the year to make the best of tradi-
tionally good prices. 
A MSTACs system based on interspecies equivalence proves to have little 
credibility on biological grounds. It also raises problems at technical and mana-
gerial levels. 
In order to take into account the technical constraints of simultaneous 
capture of mixed species with exploitation rate differentials, setting MSTACs 
with transfer arrangements between species may appear to be an interesting 
proposal. However, this means that each particular vessel (or each trip of the 
said vessel) must be attached to a specific métier according to catch composi-
t ion. 
Defining the notion of métier is a difficult task, because exploited areas 
are heterogeneous in nature, because changing factors affect the relative avail-
ability of species and because fishing strategies are flexible. 
Management of a particular stock involves the setting of coherent mea-
sures for the métiers pursuing it for target species, on one hand, and those 
pursuing it for bycatches, on the other. 
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At the national level, defining the métiers and setting up controls is no 
easy task. At the European level, it is much more complicated, especially when 
relative stability is to be maintained. Defining fishing rights on the basis of 
multi-species measures is just as difficult. 
In general terms, attaching vessels to a particular métier hampers fleet 
flexibility, which negatively affects economic performance. 
Resource management through effort quota seems to suit the realities of 
the area better. It ensures fleet flexibility while making it possible to penalize 
or encourage strategies according to which stocks are pursued or which tech-
niques are used (selectivity of gears). 
This regime opens new possibilities for a gradual fine-tuning of resource 
management through effort measures, which are being adopted today. At the 
same time, it ensures consistency with the structural policy (MAGP). 
This orientation requires a new definition of relative stability. It allows 
jo int management of the area with all parties involved (sector, research, 
adminimstration) on the basis of subsidiarity. Progressive fine-tuning of man-
agement (through penalties or bonuses) entails concomitant upgrading of in-
formation on the fishery and of means of control. 
Defining fishing rights, individual or collective, at the group level such as 
POs, is relatively easy even when one includes the preservation of certain 'his-
torical rights' on stocks that have been traditionally pursued. 
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